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Abstract
Business as Usual? Instituting Markets for Carbon Credits
John Foreman Broderick
Submitted for Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), 4th January 2011, University of Manchester
Climate change mitigation necessitates substantial alterations to patterns of world-
wide economic activity, be that reduction in demand, switches to new technology
or ’end-of-pipe’ abatement of greenhouse gases. There are profound political, eco-
nomic and ethical questions surrounding the governance of the means, rate and lo-
cation of change. Within advanced capitalist economies and internationally through
the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emis-
sions trading systems have been introduced as part of the broader neoliberal at-
tempts to ’correct market failure’ through the definition of new property rights.
This thesis investigates the development, constitution and consequences of insti-
tutions for the production, exchange and consumption of credits for emissions re-
ductions. Such credits are financial instruments awarded to organisations for puta-
tive reductions in emissions from ’business as usual’. In consumption, credits are
equated with a quantity of emissions released elsewhere. The ’Instituted Economic
Process’ framework (Randles and Harvey, 2002) is used to distinguish the various
classes of agent involved in these exchanges and identify the economic and non-
economic relationships that constitute these institutions. Inspired by the economic
anthropology of Karl Polanyi, this approach asks how economic activity is organised
and stabilised within society without presuming that there are universal economic
laws of ’the market’, that there are essential properties of commodities and agents,
or that all economic transfers are conducted within markets.
I argue that crediting is a socially contingent process of commodification of atmo-
spheric pollution which is both ontologically and normatively problematic. Extant
institutions are shown to be precarious by appealing to neutral techno-scientific jus-
tifications but remaining reliant on subjective judgement. However, they are suffi-
ciently consistent and credible that they persist and expand. These findings are of
interest to the academic communities of political economy and environmental and
economic geography, climate change policy makers and the environmental move-
ment more broadly.
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Part I.
Introduction
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1. Introduction
Carbon trading is the exchange of property rights over and financial instruments
based on greenhouse gas emissions and seeks to address climate change by altering
patterns of economic activity. The problem of climate change can be framed as one
of an overflowing pollution dump, access to which is currently poorly governed by
social norms or formal regulation (Lohmann, 2005). Broadly, within carbon trading
institutions, economic actors exchange financial instruments related to greenhouse
gas output or reductions in emissions from ’business as usual’. As such, polluting
activities are to some extent governed by price and competition rather than explicitly
political processes or norms of restraint, precaution, care or equity. Whilst being
widely promoted as an economically efficient means of governing climate change
mitigation, carbon markets have received criticism for being unjust and ineffective.
This thesis sets out to examine carbon credit institutions, clarify their institutional
structure and evaluate their effectiveness in climate change mitigation.
Carbon trading has risen to prominence in international climate policy through the
negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). The flexibility mechanisms in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol are intended to re-
duce the cost of compliance with the emissions limits for industrialised economies
and foster sustainable development in developing nations. The first examples of car-
bon transactions were voluntary undertakings in the early 1990s, between electricity
generators, in the USA and the Netherlands, and forestry NGOs operating in South
and Central America. Formal regional emissions trading schemes are currently in
operation or under development in Europe, the USA, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. In advance of state legislation, voluntary purchases of emissions reduc-
tions credits are increasingly popular in wealthy industrialised economies. Internet
retailers now enable individuals to calculate personal emissions and consume an
equivalent amount of carbon credits in compensation. This exposes new audiences
to the problem of climate change, key sources of emissions and to a carbon price of
some sort, but arguably entrenches high intensity practices of travel and consump-
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tion. Carbon neutrality has become a vogue consumer status conferred to products,
business and leisure activities by a variety of private companies operating to au-
tonomous standards. Although the co-benefits of investment to poor communities
are often promoted, ultimately carbon offsetting is market exchange, not unbridled
philanthropy.
Carbon trading is one example of contemporary efforts to address concerns about
the direct biophysical impacts of economic activity and consequential social impacts
that can be conceptualised as environmental governance. There are a broad range
of social, economic and political structures through which societies negotiate their
relationships with and influence on the biophysical world that might be termed en-
vironmental governance. Whilst government connotes the authority of the state,
and governing refers to the purposeful act of managing, steering or directing soci-
ety, governance is typically understood as the outcomes of diverse actors attempts at
governing and the norms and institutions that emerge (Adger & Jordan, 2009, p10).
Empirically, environmental governance captures the role of non-state actors, includ-
ing private corporations, NGOs of various sorts, academia and industrial associa-
tions, in the development of voluntary and compliance regimes oriented towards
ostensibly environmental objectives. The degree of formality, spatial coverage and
temporal durability of relationships may vary substantially as individuals and or-
ganisations coalesce around particular norms or codes. Multi-level governance is
used to connote the variety of aligned and competing regimes that a given actor may
interact with or may have a bearing on a particular issue area. These definitions are
somewhat open, in that they beg the question of how to recognise governance or
analyse it. In what way can fashions or trends for particular ’ecological products’
such as hybrid cars or organic strawberries be understood in the same framework
as the Montreal Protocol?
It is clear that the mainstream economic approaches that treat greenhouse gas emis-
sions as market externalities and propose emissions trading regimes as uniform
and unproblematic corrective instruments have substantial theoretical and empir-
ical weaknesses. The deployment of these intellectual arguments and their role in
shaping recent economic, social and environmental governance is frequently termed
neoliberalism, although outcomes of such developments are diverse and contingent
as recent efforts at meta-analysis have demonstrated Castree (2008a,b). It is disputed
whether the more useful conceptualisation of neoliberalism is of an historical epoch
or that neoliberalisation might be used as a term to capture some particular aspects
32
of recent change. Castree (2008b) cites privatisation of aspects of society and the
environment, marketisation of the same, deregulation and re-regulation in support
of the same, the use of market proxies to govern the public sector and the state-led
development of civil society as a substitute for state provision of services. To a large
extent emissions trading regimes for climate governance represent another instance
of these processes (Bailey, 2007; Toke, 2008).
This thesis takes a broadly political economic approach to examining environmen-
tal governance through carbon trading. That it also considers the biophysical and
spatial effects of emissions trading, it might also be regarded as geographic political
economy or economic geography. However, greater attention is paid to the constitu-
tion and operation of the exchange institutions. As Bailey & Maresh highlight ”The
least examined, but pivotal aspect of neoliberal governance is the market; its actors,
their motivations, their response to price signals, and how these influence the spatial
dynamics and integrity of environmental regimes.” (Bailey & Maresh, 2009, p447).
Indeed, geographic phenomena, such as the concentration of emissions reduction
projects in India and China are shown to be a secondary outcome of the institutional
structure and pre-existing economic patterns. The detail of economic institutions is
important and this thesis will examine the identities and motivations of agents con-
cerned, the coordinating mechanisms such as prices and standards, the role of the
state, and the accountability of agents within carbon credit systems.
Chapter 2 begins by discussing the welfare and environmental economics that the-
orize climate change as a market failure involving environmental externalities; eco-
nomic activities can emit greenhouse gases freely without facing the costs of climate
change impacts (Stern, 2006). There follows a case for regulation to correct this dis-
tortion by assigning liability to polluters and imposing taxes or restraints to realise
the socially optimal level of pollution. This approach assumes that the central regu-
lator knows in advance what the most productive use of a resource is, in this case the
access to the pollution dump. Emissions trading removes this requirement and gives
recognition to reciprocal costs not only borne by the entity suffering harm, but also
the polluter who must invest in new infrastructure or curtail their activities. In this
body of theory, unrestricted, private bargaining in well defined property rights will
lead to the most economically efficient net outcome, regardless of the initial distribu-
tion of those rights and with no central intervention except for enforcement (Coase,
1960). However, if transaction costs in asserting rights and negotiating settlements
are substantial then this may not be the case. Theoretically, carbon trading draws
33
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on these insights to create institutions which enable flexibility in timing and loca-
tion of emission abatement and reduce transaction costs between parties. However,
there are substantial theoretical and normative failings with this model of market
exchange.
A great deal of effort is required to implement a market, defining, formatting and
stabilizing the norms, regulations, actors and commodities that will constitute it.
This effort is particularly conspicuous in the contemporary neoliberal expansion of
market mechanisms to negotiate the relationships between nature and society, from
the management of fisheries to the provision of fresh water. Chapter 3 presents the
neo-Polanyi Instituted Economic Process approach to analysing market exchange.
Whilst Polanyi’s work primarily considered macro social tendencies of market in-
stitutions IEP has been empirically and theoretically oriented to meso scale analysis
of firms, organisations and institutions within particular industries or economic sec-
tors. The actor-network approach to market construction has received substantial
attention in theoretical considerations of carbon markets (Lohmann, 2009) therefore
chapter 4 presents an overview. Chapter 5 concludes the theoretical part of the thesis
by presenting a critique and evaluation of these competing theoretical frameworks.
Such diverse literatures cannot be expected to share common scales of analysis nor
compatible theories of knowledge and reality. Chapter 5 will therefore also establish
my own analysis as meso scale and critical realist. This thesis examines organisations
and the institutions they reproduce rather than formally deducing or attempting to
empirically approach general macro social phenomena. The critical realist ontology
is then distinguished from positivist and constructivist perspectives that have been
influential in this topic area and the chapter concludes by setting out the method-
ological approach for empirical work.
Carbon trading institutions may exist at a variety of scales and regulate diverse enti-
ties, from nation states, corporations, power stations, industrial plants and hospitals
down to individual consumers. How then is it possible to trade in the absence of
greenhouse gas pollution and what are the consequences of doing so? The empiri-
cal work to is organised as follows. Three successive chapters 6, 7 and 8 consider
the legally regulated emissions exchanges that are part of the UNFCCC interna-
tional climate regime. Although the focus is on crediting institutions, compliance
credit systems do not operate in isolation but are a component of broader market
based international climate governance regimes. The demand for credits originates
in allowance based systems so their principles will be outlined briefly. The Clean
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Development Mechanism has been the most economically important of UNFCCC’s
trading systems with a global scale that can potentially involve all Parties to the Ky-
oto Protocol. As of 2009, there are over 4000 projects in the CDM pipeline and it
is anticipated they will generate 1.3 billion credits by 2012. Chapter 6 will outline
its origin and structure followed by chapters 7 and 8 which will evaluate the ways
the CDM institutes the calculation, definition and quality assurance of trading units,
the framing of economic activity and agents and the organisation of market and
non-market aspects of economic exchange1. Strong claims of equivalence are made
between allowances, credits and physical GHG emissions so these issues play an im-
portant role in determining the efficacy of the institutions. Subsequently chapter 9
will consider the ways similar institutions have arisen for voluntary consumption of
privately regulated emissions units, introducing empirical data gathered from inter-
views with voluntary market participants buying for and selling to UK corporates.
The empirical section is concluded by a discussion chapter, drawing together major
themes and considering them in relation to the various theoretical positions out-
lined in Part II. Finally, the thesis concludes with an overview of its contribution to
knowledge, personal reflections on the process and points for further research.
1 Figure 8.2 on page 200 is a diagrammatic representation of the exchange relationships that constitute
the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism. It is presented sequentially as the culmination of
the research in the previous three chapters, however, some readers may find it useful to refer to in
advance, as aspects are described.
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Theoretical Perspectives on
Market Based Instruments
for Environmental Goods
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2. Environmental Economics:
Correcting Market Failures
“Climate change is a result of the greatest market failure the world has
seen.” Stern, cited in Benjamin (2007)
The Stern Review of the economics of climate change (Stern, 2006) was a landmark
in UK climate policy and mainstream discourses of climate change mitigation, esti-
mating the costs of inaction and setting these against the investments necessary to
create a climatically benign economy. It emphasizes a central theme in environmen-
tal economics: market failure due to externalities.
In his discussion of institutions in a dynamic economy Giovanni Dosi neatly outlines
the juxtaposition of mainstream neoclassical economic theory and the ’real world’ of
economic organisation:
...the contemporary economic discipline essentially consists of a process
of reduction of institutional and policy issues to exceptions, anomalies
and particular cases of a general framework centred around the equilib-
rium conditions of the economic system postulated by the theory... In a
very peculiar overlapping of positive and normative judgements, these
”imperfections” of the real world also delimit the domain of institutional
intervention, which - it is claimed - should make the world more similar
to the theory (Dosi, 2000, p593).
This mode of analysis is well acknowledged within mainstream economic theory
(for example see Dasgupta & Heal, 1979, p479) and is central to the environmen-
tal economic approach to environmental governance where market failure due to
externalities justifies and structures market based instruments (MBIs) for pollution
abatement. Bromley goes so far as to call market failure “the defining metaphor
in environmental economics” (2007). The argument runs as follows. Liberal propo-
nents argue that price making markets are efficient at allocating resources, maximize
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use of information in society, promote innovation, and provide political neutrality
on the content of the good life. However, market economies cause environmental
damage because there are no prices for environmental goods or the harm caused
by pollutants. The damage persists because it is outside of the calculus of market
exchange and does not feature on anyone’s ’bottom line’.
Transforming polluting practices requires changes in consumption, production and
investment from governments, firms, individuals and broadly, environmental economics
argues that regulative actions should be weighed and coordinated to the greater
extent by introducing corrective prices. Appropriate prices should be determined
theoretically in cost benefit calculations, via contingent valuation, replacement cost
estimation and hedonic pricing, or through new property rights directly incorpo-
rating GHG emissions into the market economy. Theoretical prices are intended to
stand in for the utility or welfare associated with the environmental goods or ills,
whilst prices arising from the exchange of property rights represent the ’real’ de-
mand for environmental protection. In both cases market activity is supposed to
deliver optimal levels of pollution or conversely mitigation.
This section will present the vernacular economic framework that prevails in policy,
business and academic discussion of carbon markets. It is a positivist and predomi-
nantly neo-classical conceptualization of markets, the economy and market failures.
This section will not provide comment or critique at this stage but sets out the intel-
lectual background to Market Based Instruments (MBIs) for environmental manage-
ment and the framework that is ’taken for granted’ in policy making and the carbon
credit industry.
2.1. Mainstream neoclassical and welfare economics
framework
New Environmental Policy Instruments are a feature of environmental regulation
in advanced capitalist economies and to a large extent draw upon the conceptual
framework and underlying assumptions of mainstream, neo-classical economics.
This is not a novel research programme, the foundations having been laid in the wel-
fare economics of Marshall, Pigou, Pareto, Hicks and Kaldor from the late 19th cen-
tury and then formally codified into environmental economics in the 1960s and 1970s
through the work of Coase, Kneese, Arrow, Dasgupta, Baumol and Oates amongst
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others (Dasgupta, 1990).
The analysis follows the formal, logic centred conception of economics as the “sci-
ence that studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 1935, p16). It allows, for example, for the
analysis crime, marriage and religion within the same framework as industrial pro-
ductivity and resource distribution (Becker, 1976). This definition depicts economics
as a positive, universal social science of choice and stands in contrast to substantive
conceptions of the economy as the social activity of subsistence and material want
satisfaction (Polanyi, 1957, p253). The ontological and methodological implications
of this distinction will be discussed in Chapter 3. There are several concepts of rel-
evance to the discussion of MBIs that will be laid out first; competition, rational
action of self interested agents, equilibrium, atomism, exogenous variables, welfare,
scarcity and efficiency. Arguments around market failure and the notion of external-
ities can be discussed from this basis and then related to property rights and new
institutional economics approaches to environmental problems.
2.1.1. Competition between atomized, self interested agents leading to
equilibrium
Neoclassical economics is methodologically individualist in that the macro scale pat-
terns of behaviour observed in society are explained upwards from the level of indi-
vidual agents. A series of assumptions and conditions set on agents results in certain
conclusions being deduced about market outcomes.
The basic premise of microeconomic analysis is that exchange of goods and services
occurs voluntarily between self interested agents to the benefit of both parties. Prices
are set by interactions between the crowd of producers seeking transactions with a
crowd of would-be consumers. Agents may be individuals, firms or organisations if
the latter are considered internally consistent and autonomous1. They are taken to
be rational, i.e. consistent in their preferences, and maximize their utility or profits
by selling at the highest price or buying at the lowest.
It is usually assumed that the crowd of sellers will supply a greater quantity of goods
as the price offered rises; there is in effect ’an upward sloping supply curve’. Con-
versely, the crowd of buyers will demand a lower quantity of goods as the price
1 Loasby (1976) points out that there is no need for the firm in the general equilibrium model.
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rises, “a downward sloping demand curve”. Under these assumptions, idealized
markets tend towards equilibrium at a price where the quantity of a particular good
supplied is matched by the quantity demanded at that price. Market clearing, refers
to this equilibrium state or the process of reaching it, with any surplus, shortage, or
variation in demand corrected for by a change in the market price or vice versa the
quantity supplied.
Competition occurs within each class of agents to find a counterparty in the other
class of agents. With sufficiently large numbers of buyers and sellers, each individ-
ual agent’s actions has no appreciable influence on price; every buyer and seller is a
price taker. Freely able to choose between identical transactions of a homogeneous
product, each agent faces a notional supply or demand curve of the opposing class
of agents in aggregate. The market clears at a unique equilibrium price and quantity
where supply and demand intersect. Perfect competition also assumes complete in-
formation, that each agent knows the nature of the products for sale and the prices
charged or paid across the whole market. Further, the output at which the long run
average total cost for an individual supplier reaches a minimum is small relative to
the industry’s total output so no individual supply curves alter market price. Finally,
each agent faces negligible costs in entering or exiting the market. The major impli-
cation of a perfectly competitive market is that no one individual has market power.
It can then be deduced that suppliers seeking to maximize profit will adjust output
quantities so that the short run marginal cost of production equates to the market
price. In the long run, profits within an industry will incentivise new entrants, and
losses drive out incumbents. An equilibrium price is reached where producers gain
no profit greater than the opportunity cost of capital deployed in the production
process. This points towards productive efficiency which will be discussed later.
There are of course other neoclassical accounts of market structure where the above
conditions are not held. Monopoly, oligopoly or monopsony may exist due to
economies of scale, fixed costs, differentiated products, or specific licensing restric-
tions or other regulations. Although market power is often taken to create dead
weight losses to society’s aggregate welfare, Schumpeter (1954) argued that the sur-
plus profits that reside with monopoly producers provide both resources for incum-
bents to engage in research and development and also incentives for external agents
to circumvent barriers to entry in such markets. However, there is no need to dwell
on the discussions of these particular deviations from idealized conditions as they
are not central to discussions of MBIs.
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Further qualifications to this model are that the agents and goods are atomized, act-
ing and interacting ahistorically and only through price signals. Markets are imper-
sonal and inclusive so that any given participant may engage in exchange on the
same terms as any other. Interests are pre-given and agents are free from social re-
sponsibility or moral constraint.. There should also be perfect information, that is
to say agents come to know prices and qualities of commodities without costs. In a
sense, these conditions make economic action deterministic; a household maximizes
its income, a firm its profits, and there should never be disagreements about what
a given agent should do (Stiglitz, 1981). The relevant aspects of both qualifications
will be elaborated more fully later.
It is not only individual agents that are proposed as atomized units of analysis in
neoclassical economics. Land, labour and capital, the factors of production taken
as inputs to productive activity, are treated as being able to be individuated and
isolated from context, history and connections between each other (Norgaard, 1985;
Lipsey & Chrystal, 1999, p118). In this stylized account of mainstream theory, prop-
erty rights pertaining to these assets are taken as well defined, verifiable, transferable
and enforced without cost i.e. legal institutions can provide stable and unambigu-
ous ownership for market participants to engage in free exchange. Theories which
address transaction costs, those non-production costs that must be met to participate
in economic activity, are again discussed later.
2.1.2. Exogenous variables
Tastes, technology and preferences are defined outside of the general equilibrium
formulation of neoclassical economics. They are pre-given, exogenous variables
which do not change according to the pattern of the model economy. Not only are
the numerical parameters of the exogenous variables defined outside of the model,
but also their structural relationships to one another. This level of technological and
motivational determinism is an acknowledged but nonetheless profound simplifica-
tion (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979, p477–479).
2.1.3. Scarcity
In formal analysis scarcity is taken as foundational after Robbins (1935, p16) defini-
tion. It is assumed that individual agents have unlimited wants but restricted means
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of meeting them at any given point in time. This leads to the general problem of de-
ciding to which of a multiplicity of uses a given set of resources is put. As Stiglitz
identifies, this is the single information problem to be solved by neoclassical general
equilibrium analysis; all other concerns about incentives, prices and quality of com-
modities, risk and contingency, likely returns on investment are assumed away in
perfect information (Stiglitz, 2001).
2.1.4. Welfare
Welfare, utility and human well being, are interchangeable within modern neo-
classical economics and defined technically and specifically as preference satisfac-
tion. A good has worth only in that it satisfies a preference, the intensity of which is
measured as individuals’ willingness to pay within a market setting. Early welfare
economics, that of Marshall and Pigou for example, implicitly used a more objec-
tive definition of welfare and appraised economic systems in terms of their outputs
in meeting needs for housing, food and the like, with Jevons introducing subjec-
tive utility and centering analysis on personal desires (Bromley, 1990). For example,
redistributive taxation to provide a basic standard of living for the poor was ana-
lytically favoured by the former but not necessarily the later. The neoclassical con-
ception of welfare as represented by exchange values is a very limited, formal, and
subjectivist interpretation but one which is used to defend consequential normative
positions. If price is held as an indirect measure of subjective welfare then efficient
market outcomes should be pursued to maximize market value as an indicator of
hedonic preference satisfaction and hence the total welfare of society. The hedonic
account of welfare is also central to Adam Smith’s ’invisible hand’ argument in that
it is “the gratification of...vain and insatiable desires” (Smith cited in Bishop, 1995,
p178) that acts as the motive force for the material and cultural improvement of so-
ciety.
Although subjective welfare is promoted as ethically neutral, it does not presup-
pose what particular bundle of goods is best for each individual, it is hard to sustain
when considering society as a whole. In order to make interpersonal comparisons
of welfare, for example when assessing public policy, individual consumption must
be aggregated and translated via a social welfare function. This describes how dif-
ferent allocations are valued in society and introduces ethical positions with respect
to distribution into the analysis. This is especially prominent when long time peri-
ods and heterogeneous populations are considered (Stern, 2006, p30). However, that
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welfare, what it is to live well, and hedonistic preference satisfaction are collapsed
into one another remains and is distinctive to formal economics. This position goes
a long way to justifying market institutions via arguments based in neutrality and
plurality. With separation from social, political and ethical constraint amoral, dis-
embedded2 markets enable the good life without public or political definition of the
good life itself or appropriate objectives for society as a whole. Substantivist political
economy makes objective specifications of the content of the good life, distinct from
individual desires and will be discussed at greater length in the following section.
2.1.5. Efficiency: Productive and Allocative
Neoclassical economic theory holds that perfectly competitive markets in equilib-
rium are both productively and allocatively efficient. Productive efficiency is de-
fined as achieving the maximum output possible from an economy as a whole given
a particular input of factors of production, that is land, labour and capital. The
economy is said to operate at its productive possibility frontier, representing the dif-
ferent permutations of goods output of the same, maximum output. Inputs are not
wasted anywhere in the economy as firms produce and then sell at the lowest pos-
sible cost. The marginal cost of production is equalized across all firms in a given
market through competition, and they all receive the same market price for their
goods without profit, if returns on invested capital, the opportunity cost and risk
premium, are not considered profit but rather a cost born by the production process.
There are multiple possible equilibria, with different combinations of goods and ser-
vices, at which the theoretical market economy is productively efficient. This mul-
tidimensional frontier is termed the production-possibility curve. It is a tautology,
rather than an empirical finding, that theoretical markets should achieve productive
efficiency. The conclusion is simply a deduction from stated assumptions.
Allocative efficiency is a theoretical optimum use of resources within an economy.
There are a number of definitions, the most usual being Pareto optimality, a pro-
posed condition where a rearrangement of goods cannot make one individual better
off without making another worse off. In other words, there is no other economic
state specifying who produces what and who consumes that all would choose over
the Pareto optimal one. Subject to conditions on voluntary participation, costless
transactions, absence of entry and exit barriers and perfect information, rational util-
2 In Karl Polanyi’s sense
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ity maximizing individuals and firms will only exchange goods or services when it
is to their perceived benefit. Exchanges occur until marginal utility of demand is
equal to marginal cost of production. If transactions are voluntary then this is nec-
essarily an equilibrium state. No rational self interested agent would volunteer to
trade themselves into a poorer position. Under conditions of perfect competition
this equilibrium state also maximizes the total consumer surplus, the difference be-
tween the total value placed on consumption of the equilibrium quantity and the
aggregate payment made, and total producer surplus, the total revenue minus the
total variable cost of production.
A second, less stringent criterion for allocative efficiency considers the possibility of
compensation so that aggregate social welfare is taken into considerations. An eco-
nomic outcome is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if a rearrangement exists whereby welfare
gains to the beneficiaries are greater than the welfare loses to others. On this basis
winners could in principle, although need not actually, compensate losers and hence
both be better off than before.
Both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria say nothing about distribution within
a given equilibrium state. They are ordinal criteria, in that it is the ranking of welfare
that is important, not the cardinal amount of welfare or distribution amongst mar-
ket participants. Both also are formal definitions and do not describe real economies.
However, the idea of efficient outcomes holds powerful sway in arguments for gov-
ernment intervention to make real economies conform to the model of ideal markets.
Finally, note that price is the only specified coordinating mechanism used to reach
these optimal states. In an idealized market framework, efficient allocations of re-
sources, capital and labour arise spontaneously through market clearing at equilib-
rium prices. Any individual agent knows and need know nothing other than its own
willingness to meet the market price for various goods, either for the satisfaction of
wants or as inputs to production. Consumers require no knowledge of firms pro-
duction techniques or the costs facing them. Likewise, firms need know nothing of
the consumers willingness to pay or technological status of competitors.
2.2. Market failure
The previous section has outlined the key conditions specified in the analysis of ideal
markets. From this starting point, it is deduced that social welfare will be maximized
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by free exchange of private goods in a society of self interested individuals. This is
then taken as a standard against which to assess actual economic activity in modern
welfare economics. Aberrations from perfectly functioning idealized markets are
interpreted as market failures, with the normative implication that society would be
better off if it remedied these failings through legal, political, fiscal or institutional
correctives. Typical invocations of market failure include:
• Imperfect competition arising from market power. For example, a monopoly
producer can sell at prices higher than marginal costs, extracting pure profits
from consumers and imposing dead weight losses on society as a whole.3
• Asymmetric information between market participants where one participant
has greater knowledge about what is being exchanged than the other such as
used cars (Akerlof, 1970). Adverse selection is another example; one party may
engage in a contingent transaction in the knowledge that it is more likely than
the population as a whole to be able to take advantage of the exchange but
this is not detectable by the counterparty. Think for instance of a poorly main-
tained industrial facility taking out insurance against failure. There are also
consequences for incentives and behaviour such as in cases of moral hazard, a
situation that may arise when an insured party reduces the care they take and
increase the likelihood of the insured contingency occurring.
• Incomplete property rights, causing rational individual agents to exploit a re-
source greater than the optimum rate a monopoly owner or social planner
would. Hardin’s misnamed “tragedy of the commons” is a frequently cited
example (see also p49). His proposed remedy to over-exploitation of open ac-
cess resources was privatization or state ownership (Hardin, 1968; Cole, 1999).
• Missing markets in risk and future supply and demand lead to inter-temporal
misallocations of resources. It is a necessity for equilibrium that there is a com-
petitive market for each and every good represented in the form of a commod-
3 Whilst a perfectly competitive firm faces a flat demand curve, it can sell whatever quantity it chooses
but only at the market price, a monopoly producer faces the negatively sloped demand curve of the
market as a whole. There is no industry supply curve for a monopoly as there is one supplier with
a singular production cost curve. Profit is maximized when marginal cost equals marginal revenue
and this determines the quantity sold. The price received is determined by the market demand
curve and this will lead to pure profit if the average total cost curve is below the demand curve at
this quantity. Surplus is lost to society as a whole as the producer could increase output and meet
demand at a lower equilibrium price, hence the allocative inefficiency. However, there is also the
possibility of the monopoly not being able to gain profits at all, if its average total cost curve is above
the demand curve (Lipsey & Chrystal, 1999).
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ity and situations concerning the exploitation of natural resources are espe-
cially vulnerable to this problem (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979, p39). The absence of
markets for the supply of goods in the future also has implications for macroe-
conomic stability. Most market transactions in real economies are based on
spot prices available to participants at that time, in the knowledge of the spot
prices for assets held and with expectations rather than certainties regarding
future prices. As such, expectations of future market conditions are central to
a number of mainstream explanations of economic bubbles and slumps, not
only Keynesianism. Market participants can seek to remedy these uncertain-
ties through institutions, such as long term bilateral contracts or vertical inte-
gration into a larger firm (Dasgupta & Heal, 1979, p109).
• Public goods whose consumption cannot be restricted in general and are under
produced by free markets. Cases such as national defence demonstrate how
costs must be borne to produce the good but consumption is collective and
free riding possible.
• External effects where third parties are affected either positively or negatively
by an economic activity. Allocative efficiency cannot be reached as marginal
costs are not represented in market prices.
The common feature of all instances is a theoretical misallocation of resources lead-
ing to a loss of social welfare. For example, when imperfect or asymmetric informa-
tion is given priority over the assumption of perfect information, markets are seen
as invariably inefficient and leading to sub-optimal outcomes. Akerlof and Stiglitz’s
research programme has been to use equilibrium methods to investigate the ways
in which actual market institutions accommodate these conditions and examine
the incentives for gathering and disclosing information in inter alia labour, durable
goods, financial and insurance markets (Stiglitz, 2001). In contrast most mainstream
economists see environmental issues as a relatively straightforward problem of mis-
allocation of resources due to one or a combination of unmanaged market failures.
They opine that if society would only implement the conclusions of welfare eco-
nomics analysis, persistent environmental problems would be in practice and by
definition a thing of the past. The arguments are framed in terms of efficiency, out-
put and free exchange, rather than equity, distribution or the concrete realities shap-
ing economic activity. The final two classifications, public goods and externalities,
dominate the literature, especially concerning climate change.
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2.2.1. Public Goods
A benign climate can be conceptualized as a public good, or synonymously a col-
lective consumption good, which is non-excludable and non-rival (Stern, 2006, p25).
That is to say, it is not possible to prevent anyone enjoying the benefits of a given
climatic state, which is experienced by all regardless of their investment in its protec-
tion or disregard for its harm, and that any individual’s consumption of an amenable
climate does not diminish the benefits others gain from it. Comparable examples
include national defence or reception of “free to air” TV, in contrast with normal,
private goods, that are both rivalrous and excludable. The other typical categories
in this bi-axial classification are club goods that are non-rivalrous but excludable,
such as a bridge at low utilization, and so called common pool resources4 which are
rivalrous but non-excludable, such as high seas fisheries.
Whilst rivalry is taken to be an inherent property of an object or service, excludabil-
ity is a feature of the social and technological conditions prevailing. For example,
road user charging becomes practically feasible with the advent of number plate
recognition or RFID technologies, scientific research becomes excludable with the
introduction of patent law within the scope of a given jurisdiction (Lipsey & Chrys-
tal, 1999, p290).
The neoclassical argument runs that market economies under produce non-excludable
goods because individuals or firms producing them cannot attract sufficient rev-
enues to meet production costs. The corollary is the traditional rationale for public
investment in basic scientific research or public infrastructure. For example, science
is stylized as an economic activity producing codified knowledge which is both a
good in itself and also an input to other economic activities. It suffers underinvest-
ment because the products are indivisible, inappropriable and uncertain (Arrow,
1962) and it is therefore optimal to use general taxation revenues to support basic
research.
In the case of common property non-excludability may provide incentives for in-
dividual agents to exploit a resource past the point of optimum marginal return to
4 Whilst this is common nomenclature in economic textbooks, popularised by the biologist Hardin’s
landmark paper on “the tragedy of the commons” (1968), it is questionable whether it is entirely
appropriate. Common property and access to it may be very well regulated and managed through
one political forum or another, in which case they cease to be non-excludable in practice. The sit-
uation Hardin describes is better termed free and unregulated access as it contains no enforced or
recognised property rights which are typical of commons institutions (Aguilera-Klink, 1994).
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society. The gains from an additional agent exploiting the resource are partly addi-
tional but partly also at the expense of others. Not only does this lead to inefficient
outcomes but it may also compromise the long term sustainability of the renewable
resource, as is widely seen in contemporary fisheries (Clark, 1973).
Notably, neoclassical analysis suggests that there will be an optimum quantity of a
public good, if it is possible to vary quantity, and ways to arrive at that point through
economic policy instruments. Because consumption is collective, the theoretical de-
mand curve for a public good is the vertical sum of each individual consumer’s
demand curve and the optimum quantity the intersection of this with the marginal
cost of supply of the public good. In terms of climate change, the optimum amount
of abatement of emissions in a given period is when the marginal abatement cost
(MAC) equals the net social benefit of the public good of a benign climate. This
formulation implies the calculability of the costs and benefits of the public good,
however, as Samuelson points out (1954) no decentralized pricing system can arrive
spontaneously at this point for a public good as the prices that would induce agents
to produce the optimum combination of goods would necessarily be inefficient in
their allocation (Bator, 1958). A centralized computational system will be beset by
problems in practical measurement of preference intensities as there is a strategic
incentive for individuals to under-report their preference for the public good. For
these and other reasons, such estimation techniques and the general approach of
Cost Benefit Analysis are academically and normatively contentious issues, aspects
of which are discussed in section 2.3.
2.2.2. Externalities
An externality, also known as a spillover or neighborhood effect, is typically defined
as an impact felt by a third party due to the economic activity of others. The impacts
may be positive, negative or both where multiple third parties are involved. Noise,
air pollution and financial regulation to prevent systemic loses are typically given
as examples of negative externalities, with investment in research and development
or external home improvements typical examples of positive cases. Analytically it
is important to note that the effect is incidental or unintended, otherwise it will be
considered within the process of market bargaining (Mishan, 1971) 5. Voluntary
5 Vatn and Bromley contend that this is not the case as the neoclassical model requires that agents
are individually rational and as such their actions cannot be unintended (Vatn & Bromley, 1997).
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participation in transactions to mutual benefit is the central relationship of the neo-
classical framework. With externalities uncorrected by a supplementary institution,
no price is paid for the involuntary impact so the market economy as a whole deliv-
ers sub-optimal allocation of resources and reduced net welfare. Simply put, price
signals in the market promote too much production of some goods and too little of
others.
Negative environmental externalities lead to situations where the marginal social
costs of an activity are greater than the marginal social benefits. It is social welfare
that is deemed to be reduced, not the individual welfare of any given party which is
necessarily increased by the economic activity, otherwise they would not rationally,
undertake the activity. As a result market economy will typically produce goods
with negative externalities in a quantity greater than the social optimum. A more
efficient allocation of resources with greater net social welfare may be possible and
as such there are grounds for state intervention or changes in the wider institutions
governing the economy. Analytically, public goods are a special case of an external-
ity where the identity of the initiating agent is not connected to the consequences or
impacts (Bator, 1958).
In Pigou’s original terminology there is a divergence of private net product and so-
cial net product (Pigou, 1932) whilst Dasgupta frames externalities as a discrepancy
between the accounting price of a natural resource and the market price paid in the
actual economy (Dasgupta, 1990)6. Both implicitly refer to an ideal Pareto optimal
state for identification of market failure7. A number of important conclusions fol-
low from this and structure neoclassical “fixes” for market failure; i) public goods
They argue that some courses of action, e.g. costly waste disposal, are not taken because they would
violate the assumptions of individual welfare maximization for agents. This is not to say that the
production of negative externalities is malicious but rather that they should at least be interpreted
as “cost shifting” within the existing regime of rights and liabilities. As such, the effect is present
within market prices and their argument echoes that around Pareto-irrelevant externalities (see 58).
The structural implication is that competitive pressures of a market society will tend to increase the
number and scale of externalities and any market correctives will be continually “chasing a moving
target” (Vatn & Bromley, 1997).
6 In this latter framework externalities can be interpreted as subsidies. For example their are implicit
wealth transfers from South to North through under priced primary extractive activity if there are
social and ecological costs outside of the market, which is one justification for replacing GDP with a
Net National Product as a key economic indicator. Gross domestic product by definition ignores the
depreciation of capital assets, including the depletion of “natural capital” which is excluded from
accounts.
7 However, this is not the case in all treatments of externalities in the literature, notably transaction
cost economics as discussed in section 2.3.2
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are outputs of society that are to be provided and measured by economic means,
bringing matters of exclusion, voluntary exchange and calculation to the fore and ii)
there is the possibility of an optimal provision of public goods and goods generating
externalities either positive or negative.
2.3. Fixing environmental market failure
Much economic activity presents society with discordant outcomes. Synthetic fertil-
izers improve crop yields and farm output but diminish biodiversity and accumu-
late in food chains to the detriment of predators. Coal fired power stations deliver
affordable, reliable electricity but release acidic gases that damage forest and lakes at
great distances. Waterfront hotels bring jobs to coastal areas but also rowdy guests
who are a nuisance at night. There are many possible ways in which society could
recognise and manage these issues, through industrial leadership, compensation,
education, or the much maligned ’command and control’ regulation, but increas-
ingly the trope of market failure as outlined is becoming dominant; the farm produce
enters society’s financial accounts whilst the lost invertebrates do not but ought to.
Environmental economics has developed policy programmes intended to weigh the
harms caused by polluting activities against the benefits they provide, distribute
revenues and burdens amongst different parties and realise the greatest economic
welfare to society.
In this field there are two main analytical approaches that give rise to related policy
interventions; i) marginal benefit, marginal damage cost analysis and the use of taxa-
tion or other redistributive price instruments to penalize polluters, compensate those
harmed or deliver an optimal quantity of a public good, and ii) the creation of ex-
changeable property rights between agents to allow those who most value a resource
or right to an activity to control access. Both imply the intervention of the state, co-
ordinating resource reallocation or enforcing property rights, to deliver a market
ideal but with a minimal intrusion of political positions or processes. Crudely, poli-
cies arising from the former are stylized as price instruments and the latter quantity
instruments. In the purest mathematical formulations the outcomes of both policy
types should be equivalent as both are set with reference to the same optimal equi-
librium state (Weitzman, 1974). However, the two programmes are have distinct
rationales, assumptions and means of implementation. For the subsequent discus-
sion of carbon trading institutions it is useful to outline both.
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2.3.1. Pigouvian Taxes, Shadow Pricing and the Social Cost of Carbon
Historically, the first approach developed to correct externalities or pay for the pro-
vision of public goods was Pigou’s proposal of taxes at the level of marginal social
cost or marginal social benefit respectively (Pigou, 1932). A tax imposed by the state
would generate revenues to be used as compensation or remediation. Price instru-
ments influence both supply side and demand side agents to alter the generation of
externalities. As well as redistributing resources, the extra costs imposed by such a
tax incentivise consumers to reduced demand and hence producers to reduce out-
put. Conversely the extra incentive provided by a subsidy for an under-produced
positive externality will promote output or increase the quantity demanded.
Theoretically, all economic agents affected by an externality tax will reduce their
production, or consumption, of the externality until the marginal cost of reductions
is equal to the tax. The result is that some parties reduce more than others but ul-
timately all equilibrate to the same reduction cost. Further reductions should cost
the same amount regardless of who undertakes them (Baumol & Oates, 1971). This
form of price regulation is considered most efficient when applied evenly across the
whole of an economy. In analytic terms there should not be discrimination between
originators of a given externality as the appropriate uniform tax or subsidy will al-
locate optimally. In other words, the profit motive incentivises firms within a sector
to find the cheapest abatement technologies and across different sectors consumer
demand will cause reallocation according to preferences. Those who voluntarily
meet the price of the tax are not prevented from consuming goods generating the
externality, which would be a loss of welfare, whilst those who choose not to pay
goods bearing the tax evidently do not value the good any more than that amount
and their welfare loss is less than the damage avoided. Were a regulator to apply
different levies across an economy then a market failure, in terms of sub-optimal al-
location, would in a sense persist. In not discriminating between means of avoiding,
or providing for, an externality, Pigouvian taxes align with many of the libertarian
arguments for market processes and market outcomes.
To some extent they reduce the information requirement of the regulator as individ-
ual preferences need not be known in advance, nor the most efficient technologies
to reduce the externality identified at the outset. However, setting the appropriate
level of the tax or subsidy is acknowledged as being problematic, from both analyt-
ical and pragmatic perspectives. The optimum theoretical level is not the marginal
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net damage at the time of first intervening, but rather the marginal net damage that
would be experienced in Pareto equilibrium. Calculating the appropriate level is ei-
ther a challenging or impossible task according to analyst’s position on information
in the economy (Baumol & Oates, 1971; Hayek, 2005). Theoretically, such calcula-
tions require all the previous assumptions about completeness and competitiveness
of markets to be met. Practically, there must be means of introducing proxies for the
absent commodities, for example the value of a sparrowhawk or a Pennine vista in
the year 2035, in a common value framework8. Further, in the case of stock pollu-
tants, like greenhouse gases, calculations are made on the basis of the flow of dam-
ages caused by a unit of emissions now, into the far future, discounted and summed
(Sinn, 2008). As well as requiring a social welfare function to aggregate and the util-
ity of consumption across different individuals, Pareto equilibrium analysis is es-
sentially static so values across time must be related through a common numeraire,
usually the present value of expected utility (Stern, 2006, p304). Efforts to estimate
a marginal social cost of greenhouse gases, often known as the social cost of carbon
(SCC), place values in a range over orders of magnitude from £0 to £1000+ per tonne
of carbon emitted (Stern, 2006, p288). In calculative terms, the SCC will be higher if
i) future emissions are taken to be higher, ii) the climate sensitivity parameter used
is higher or iii) a lower discount rate is used in the calculation. However, these cal-
culations are entirely speculative given their dependence upon assumptions made
about the future flow of greenhouse gases, how to value the future harms that they
cause or benefits they realise and how to understand humanity’s ability to adapt.
Nevertheless, the SCC is suggested as the basis of a “shadow price” for carbon to
be incorporated into cost benefit analyses of government interventions or private
projects. It can be used, for example, to illustrate the effective subsidy that exter-
nality generating industries like primary extraction receive from society as whole,
often leading to very regressive outcomes and subsidies from the poor to the rich
(Dasgupta, 1990). A shadow price is not typically referred to as a formal economic
parameter like SCC, rather it is an administrative tool. This distinction is question-
able given the nature of many of the assumptions required to arrive at an SCC and
the implicit political economic norms inherent in the neoclassical paradigm.
There is a wealth of literature on the inconsistencies and difficulties of estimates of
8 Whilst there are substantial disputes as to the efficacy or indeed meaningfulness of using such prox-
ies to arrive at cost estimates, Anderson (1998, p241) emphasizes that even the welfare economics
required for CBA is inconsistent in that “there is an implicit tendency to construe costs as essentially
homogeneous and cardinal and benefits as heterogeneous and ordinal.”.
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external costs both for Pigouvian taxation and comparable aspects of cost benefit
analysis (CBA) from within mainstream economics and outside of it. In climate pol-
icy, the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC was something of a watershed and
provoked much discussion and controversy, particularly in its different weightings
of the value of individual lives according to the economic output of their country
of origin (Pearce et al., 1996). The practice of using price estimates of ecological or
human costs is frequently seen as problematic on ethical and broader political eco-
nomic grounds (Stirling, 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). The outcomes of SCC cal-
culation depend to some extent upon the ethical arguments that preface their struc-
ture and rationalize the parameters chosen for the model. For example, aversion to
inequality may reduce SCC value by placing intra-generational concerns ahead of
inter-generational equality depending upon the relative values of time preference
parameters. However the SCC is based upon net social measures of welfare con-
sidering utility across different income groups only so far as a net social welfare
function is used in aggregation and in practice Pigouvian taxes may have regressive
implications as the poor may spend a greater proportion of their income on exter-
nality generating goods (Feng et al., 2010). This is to some extent illustrative of the
diversity of ethical perspectives on inter-temporal, domestic and international eq-
uity within extant societies and the limited ability of reductive aggregative methods
like CBA to capture them (Dasgupta, 2008).
The difficulties of such models remain not only in finding the ’correct’ parameters
but stem from the inappropriate structure of the model in relation to the system
examined. For example, environmental problems are necessarily, from the perspec-
tive of the modeller, characterized as risk rather than more properly understood in
terms of radical uncertainty (Dietz & Fankhauser, 2009)9. The Stern review, and sub-
sequent debate it generated, highlighted problems in the creation of present value
proxies for future flows of costs and benefits. The analytical difficulties of disentan-
gling risk aversion, inequality aversion, and inter-temporal substitution when ’the
answer’ is expressed in a single numeraire were prominent (Stern, 2006; Tol & Yohe,
2006; Spash, 2007; Heal, 2009, Chapters 2 and 13). With respect to climate change,
some commentators suggest that the environmental economics community is mov-
ing away from deterministic measures of climate damage cost and towards proba-
bilistic models (Dietz & Maddison, 2009) which may generate controversial outputs
9 Pindyck (2007) provides an excellent overview of the distinction between risk and uncertainty and
its implications for environmental economics.
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and unbounded cost estimates (Weitzman, 2009) although these conclusions are dis-
puted on physical (Costello et al., 2010) and actual social responses to extinction risk
(Nordhaus, 2009)10.
Actual examples of taxes levied via the complete Pigouvian rationale are rare be-
cause of the manifold nature of externalities and the prohibitive administrative costs
were each to be regulated individually. Pearce vividly illustrates the variation within
UK environmental taxation and the discrepancies between these and an optimal SCC
(2003). However, there is a case for the less specific ’green tax reform’, especially if
the revenue raised from ecotaxes can be used to reduce other distortionary taxes
such as those levied on labour. This so called ’double dividend’ exists where the
fiscal benefits of ecotaxation are greater than correction of the environmental exter-
nality (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999).
In summary, the central mechanism of Pigouvian taxation is redistribution through
the introduction of a damage cost tax or welfare loss subsidy. The calculation of
these values is pivotal and performed centrally by the regulating authority. Discus-
sions of expected utility estimation, use of discount rates and social welfare func-
tions contribute to these calculations but may also be deployed through other poli-
cies or modes of governance such as cost benefit analysis. As with CBA, Pigou-
vian taxation maintains a theoretical ideal based upon static equilibrium models of
individualized, consumption based welfare, and at best provides ’potential Pareto
improvement analysis’ (Bromley, 1990).
10 Weitzman presents this as his ’dismal theorem’ (Weitzman, 2009); fat tails on the climate sensitivity
(CS) probability distribution functions (PDF) combined with a CBA damage function that rises at a
faster rate than the CS PDF diminishes imply that the integrated damage cost that tends to infinity.
The central point is that uncertainty is the most important issue in climate policy and that CBA
needs to be used judiciously. Issues relevant to this argument are i) the underlying climatology,
including whether the long tails of CS are actually infinite which hinges on the physical possibility
of CS being greater than 20, ii) the ontological status of the CS and the PDF within the CBA i.e.
whether the distribution is of one real planetary CS among many real planetary CSs, in which case
the PDF is a property of CS, or is the PDF a Bayesian sampling of a singular ’Earth’s CS’ and the
PDF is property of our knowledge of the CS, iii) whether Weitzman’s maths actually requires CS to
be a doubling rather than any increase, including a thought experiment that suggests wearing the
wrong hat might change albedo and cause infinite losses (see http://julesandjames.blogspot.
com/2007/10/weitzmans-dismal-theorem.html). More widely there are major issues around the
appropriateness of this type of economic analysis under conditions of uncertainty and the use of a
cash measure of utility and implicitly social welfare.
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2.3.2. Coase Theorem, Property Rights and Bargained Solutions
Rather than attempting to correct market failure ex post by introducing corrective
prices, an alternative literature argues that the extension or revision of property
rights is sufficient to allow market transactions to accommodate the externality and
realise an optimal outcome. It is this literature that forms the intellectual basis for
carbon trading and originates in Coase’s landmark article (1960) written as direct
critique of Pigouvian welfare economics. The Problem of Social Cost made three key
contributions to the discussion of externalities; i) it raised the profile of losses to
those assigned liability for creating negative externalities, ii) it described a situation
where the allocation of rights between generator and receiver of an externality did
not ultimately affect net social welfare, and iii) it recognised the importance of trans-
action costs, at the margin and in total, when considering alternative institutional
arrangements. Like neoclassical market failure arguments, the welfare justification
is based on maximizing consumption but introduces individual autonomy to reduce
information requirements and minimize administration and exclusion costs.
The original cases Pigou cites as justifying remediation, including vehicle taxation
for road expansion11 and agricultural nuisance from rabbit’s crossing boundaries
(1932, p12), are basic two agent problems where liability is presumed to rest with a
recognizable perpetrator and victim. Ronald Coase’s landmark 1960 article rejects
deontological positions regarding the identification of the perpetrator and victim
of an externality. To Coase, liability is not pre-existing and as Yandle puts it “This
analysis has nothing to do with polluters’ imposing costs on society, but everything
to do with competing demands for use of an asset (1998, p121)”.
Allocation of rights to that asset should be decided on the basis of economic effi-
ciency, itself a feature of transaction costs inherent to the institution12. Coase (1960)
uses Pigou’s own examples to illustrate his point that:
...from an economic point of view, a situation in which there is “uncom-
pensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway
engines” is not necessarily undesirable. Whether it is undesirable or not
11 Although this was the case in the UK in early 20th century, vehicle licensing revenues and fuel duties
have not been hypothecated since the abolition of Road Tax in 1937. Transport infrastructure is in
the main provided for out of general taxation making it a popular misconception that “cyclists don’t
pay road tax”.
12 This is a somewhat circular argument as a particular transaction may be related to the initial alloca-
tion of rights.
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depends on the particular circumstances...
The question at issue is not whether it is desirable to run an additional
train or a faster train or to install smoke preventing devices; the ques-
tion at issue is whether it is desirable to have a system in which the rail-
way has to compensate those who suffer damage from the fires which it
causes or one in which the railway does not have to compensate them
(Coase, 1960, p34).
His central conclusion is that optimal allocation does not depend upon the particu-
lar distribution of rights but rather the institutional framework and transaction cost
structures that result. The most important thing for public policy is to reduce the im-
pediments to bargains being formed between agents so that market allocation can
proceed smoothly and to efficient conclusions. Coase showed that with zero trans-
action costs the final allocation of resources should be the same regardless of which
party was deemed to be liable for the externality, the only difference was relative
final wealth13. As Demsetz succinctly puts it “The output mix that results when the
exchange of property is allowed is efficient and the mix is independent of who is
assigned ownership” (1967).
This result, known as “Coase’s Theorem” (Stigler, 1966), of course has implications
for policies and interventions advised to correct market failure. The first relates to
liability. If the loss of welfare to the ’liable’ party in remediating an externality is
introduced into a Pigouvian regulatory analysis then the question is raised as to
whether or not the effect on the third party is large enough to be Pareto-relevant
(Buchanan & Stubblebine, 1962), indeed whether the market fails in the sense that
allocation remains sub-optimal. Coase opens his analysis by asking the question of
a polluted river “is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the
product which the contamination of the stream makes possible?” (1960, p2). Ac-
cording to this logic, persistent externalities may exist in a Pareto equilibrium state.
Were the state to intervene to correct this position the outcome would be allocatively
inefficient by neoclassical measures of social welfare. Such Pareto-irrelevant exter-
nalities are, unsurprisingly, a contentious position ridiculed by Vatn and Bromley
(1994) as “that most wondrous of Panglossian benedictions”. In Bromley’s words
“The hyper-Coasean would advise the victims to remove themselves from the vicin-
13 Buchanan and Stubblebine constrain this result by specifying that it applies only to firms but the
more significant point is that it should hold only where agents’ actions are determined by competi-
tive market prices (1962).
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ity of the polluter. To force the polluter to stop polluting would diminish the national
dividend and thereby be judged socially inferior” (2007, p677).
Rather than have the state intervene and dictate terms, a market with clear enforce-
able property rights ought to discover through exchange which agent can alter be-
haviour at least cost. This is intended to both resolve the social welfare loss and also
direct agents appropriately towards an optimal outcome:
It seems to me preferable to use the opportunity cost concept and to ap-
proach these problems by comparing the value of the product yielded by
factors in alternative uses or by alternative arrangements. The main ad-
vantage of a pricing system is that it leads to the employment of factors
in places where the value of the product yielded is greatest and does so
at less cost than alternative systems (Coase, 1960, p40)
As such, the property rights approach admits the possibility of too little pollution
and too much ecological quality. Such is the origin of Larry Summers’ infamous
World Bank memo arguing that ”the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic
waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that... I’ve
always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly underpolluted”
(1992).
The second major implication from Coase Theorem, that efficiency does not depend
on patterns of initial allocation, suggests a separation of individual welfare from al-
location of resources. The distribution of individual welfare ought to follow from
the rights allocation but not interfere with the output mix. In theory, a progressive
regime could assign property rights to the least well off and the final outcome would
be optimal and unchanged with ’fair’, market determined compensation paid to
those suffering the externality (Tietenberg, 2003). The formal efficiency of this result
is challenged by welfare economists as an appropriate social discount rate is ana-
lytically distinct from the discount rates attributed to individual economic agents.
When costs or benefits are summed through time, very different values of net social
welfare may be realised according to the initial allocation of rights (Dasgupta, 1990).
Further, the Coasian solution to environmental externalities is typically represented
as a single polluter single victim bargaining situation. Efficient outcomes are achieved
regardless of initial allocation of rights as there is the assumption of perfect informa-
tion and zero transaction costs. As outlined earlier, this is not a position that Coase
endorses primarily on the basis of persistent transaction costs, although it is regu-
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larly cited by advocates of free market environmentalism as presenting a strong case
for the use of MBIs to tackle environmental pollution. However, it is rarely recog-
nised that the single polluter single victim case is far from a market situation, never
mind a competitive market. As Hahnel and Sheeran (2009) point out, establishing
property rights is only the first step towards creating a market, and assigning lia-
bility and damages for an externality is not the same as creating a marketable right.
They detail how the bilateral bargaining situations that Coase describes will not pro-
duce efficient outcomes unless both parties have ’complete information’ i.e. not only
of their own damage or abatement cost curve but also their counterparty’s, as there
are incentives to misrepresent one’s own costs.
Coase did however emphasize important ways that the real world did not conform
to the blackboard economics of Pigou and other welfare theorists. This aspect of his
work is frequently missed in subsequent interpretation (Butler & Garnett, 2003). His
first major work on economic organisation describes how the costs associated with
market transactions provide incentives to conduct some activities within planned,
hierarchical organisations such as the firm rather than through voluntary market
exchange (Coase, 1937). He himself laments that:
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasean
world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of mod-
ern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to
leave. (Coase (1988, p174) in Ellickson, 1989)
Highlighting the effects of transaction costs and the institutions that determine them
was Coase’s foremost intellectual contribution and was developed in time into New
Institutional Economics (NIE). Discussing the regulation of public infrastructure and
utility companies Williamson (1996, p1020) asserts key aspects of the NIE frame-
work:
I come down in favor of the propositions that (1) institutions are im-
portant, (2) institutions are susceptible to analysis, and (3) public pol-
icy analysis should eschew hypothetical ideals in favor of comparative
institutional analysis of alternative feasible forms... Attention is thus ap-
propriately focused on (1) the attributes of the assets, (2) the condition of
uncertainty and the unavoidable incompleteness of contract, and (3) the
importance of embedding contracts in governance structures that mit-
igate hazards and infuse confidence (with special attention to credible
commitments).
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For new institutionalists, it is not enough to demonstrate that a market outcome is
sub optimal in comparison to an ideal market. In this framework, the externality
only exists if it is remediable i.e. there is the practical possibility of an alternative, su-
perior arrangement and that this is preferable taking into account administrative
costs (Williamson, 2000). NIE substitutes the ’nirvana approach’ of welfare eco-
nomics for a comparative institutional approach (Demsetz, 1969). Asking how the
structure of institutions determines the outcomes of economic activity is characteris-
tic of NIE and a distinct position from the assumptions and equilibria idealized in the
neoclassical framework. Nonetheless, NIE maintains the methodological individu-
alism of the neoclassical framework for the purposes of its analysis. Agents are rel-
atively free and able to recognise opportunities to increase their individual welfare
and take action to realise it, including of course strategic action that may place con-
straints on their and others’ actions (North, 1984). Consequently NIE posits that it is
agents acting to maximise self interest that build efficient institutions (Williamson,
1985). This is in distinction to the ’old’ institutionalism of Veblen and Commons
which placed much greater emphasis on agents’ context, relationships, capacity to
act politically, and the dynamic processes of the changing structure of the economy
(Hodgson, 1994, p70)14. Old institutionalism recognises that self-interest and mean-
ingful action must be considered in relation to and as an outcome of institutions not
prior to them. For example, public service and the desire to acquire votes are quite
different to consuming goods from a marketplace and motivations and means differ
as a result. As O’Neill puts it “The old institutionalism differs from the new in that it
allows individuals’ preferences to be explained by reference to the institutional con-
text in which they operate... The explanatory claims of the old institutionalism enter
as unannounced, unnoticed and unwelcome guests into the new institutionalists’
assumptions about the ’utility function’ of the agent in different contexts” (O’Neill,
2007, p67). Possible modes of action also differ substantially within institutional set-
tings. For example the only way for an individual to express dissatisfaction with
the sale of a good in a pure market setting is to not purchase it. There is no way to
persuade or argue over the appropriateness of an object for exchange, e.g. a ’womb
for hire’, nor can an individual make a case based on need or entitlement (Caporaso
& Levine, 1992, p223).
14 Institutional explanations of economic patterns have also been offered in abstract terms and at
greater social and historical scales. Marx’s account of economic transformation is based on the di-
alectical tensions between forces of production and relations of production that are institutional in
character.
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Transactions costs are central to the NIE analysis of externalities. Dahlman (1979)
underscores this point by arguing that under the specified conditions for neoclas-
sical analysis (perfect information, zero transaction costs) externalities cannot exist
as they would be voluntarily bargained away. Given that transactions costs exist in
the actual economy, the nature of the externality, the parties affected and the insti-
tutional context become relevant in a way that formal neoclassical analysis does not
recognise. If the externality exists between two parties and is readily identifiable,
common law liability may be all that is required to result in bargains being struck to
mutual satisfaction and maximum social welfare, whereas government intervention
may be the most efficient institution where transaction costs could mount substan-
tially for example where there are large numbers of affected parties (Coase, 1960).
However, in practice the information problems that beset optimal Pigouvian taxa-
tion may not be solved. For instance, where it is important to know the value of
damages resulting from pollution, for example in a dispute between parties, the ju-
diciary must fill the role of the omniscient bureaucrat and decide upon the marginal
cost of pollution that is capitalized in the respective property right (Helm, 2005).
This mode of reasoning also brings to the fore the particular rights that are specified
and associated with property rather than treating property only as simple physical
entities. An individual or firm holding a property right is permitted to carry out
a limited set of actions according to the wider social and regulatory context. This
is clear in the case of land where access rights and land use planning regulations
may persist, and sub surface mineral resources, ground water or crop planting re-
strictions apply. Coase then extends this to take “the right to do something” as a
factor of production and conversely the exercise of such rights having consequences
and costs for others (1960, p44). In the case of environmental externalities, property
rights regimes might implicitly allow the release of polluting substances without li-
ability. The explicit creation of new property rights or common law liabilities for
these consequences are the basis of market exchange or enable bargains to be made
between affected parties.
Cole (1999) argues that all environmental problems are founded in issues of prop-
erty rights, by conflating property ownership with all forms of control, individual
or collective, legal or normative, commercial or public. Although this position is
disputable, his analysis offers a useful example of how practical confusion can stem
from a misunderstanding of the distinction between “property rights in something
and the thing itself” (Cole, 1999, p113). You may own your home but you don’t have
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the right to burn it down (Dales, 1968). Cole describes the legal status of emissions
allowances in American Clean Air Act (1990). Public utility companies can own and
trade property rights in emissions allowances, however, the emissions allowance isn’t
a property right itself. The allowance confers the ability to meet a specific govern-
ment regulation and does not offer carte blanche to pollute nor hold any formal sway
over the content of the regulation. The regulator is also able to change the scope
of regulation and withdraw allowances at will without being bound by the legal
necessity of providing compensation to the holders.
J.H. Dales developed the first substantial case for markets in pollution rights in his
1968 essay Pollution, Property and Prices. Starting from the premise “to live is to
pollute” (Dales, 1968, p13) he argues that waste disposal costs are always a posi-
tive amount for society when both the costs of disposal and costs of damage are
summed. The best that we can do is to formulate appropriate regulation to mini-
mize this total and key to this is the understanding the particular biophysical fate of
wastes in the natural environment and the spatial distribution of sources. In cases
where an appropriate geographic constraint encompassing pollution can be identi-
fied then emissions trading can be formally shown to provide a least cost means of
attaining a given environmental target if not an overall Pareto optimal distribution
because of the public good element of the target itself (Montgomery, 1972). Much
is made of the putative certainty of achieving the desired environmental objective
through a fixed “cap” on permits, as opposed to the uncertain output effects of a
Pigouvian tax (Hepburn, 2007).
2.3.3. Public Choice Theory, Austrian Economics and
Free Market Environmentalism
Although not directly providing an analysis of environmental economic concerns
for ecological public goods and externalities, public choice theory and Austrian eco-
nomics perspectives respond to the neoclassical and institutional fixes for market
failure and provide some of the most vociferous support for market governance of
the economy.
Adherents to the Austrian economic theory of Menger, von Mises, Hayek and oth-
ers, have the primary contention that institutions of private property and the mar-
ket enable spontaneous but dynamic order as individuals and firms co-ordinate their
plans through prices. Price co-ordination is cited as superior to central planning as it
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maximizes the use of distributed and tacit knowledge, and superior to participatory
planning as it reveals “the intensity of other people’s values and thus what the spe-
cific content of the ’public good’ is” (Pennington, 1999, emphasis original). It differs
from neoclassical theory in a number of ways, although it shares with neoclassical
economics a model of welfare as the satisfaction of wants Austrian economics em-
phasizes liberty and purposeful behaviour. Notably Austrian economics rejects the
notion of ideal markets progressing to equilibrium and allows for the preferences to
change as a result of circumstance (Hodgson, 2002, Chapter 11). Disequilibrium is
the norm and entrepreneurship a vital characteristic of capitalist economies (Schum-
peter, 1954). For example Vernon Smith’s analysis of deregulation of the US airline
industry in the 1980s describes how the hub and spoke model of delivery had not
been anticipated or calculated by any participant but arose spontaneously, devel-
oped dynamically and produced new variety in patterns of production and con-
sumption of transport services (Smith, 2002; Donahue, 2002). As a result, efficient
allocation and the possibility of market failure are rejected on the grounds that it is
actually impossible to know what the optimal case is outside of subjective action.
Further, the only way to effectively weigh plural values and preferences is to reduce
all social and ecological phenomena to commodities and allow voluntary exchange
and price development to direct their fate in society. The role of the state in this
model of political economy ought to be limited to the enforcement of contracts and
property rights with individuals and firms directly bargaining over supplementary
issues, in effect the rest of social life.
Public choice theory, articulated for example by Buchanan and Tullock (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1962), concerns the application of economic reasoning, tools and methods
to issues of politics and government. This body of theory, being methodologically
individualist, takes rational self-interested action as its starting point and makes the
distinction between politics and the economy one of institutional context i.e. the
market sphere of production and consumption or the government sphere of control
of interdependent or public matters (Caporaso & Levine, 1992, p135). The design
and implementation of environmental policy is therefore subject to the bureaucrat’s
propensity to maximize her budget, the politician’s to maximize his number of votes
and the voter’s preference for politicians who will increase their individual wealth.
As a result the benign, public welfare optimizing state which is intended to correct
market failure is replaced by one of endemic ’government failure’ (O’Neill, 2007,
p62). Exercises in Pigouvian taxation, cost benefit analysis or shadow pricing (2.3.1)
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are seen as vulnerable from the outset so the most effective solution to environmen-
tal problems is to directly internalize unintended effects into systems of voluntary
economic exchange.
Free market environmentalism is a colloquial title for a loose political economic pro-
gramme and not a coherent body of economic theory as such. Drawing on Austrian
economics and public choice theory, it places emphasis on completely specifying
property rights rather than legislating particular environmental standards or levy-
ing taxes (Anderson & Leal, 1991). Competitive markets ought to provide incentives
for private agents to acquire information and through the sum of their exchanges the
institution as a whole reaches a calculate optimum. Putatively objective valuations
of ecological phenomena are regarded by free market environmentalists as mani-
festations of technocrats and bureaucrats own subjective preferences. In contrast,
prices generated through market exchange of private property are seen as “trans-
ferring subjective values into an objective measure” (Anderson & Leal, 1991, p18)
conveying information about interpersonal valuation, social scarcity, and offering a
measure of organizational performance on the balance sheet. If a central planner is
mistaken in assigning a damage cost or persists in providing an out of date or in-
appropriate subsidy, the disciplinary mechanisms are much less keen or timely than
financial loss or bankruptcy (Pennington, 1999).
This approach focuses on incentives structure afforded by property rights that spec-
ify the particular actions that can be taken with particular natural resources. It sit-
uates this in a dynamic institutional context of redefinition according to the evolu-
tion of social norms in control of land, forestry and fisheries. Proponents argue that
systems of private covenants and evolving Coasian bargains have effectively con-
tributed to historical preservation of landscape amenity and agricultural integrity
in the United Kingdom and the United States (Anderson & Leal, 1991; Pennington,
1999). This process of redefinition is creative driven by profit opportunities in recov-
ery of the value of social losses from externalities.
Where environmental entrepreneurs can devise ways of marketing envi-
ronmental values, market incentives can have dramatic results. It is im-
portant to recognize that any case of external benefits or costs provides
fertile ground for an entrepreneur who can define and enforce property
rights (Anderson & Leal, 1991, p21).
Adopting the ideas of new institutional economics, the free market environmen-
talism approach sees all socio-political accommodations over natural resources and
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pollution problems as being subject to substantial transaction costs but argues that in
most cases that market systems economize on these costs and align monitoring and
enforcement costs with those who will directly benefit. Only circumstances with
insurmountable definition and enforcement costs are ceded to political institutions,
and in those cases reluctantly because of the presumed authoritarianism and fiscal
irresponsibility that follows (Anderson & Leal, 1991, p23). For example, Anderson
and Leal cite cap and trade pollution permit systems as an unfortunate but necessary
compromise for cases of atmospheric pollution. The resulting “market socialism” al-
lows for decentralization of abatement but maintains a pivotal and vulnerable role
for the regulator in setting environmental objectives and permit allocations.
2.4. Greenhouse gas property rights for climate change
mitigation
If ever there were an environmental problem designed for emissions
trading, global warming is it (Ellerman, 2005b).
Through the lens of environmental economics, pollution externalities have come to
be seen as substantial and pervasive in industrial society (Pearce, 2002). In liberal
democracies, efficiency and cost effectiveness are now primary concerns of environ-
mental policy makers and have shaped the process of policy formulation to provide
fix for these so called market failures (Toke, 2008). Indeed, the United States with Ex-
ecutive Order 12291 has gone so far as to mandate regulatory impact assessment, in
effect a cost benefit analysis, of all major health, environmental and chemical regu-
lations (Soederbaum, 2007). As outlined in section 2.2 the environmental economics
literature proposes a set of theoretical arguments for the use of price mechanisms
in regulation to realise least cost, if not economy wide Pareto optimal, levels of
abatement through environmental standards with taxation (Baumol & Oates, 1971)
or tradeable pollution permits (Montgomery, 1972).
In practice, permit systems have been variously applied to air pollution, water pol-
lution, fisheries and water resource management (Tietenberg, 2003), their most con-
spicuous use coming with the US sulphur dioxide (SO2) control programme under
the Clean Air Act Amendments in the 1990s (Burtraw et al., 2005). Policy appraisals
tend to compare the mitigation costs of MBIs over performance standards or ’com-
mand and control’ regulations. Rather than review this broad literature, this section
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will briefly outline the mainstream position that presents ’climate policy as a natural
case for emissions trading’ (Hansjurgens, 2005, p223). Many of the aspects discussed
here will be developed further in subsequent chapters.
In the highest profile assessment of climate change economics and policy, Stern
(2006) identifies four particular features of climate change relevant to their analy-
sis and distinct from other environmental problems typically approached through
the framework of externalities. Firstly, climate change is global in its origin and ef-
fects given that most significant greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O) are well mixed
in the atmosphere. Secondly, both the biophysical and socio-economic systems as-
sociated with climate change develop over time with lags between cause and effect.
Thirdly, there are important uncertainties in the timing, size and type of the impacts
and costs associated with adaptation. Finally, there is the possibility that large and
rapid climate change could cause substantial disruption to the global economy such
that marginal economic analysis is not appropriate. They conclude that the first
response in mitigation policy should be to introduce a price for the marginal dam-
ages caused by greenhouse gas emissions and that the foregoing risk/uncertainty
arguments suggest that quantity targets with emissions trading or an iterative tax
revised to meet such targets is most appropriate (Stern, 2006, p35). Credibility and
predictability of policies are also highlighted because of the necessity to spur long
term and large scale investments in infrastructure and technological innovation.
Stern also considers other cases where non-market based instruments may be appro-
priate. Performance standards and direct regulation are cited as being more effective
in correcting market failures if there is asymmetric information or split incentives,
such as household heating where neither landlord nor tenant has incentives to in-
vest in insulation if prospective tenants have difficulty in estimating future utility
bills. The externalities that are thought to be influential in processes of innova-
tion, for example the low cost of adopting of new knowledge, increasing returns to
scale, adoptive externalities and the development of standardized technology and
expertise, also suggest that policies that drive widespread learning and diffusion
will be more effective than market instruments. Nevertheless, these situations are
considered if not exceptional then untypical, and chapters 14 and 15 of the review
provide unambiguous support for a uniform carbon price with broad spatial and
sectoral coverage on the basis of efficiency, cost effectiveness and the productive
gains from economic specialization15. Bohringer’s (2003) commentary on the Kyoto
15 The converse is the expectation of corrective tariffs were a small group of nations to take on greater
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Protocol similarly concludes that “...the implementation rules of emissions abate-
ment should comply with basic efficiency criteria. Most importantly, the harmo-
nization of marginal abatement costs across space through the use of market based
instruments.” The specific justification of property rights over emissions taxes are
in mainstream economic analysis of climate policy secondary to the broad support
for putatively efficient market based instruments per se. Broad spatial coverage is
justified on the basis of the physical properties of long lived well mixed greenhouse
gases; for instance “the geographic source of GHG emissions is irrelevant to their cli-
mate change impact. Therefore, GHG emission reductions are a global, rather than
local, public good and can be traded in a global market” (Gillenwater et al., 2007).
The simplest form of emissions trading scheme, ’cap and trade’, creates property
rights for a specified quantity of emissions in a given time period and allocates these
to the sources of pollution to be regulated. They are allowed then to trade freely
between themselves to the point that at reckoning they each hold as many permits
as they have produced pollution. Abatement decisions are directed at the level of
the regulated entity, be it state, firm or individual, by the price signal present in
the emissions market either directly or as an opportunity cost of not selling permits
held. There are many analysts who would subscribed to Ellerman’s position and
Hansjurgens, in the same volume, summarises the economic, political, and physical
rationale for this kind of instrument (Hansjurgens, 2005, p223–226)16:
Abatement costs vary substantially among emissions sources so that market ori-
ented instruments, including emissions taxes, present theoretical advantages
over uniform standards. This is especially great when the diversity of source
activities and the differences between industrialized and developing economies
is considered.
Existing regulation is absent in most jurisdictions so that participants in trading
schemes have substantial flexibility in the means of achieving abatement.
Damage costs are uncertain and there is reason to believe that the potential re-
sponse of the climate system has damage thresholds and positive feedbacks.
Introduction of trading is politically feasible because allocation rules can be set
to secure the support of vested interests and industry lobby groups. Although
carbon price and attempt to protect domestic industry from competitors in unregulated nations.
16 I do not attempt here to provide an appraisal of the strength of each argument only a brief presenta-
tion.
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auctioning is theoretically superior the real politik is that incumbent polluters
need to be compensated for the imposition of new regulation.
Efficiency in innovation trading provides incentives to stimulate innovation con-
tinuously and maintain dynamic efficiency in a way taxes and standards do
not.
Relevant pollutants are measurable especially carbon emission through fossil fuel
proxy accounting so such schemes are easy to implement. Greenhouse gases
can be compared in carbon equivalents although their measurement may be
more difficult. The administrative level of implementation should be decided
on the basis of transaction costs and enforceability.
Relevant pollutants are uniformly mixed and long lived so that ’hot spots’ do not
form and the location and time of emission are insignificant. Abatement can
therefore be reorganized by market participants to occur at the lowest cost time
and place.
As should be apparent from the discussion of economic analysis of climate change
in section 2.3, many of these arguments do not apply uniquely to emissions trading
or the creation of property rights. Indeed, proponents of a carbon tax or a sim-
ilar set of Pigouvian instruments would also appeal to the efficiency of the price
mechanism, necessity in a regulatory void, and the physical characteristics of the
pollutants. Mainstream neoclassical analysis of the pros and cons of these two in-
struments usually emphasizes their equivalent ability to achieve optimal or least cost
emissions reductions under idealized conditions. If uncertainty is admitted, then in
theory price (tax) instruments will be more efficient than quantity instruments (trad-
ing) if the marginal abatement cost curve is considered to be comparatively flat in
relation to the marginal social benefit curve and vice versa if it is steeper (Weitzman,
1974). Hepburn (2006) argues on this basis that unless we are on the threshold of a
’tipping point’ then a price instrument, such as an internationally harmonized car-
bon tax, would be superior to a quantity instrument. If there are extra emissions in
the short term then they contribute little to the problem overall and can be remedied
by an increase in the tax and consequently abatement in the future.
Richard Sandor, founder of the Chicago Climate Exchange, the world’s first green-
house gas trading exchange (CCX, 2010), places greater emphasis on the incen-
tives for agents in his justification of emissions trading especially those of the en-
trepreneur to generate profits from the demand for the new commodities (Sandor
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et al., 2002). He describes the history of market institution development as being ini-
tiated by capital as structural changes cause demand for investment in a new sector.
This is followed by the standardization of a commodity and the development of the
legal means of assigning ownership. Climate policy, until recent times, was predom-
inantly the domain of nation state regulation and supra-national regime formation
(Bulkeley, 2005) but Sandor et al illustrate the diversity of organisations and scales
of interaction that characterized early greenhouse gas trading (Sandor et al., 2002).
However, in making a historical-political argument around the driving force for the
development of market institutions, namely demand for capital, there is not a clear
explanation why systems of taxation and subsidy were not similarly able to direct
capital. Those who adhere to a ’government failure’ model of economic regulation
are wary of the opportunities for rent seeking that the allocation of emissions prop-
erty rights or the collection of tax revenues provide. However, in the absence of
an ultra libertarian common law and liability framework, all market based policies
involve a central coordinating bureaucracy that may or may not be subject to these
concerns which only empirical demonstration will distinguish. Indeed, the opposite
may well be the case as revenue raised by environmental market based instruments,
including auctions of emissions permits, may provide other benefits as Hepburn
(2006) details:
1. Revenue recycling can be used to reduce other distortionary taxes (such as on
labour) and increase welfare indirectly. This is a case for revenue generation
per se and against grandfathering. Pigouvian taxation would also realise this
’double dividend’ (Goulder, 1995).
2. More efficient regulation as it avoids incentives to distort emissions baseline
e.g. by increasing an output used as an allocation proxy.
3. Starts from basis of the polluter pays principle, allocating rights to a clean en-
vironment to the public represented by the state in the first instance.
4. Rents from grandfathered permits would accumulated with shareholders of
beneficiary firms who typically represent the richest members of society (Boven-
berg et al., 2005).
5. Revenue raising is conspicuous, focusing public and regulated parties’ atten-
tion on the policy and its broader objectives.
These arguments apply across a number of institutional scales, according to whether
the revenue raising is taken to be local, national or international. However, a dis-
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tinct feature of property rights systems is that the majority of financial flows from
trading activity are not public revenues but are directed by the price mechanism
rather than a bureaucracy. This is most often interpreted as providing the benefit
of the efficiency and information processing attributes of the market institution. In
the context of contemporary climate mitigation, it is also often noted that i) these
are flows of private economic resources and ii) they may occur from rich northern
economies to the global south as support for investment in mitigation in areas with
limited capital. Links to the developing world are cast as both efficient and benevo-
lent (Stern, 2006, Chapter 15). However, given that this is a substantial distributional
concern it is apparent that there will be resistance from agents who feel their inter-
ests jeopardized, be they states, sectors, firms, civil society groups or individuals,
and mainstream economic theory has little to say on the matter. For this reason,
amongst others, trading systems that begin with a cap are politically charged at the
level of international regimes. Understandably, developing nations consider the in-
troduction of the economic burden of abatement costs on their industrial activity to
be a regressive and unjust requirement, especially if it is not matched by meaning-
ful commitment to reductions from rich economies. Chichilnisky and Heal (1998),
whilst supporting a greenhouse gas trading system, argue contrary to Coase The-
orem that efficiency and distribution are inseparable as a benign climate is a pub-
lic good, and that marginal utility of consumption decreases with income. Indeed,
the European Union opposed the introduction of emissions trading between nations
during the development of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol on the basis that rich na-
tions ought to demonstrate leadership by initiating domestic reductions rather than
buying reductions from overseas (Sorrell & Skea, 1999, p365).
There is also the assumption in much of the economics literature that the specifica-
tion of appropriate property rights is a straightforward process and that the problem
of climate change mitigation is undoubtedly amenable to being framed in terms of
commodification. The deleterious effects of greenhouse gas releases are indeed felt
across a wide spatial and temporal scale rather than at the point of emissions and
so do not cause ’hot spots’ of environmental harm. The UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol
identifies a basket of six gases as meeting the criterion of being long lived and well
mixed; CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs, HFCs. These represent the majority although
certainly not all of the agents responsible for radiative forcing (see for instance fig 2
from IPCC AR4 WG1 chapter 2). Of course, the social means and consequences of
commodification are a central part of the critique of market governance offered by
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Marxian political economists (Bond, 2008).
Within the emissions trading paradigm there are a number of possibilities for orga-
nizing the institutions themselves. ’Cap and trade’, permit based systems are the
most discussed and theorized, as above, but the empirical focus of this thesis are the
credit based systems, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and var-
ious voluntary institutions, that allow for the integration of economic agents based
in uncapped economies or sectors. Briefly, in these institutions, property rights are
created on the basis of a defined project achieving a specified environmental per-
formance standard. The credits generated for ’over-compliance’ can then be traded
with other entities failing to meet their particular performance standard.
The CDM was explicitly designed to reduce the costs of compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol for the rich nations and direct foreign investment, expertise and technology
to developing economies (Grubb et al., 1999). Primarily adopted as a component of
corporate social responsibility, voluntary institutions provide a pseudo carbon price
to participating organisations and individuals both on supply and demand side of
exchange. There are two aspects to the economic justification for credit schemes; i)
there are substantially differing energy efficiencies and hence marginal abatement
costs between participating entities and ii) market incentives will find lowest cost
reductions and minimize bureaucratic losses (Jackson et al., 2001, p38). Whilst there
is a substantial environmental economics literature on climate change broadly (see
above and Heal, 2009) empirical work on the crediting model of emissions trading is
available but limited. Brechet and Lussis (2006) perform a marginal abatement cost
partial equilibrium analysis that under their reference assumptions suggests that
Belgium could achieve 83% of its abatement overseas through the purchase of CDM
and JI instruments at a 2010 marginal carbon price of US$6.9 per tonne. They also
trumpet the affordability of such a strategy, concluding that it would reduce total
abatement costs by an order of magnitude echoed in other similar work (Chen, 2003;
Anger et al., 2007; Blyth et al., 2009). More recently the UK Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) has developed an econometric model, GLOCAF, to
estimate the price and availability of offset credits under particular circumstances,
to aid national planning and to inform UNFCCC negotiations (CCC, 2008, p164).
To summarize, the mainstream economic account of and justification for market
based instruments for climate change mitigation is centred on realizing cost effec-
tiveness in abatement. Key points of distinction and disagreement between schools
of thought relate to the possibility of achieving a theoretically optimal degree of
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abatement and allocation of effort in the global economy. Discussions of the relative
benefits of a Pigouvian tax over property rights approaches relate predominantly
to the structure of uncertainty in costs and benefit functions and political economic
and institutional economic aspects of the systems that are absent from this theoret-
ical framework. Returning to the questions set out in Chapter 1, if we are to learn
more about how emissions trading institutions operate and what the consequences
are for climate change mitigation, we need a theoretical framework that places the
institutions themselves at the forefront of analysis and considers agents’ behaviour
to be shaped by the institutional context. These systems undoubtedly deserve eco-
nomic analysis, in the substantive sense that they relate to the material provisioning
of society, but there is also the need to consider more fully the social and biophys-
ical processes the commodification process envelopes. Whilst some environmental
economists opine that their arguments are insufficiently realised in environmental
policies (Pearce, 2002; Helm, 2005), the next chapter details alternative perspectives
that are critical of reductive formal analysis and the impacts of policies based on its
prescriptions.
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3. Neo-Polanyian Perspectives and the
Instituted Economic Process
Framework
The instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity and
stability; it produces a structure with a definite function in society; it
shifts the place of the process in society, thus adding significance to its
history; it centres interest on values, motives and policy (Polanyi, 1957,
p249–250).
The neoclassical framework at the centre of environmental governance through mar-
ket based instruments purports to explain the functioning and underlying structure
of economic phenomena. Price, the behaviour of agents, the meaning of welfare,
the format of a commodity, the nature and transmission of information and a raft
of other phenomena are deployed conceptually and either explained internally by
deduction or specified in assumptions and preconditions. This section outlines an
alternative, and it will be argued superior, framework that maintains economic ac-
tivity as its central focus but adopts a different conceptual apparatus. The origin
is in the economic history and anthropology of Karl Polanyi where the idea of ’the
economy as instituted process’ is first used to explain the variability within and be-
tween actually existing economies (Polanyi, 1957, Chapter 13). In Trade and Market
in the Early Empires he develops the argument that the substantive economy, the
social process of meeting material want satisfaction, is variously instituted in dif-
ferent times and places. Although superficially similar to the varieties of capitalism
literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mikler, 2009), neo-Polanyian work emphasises the
way economic activity is dynamically instituted in relation to other social, legal and
political institutions and the dynamics of variation rather than primarily providing
a static taxonomy (Ramlogan & Harvey, 2003). The instituted economic processes
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(IEP) framework1 is oriented towards institutional considerations rather than pre-
dominantly firm (agent) centred explanations as the varieties of capitalism litera-
ture (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p6)2 and is much more comprehensive in the types of
economic processes that are conceptualised. This wider frame of reference is pro-
foundly different to the axiomatic, isolated, essentialised capitalism of classical and
neoclassical economic theory.
Institutionalisation as a process ranges in explicitness from legal codes to social
norms, stability from a matter of years to centuries, and scale from a household
to a transnational institution, including the possibility of a given agent interacting
in multiscalar economic processes. These features of variation exist within different
processes and indicate the necessity of careful and specific analysis of, for example,
end product markets, labour and employment patterns, price formation, innovation
and product standardisation. Accordingly, processes of innovation can be seen not
only in terms of knowledge dynamics or intra-firm technical change but also through
the reconfiguration of whole supply chains, novel producer-consumer interactions,
or the result of particular exchange structures such as multiple monopsony (Coombs
et al., 2003). This attention to variety and process has substantial implications for
analysis of economic change and growth, richly illustrated in Harvey’s work on in-
novation, competition and distribution in UK food retailing (Harvey, 2000). The
following section will detail the IEP perspective and illustrate its utility in examin-
ing market processes through the lens of ’the organisation of exchange’. However, it
is first it is useful to briefly précis Polanyi’s foundational contribution.
Across his academic corpus, Polanyi’s intention is to explain the arrangement and
integration of economic activity in its own historic and geographic circumstances,
rather than formulating universal economic ’laws’. From this rather modest initial
theoretical starting point his best known work, The Great Transformation, proffers an
explanation of the socio-economic breakdown that lead to the rise of fascism and
communism culminating in two world wars. He cites four institutions that were at
the heart of 19th century Western civilization (Polanyi, 2001, p3):
1. The balance of power system that lead to the Hundred Years’ Peace
2. The gold standard, an unprecedented economic institution extending the mar-
1 The change of emphasis from Polanyi’s original ’economy as instituted process’ to Harvey and Ran-
dles’ ’instituted economic process’ is considered later.
2 This is not to say Polanyi provides explanation in terms of structurally determined action but rather
that institutions as objective structures generated by intentional agents are the focus of analysis.
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3. The self-regulating market, which was the dominant of the four
4. The liberal state, constructed in support of the self-regulating market
The self-regulating market in Polanyi’s framework is a particular mode of eco-
nomic integration. Integration implies that there is a matrix of interdependent so-
cial and economic systems that mutually conform with one another; a more com-
plex and consolidated set of circumstances than a simple multiplicity of exchanges.
In Polanyi’s terms, recognisably economic processes occur under all social config-
urations and modes of integration. Drawing on examples from the Trobriand Is-
lands, Dahomey, Hellenic civilisations and English post-medieval history he identi-
fies three distinct patterns of integration that structure economic processes and are
echoed by other social institutions rather than remaining as isolated actions (Polanyi,
1957, p251):
Reciprocity between symmetrical economic agents, such as households or kinship
groups, not limited to two parties but engaging in reciprocal, non calculative
behaviour. Standards of ’equivalence’, for want of a better word, are not for-
mally set and maintenance of the pattern is by social disapprobrium rather
than strict enforcement of one kind or another.
Redistribution via an ’allocative centre’, an authoritative institution of some sort,
such as monarchy, church or nation state. Goods are collected, physically or
conceptually, and reallocated via custom, law or central authority. For example
food sharing after a hunt or through systems of collectivised grain storage.
Exchange agent to agent through price making markets, with supportive institu-
tions of individuated agents and distributed property rights. Price making
markets are only regarded as integrative in so far as prices propagate between
commodities and have wider indirect effects. Historically Polanyi describes
how trade has been diversely instituted, often with restrictions on the types
of goods that may be exchanged, the identity and status of participants in ex-
change and the spatial scales over which circuits of exchange operate.
These forms are not mutually exclusive within a given society. For example, as
Polanyi notes ”Reciprocity as a form of integration gains greatly in power through
its capacity of employing both redistribution and exchange as subordinate measures.
Reciprocity may be attained through sharing the burden of labour according to def-
inite rules of redistribution as when ’taking a turn”’ (p253). Each form has corre-
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sponding modes of social integration, such as the household, monarchy and market
society3 respectively, and Polanyi is emphatic about these broader institutional pre-
conditions that are required for a particular mode to dominate economic activity in
the substantive sense. This is central to the main thesis of The Great Transformation,
which is presented in contingent historical terms but explained by appealing to the
ontological reality of institutions. He argues that the self-regulating market required
an unprecedented rearrangement of wider aspects of society and culture to create
a system of price making markets. Market rationality then came to dominate the
organisation of human society ”...together with the surface of mother earth, which
could now be freely marketed, into industrial units under the command of private
persons mainly engaged in buying and selling for profit” (Polanyi, 1977, p9, cited
in Cangiani, 2003). It is this resulting economic arrangement that Polanyi consid-
ers to some extent ”disembedded”4; the material provisioning of society, no longer
organised by social institutions with other non-economic functions and socially de-
fined rationalities, becomes to the greater extent dominated by prices and self in-
terested behaviour. Where economic production may have previously been con-
ducted within a family unit, overlaid with other responsibilities and motivations, in
the market society the attitudes of individuals, preferences in mainstream economic
terms, became oriented around a self-centred economic rationality. ”A whole cul-
ture— with all its possibilities and limitations—and the picture of inner man and
society induced by life in a market economy necessarily followed from the essential
structure of a human community organised through the market”(Polanyi, 1977, p10,
cited in Cangiani, 2003). To this end, Polanyi preferred the term ”market society” to
capitalism with its rather opaque foundation of ”value in motion” (Block, 2003).
A transformation to an entirely self-regulated market and creation of an autonomous
3 Polanyi infrequently uses the term capitalism.
4 Polanyi also insists that complete separation is an impossibility (2001, p205) and this has been de-
veloped further by Block (2003) in the notion of the ”always embedded market economy”. Krippner
and Alvarez (2007) discuss different interpretations of the contradiction between Polanyi’s histori-
cal description of the late 19th century British disembedded market society and his theoretical pre-
sentation of the double movement. Peculiarly, despite his own limited deployment of the term,
Polanyi is often associated with the concept of embeddedness (Randles, 2003; Harvey et al., 2007).
Typically, he is cited alongside Granovetter’s celebrated paper (1985) invoking embeddedness as
a supplement to mainstream economics and interpreted as the social connectedness of individual
agents. This is to overlook his very different conceptualisation of the economy and economic activ-
ity, where (dis)embeddedness is a property of institutions not individuals (Harvey et al., 2007). The
development of the factory system during the industrial revolution demonstrates the complexities
of ”disembedding”; a novel institutional configuration of wage labour, flows of natural resources
and exchange of money, whose theorists aspired to self-regulation through the market system but
saw how much remained attached to socio-political institutions.
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economy with a complete separation of economic activity from social institutions
could never be achieved. Polanyi argues that the consequences of freely fluctuating
prices having such power over man and nature ”implied a stark utopia” (2001, p74)
which caused great material suffering for some, reduced social cohesion, increased
personal insecurity and diminished solidarity. This stimulated reflexive social pro-
tection, through institutions such as the Speenhamland Law, which in turn caused
economic incoherence, impairment of market function and further social disruption
(Polanyi, 2001, Chapter 7). He termed this tension, between the social and institu-
tional resistance to market outcomes and the internal tendency of market society, its
agents and ideas, to further conform itself to market rationality, the double move-
ment. Randles (2003) argues that this concept is inherently ’open’ given Polanyi’s
insistence on contingent institutional situations whilst Harvey, Randles and Ramlo-
gan (2007) link the double movement into his conception of specifically economic
processes and their place in society (emphasis in original):
Embedded does not mean social as against economic. Economic processes
do not become less economic when they are embedded, or more eco-
nomic when disembedded. So also, ’disembedded’ does not reduce to
’self-regulated’. Even less does ’market-economic’ equate to ’asocial eco-
nomic’. In the light of later works, it is therefore implausible to have an
interpretation of the ’double movement’ as a to-ing and fro-ing between
embeddedness and disembeddedness. The double movement makes
more sense, in this retrospective re-fashioning, as a dialectic of regulation
and de-regulation within a historical process resulting in differentiated
modes of economic governance as a particular domain within contem-
porary governance structures (Harvey et al., 2007, p11).
As such, there are various possible interpretations of causality and consequence of
the double movement in market societies; i) the emergence of market restraint and
social protection through state regulation ii) strategic co-construction of regulation,
directed by market participants in their own interests, endogenously and iteratively,
and iii) regulation led market construction either from the state to achieve a partic-
ular objective or by proto-market participants prior to the creation of demand and
market activity. These are themes that will be drawn upon substantially in the later
empirical chapters.
Polanyi’s theory stands against both laissez faire market liberalism and orthodox
Marxism (Block, 2001, p xxix); on the one hand he shows how formal economic
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ideals are impossible utopias but on the other hand he opens the possibility of mar-
ket exchange structured by democratic institutions. However, he recognised that
the freedom that any given society has to determine its own fate is restricted by
the institutional milleu it sits within. In chapters 2 & 3 of The Great Transformation
Polanyi uses the gold standard to illustrate the limited political options that any na-
tional government faced in the protection of its peoples’ interests, one consequence
of which was the rise of fascism which dissolved both market liberalism and democ-
racy. The gold standard had been instituted to provide security to the financial sector
in its investments and dealings overseas, by guaranteeing that participating curren-
cies would have a common basis and hence value could be circulated freely. It in-
stitutionalised a transnational interest in peace and stability. However, in operation
it also provoked border tariffs to protect currencies and domestic economies from
trade deficits, deflation with associated uncertainty for the business community and
substantial fluctuations in income for the workforce. These acts fuelled the imperial
rivalry of Britain and Germany, as colonial economies became necessary to supply
material resources and subordinate trading partners of sufficient scale to pacify do-
mestic class tension.
The concept of the fictitious commodity complements the notion of the double
movement in The Great Transformation’s explanatory framework whilst also repre-
senting a normative position. For Polanyi, commodities were characterised as things
produced for exchange and it was apparent to him that land, labour and money were
qualitatively different entities. Their subordination to markets, in classical theory
and 19th century actuality, relied upon a fiction that was inherently inappropriate
and unstable. This instability is revealed also in the complementary side of the ar-
gument, that real commodities are produced for exchange and instituted as such.
Under these arrangements, economic activity is no longer production for use within
the household or village but for integration into wider processes of circulation of
goods. As a result, wage labourers become dependent upon and hence vulnerable
to larger scale socio-economic dynamics than in other modes of economic integra-
tion where more local phenomena dictated their fate. With respect to the commodity
fiction of labour, Polanyi writes:
Labor is only another name for human activity which goes with life it-
self... nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored
or mobilized... Nevertheless it is with the help of this fiction that the
actual markets for labor, land and money are organised... To allow the
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market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings...
would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ”la-
bor power”, cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left
unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be
the bearer of this peculiar commodity (Polanyi, 2001, p74–75).
Land, or nature, similarly does not readily conform to the market model, due to
its own autonomous dynamics and its inevitably incomplete incorporation into the
market. Empirical consideration of money systems, invariably issued and guaran-
teed by the state, itself a political institution, reinforces Polanyi’s claim of the in-
separability of economy and society (Block, 1994; Polanyi, 2001, p205). Exchange
money is not a commodity like any other but is a specifically economic institution.
Its unique properties create new possibilities and problems. Of the gold standard
period, Polanyi writes ”In contrast to men and goods, money was free from all ham-
pering measures and continued to develop its capacity to transact business at any
distance at any time. The more difficult it became to shift actual objects, the easier it
became to transmit claims to them” (Polanyi, 2001, p215). As money was transferred
into an autonomous market, such as was the intention of the gold standard regime, it
destabilised all other exchanges. This had such an influence over productive activity
that the consequences were inevitably socially intolerable. The financial imbalances
created between nations could not be solved by the self-regulating market so politi-
cal, and in these circumstances violent, resolutions were required.
In Polanyi’s analysis, the subjugation of labour, land and money to market rational-
ity could only lead to social and ecological breakdown because the systems which
produced and regulated them were incompatible with the isolated and calculative
dynamics of a self-regulating market system. It is with this framework that he ex-
plains the dynamics and history of England through the nineteenth century and ac-
counts for the subsequent world wars. Recently, Polanyian themes have been used in
contemporary discussions of neoliberalisation and environmental governance gen-
erally (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck, 2008; Castree, 2008a) and specifically con-
sidering labelling and ethical consumption (Guthman, 2007; Hughes et al., 2008), en-
vironmental accounting and quantification (Lohmann, 2009), natural resource man-
agement (Mansfield, 2004) and water privatization (Bakker, 2005).
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3.1. The Instituted Economic Processes approach
The IEP framework is a theoretical approach that draws on Polanyi’s insights and
has been used variously to examine the structure of UK food retailing (Harvey,
2000), the dynamics of innovation (Coombs et al., 2003), the organisation of call
centres and their relations to other economic institutions (Glucksmann, 2007), the
organisation of exchange in general (Randles & Harvey, 2002), the genesis of mobile
telephony in the EU (Mina, 2003), multiple aspects of food technology, production,
distribution and consumption using the tomato as an ”empirical probe” (Harvey
et al., 2002), mergers and interdependent markets (Randles, 2002) and transforma-
tions of economic structure more broadly (Harvey & Metcalfe, 2004). The central
objects of these studies are the socio-economic institutions that structure economic
activity and how they vary over time. Process and change are key; as organisations
and agents interact they alter both their own characteristics and their patterns of
interaction, co-constructing institutions. For instance Harvey, Quilley and Beynon
(Harvey et al., 2002) go beyond commodity analysis, such as Appadurai’s (1986)
that focuses on things only because they are exchanged and only through the lens of
exchange. They use the tomato as an example of a compound of bio-socio-economic
institutions to probe contemporary capitalism and reveal new insights into its vari-
ations and dynamics.
Distinct from other economic theories, the approach does not presume markets or
market norms to operate within every economic setting, allowing for thoroughgo-
ing analysis of the public sector’s economic activities and the levying of taxes in
the first instance. Surprisingly, Polanyi has little to say about technological innova-
tion, the internal dynamics of institutional change and competition in market and
non-market settings, yet these are areas where his analytical method has been suc-
cessfully applied. Randles (2003) presents the case for ”Polanyian inspired” work,
which extends the theoretical tools within a complementary framework, either on
the grounds that many contingent situations were not in existence at his time of writ-
ing or in order to correct inconsistencies or fill gaps, such as his own misapplication
of the fictitious commodities argument to circumstances where market exchange of-
ten does not exist, such as the hiring of labour.
It is within the Polanyi inspired literature that this thesis sits, concerning a topic that
Polanyi could not have anticipated and which requires a more detailed meso scale
analytical framework than he provides. The following section will therefore present
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neo-Polanyian IEP perspectives on; i) dynamics and change in society and the econ-
omy, ii) the modern nature-society binary, iii) the characterisation of economic pro-
cesses, iv) ’the organisation of exchange’ as a conceptual lens through which to ex-
amine market-type institutions.
3.1.1. Dynamics and change
The IEP approach recognises variation in social integration of economic activity
(meta level - see 3.1.3), variation in forms of capitalism (macro level), variation in
markets exchange within capitalist systems (meso level - see 3.2) and variation in
agents’ interactions (micro level). The emphasis on processes is necessary to explain
order, stability and homogeneity as much as change, variation and transformation.
In circumstances of substantial or rapid change, with the emergence of and stabili-
sation of new norms, it is more fruitful to consider the process of ”instituting” rather
than the operation of rigid ’institutions’ (Mina, 2003). It is a mistake to confuse
economic order as equilibrium, indeed were the conditions for equilibrium to be
fulfilled a market institution would serve no purpose. Market institutions are insep-
arable from conditions of change, pervasive uncertainty and novelty. Harvey and
Metcalfe (2004) discuss both Schumpeterian and Polanyian perspectives on markets
institutions’ influences on structural change; the former considering intra-market
endogenous growth and change, the latter broader social change and the shifting
boundaries of market institutions. In developing a case study of food exchange and
distribution in Covent Garden Market they distinguish Polanyi’s unique insight into
the historical processes of instituting economic activities and also his oversight on
the innovative dynamics of market economies that mark Schumpeter’s major con-
tribution. Rather than adopt the evolutionary economics trope of the ’selection envi-
ronment’ they clarify that prevailing patterns of exchange and distribution are ”not
so much an external selection environment for novel innovations, but the framing in-
ternal conditions under which innovation is undertaken” (Harvey & Metcalfe, 2004,
p23).
3.1.2. IEP and the nature-society binary
This matter of dynamic co-construction applies equally to the commonly held nature-
society binary. In IEP terms the two are not considered as separate realms, each
providing a neutral, static environment for the other to operate within, to its own
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laws. Whilst not going so far as to invoke a wholly relational ontology, as per La-
tour Callon and Law’s actor-network theory, IEP comprehends the two as mutu-
ally interacting causal domains. For example, as human activities alter landscapes
for agriculture, other patterns of economic activity, settlement, production and con-
sumption, including ’entirely social’ relations such as financial contracts, are affected
simultaneously with biophysical phenomena like ecosystem species composition,
evolutionary selection pressures, eutrophication and sedimentation. In turn each
set of conditions and processes continually remakes the other, realising contingent
outcomes. Harvey et al (Harvey et al., 2002, p263) illustrate this relationship in the
case of BSE and new variant CJD in the UK food industry of the 1990s. Whilst the
behaviour of prion proteins has a biological causality, that they were not destroyed
by socio-politically defined sterilisation procedures had substantial economic con-
sequences and was profoundly influenced by lay-expert-state relationships in scien-
tific risk assessment. Ontologically, the IEP framework is critical realist, and takes
the position that there is no autonomous economic realm; rather contingent, overde-
termined outcomes arise from the interrelations with other domains.
The modern separation of nature and society into separate realms has been substan-
tially examined and deconstructed elsewhere in contemporary geographic literature
(Castree, 1995; Harvey, 1996). Ginn and Demeritt (2009) neatly illustrate the epis-
temic difficulties of the binary through the oxymoron ’natural food’. In practice,
all food production and consumption occurs within economic institutions and is
imbued with inter-subjective meaning; that some modes of production are deemed
sufficiently archaic or traditional to warrant labelling as ’natural’ serves only to bring
out further social controversies. Harvey, Quilley and Beynon’s work on the tomato
(2002) extend the the IEP framework into the realm of ’nature’ by describing how
domesticated plant and animal breeds, Burmese cats or Jersey potatoes for instance,
are best understood as bio-socio-economic institutions. Their evolutionary path is
shaped both by their material circumstances and artificial selection subject to the
varying commercial agricultural practices, household economies, fashions and so-
cial norms of what constitutes the right characteristic for an individual organism as
a representative of the breed. Horticulture, national cuisines, GM technologies and
supermarket retailing can be similarly comprehended.
Although the IEP approach considers institutional variety it does not treat each em-
pirical case as unique or peculiar, subscribing to a wholesale relativism. As detailed
in the next section, number of core and specifically economic processes organise the
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analysis and provide a framework for comparative studies.
3.1.3. Specifically economic processes
Polanyi’s work that forms the basis of the IEP approach considers pre-capitalist,
socialist and capitalist forms of economic organisation within the same conceptual
framework by defining specifically economic processes and situating them within a
wider set of social institutions (1957). Firstly it bears repeating that his definition of
the economy is substantivist (see p111) and specifically concerned with the material
reproduction of humanity. Secondly, whilst the emphasis is placed on ”the econ-
omy as an instituted process” alternating emphasis with the neo-Polanyian instituted
economic process framework, this distinction is primarily a matter of scales of inter-
est, macro social patterns of integration versus meso scale processes of institutions,
rather than a divergent reinterpretation.
Polanyi argues that historical circumstances present specifically economic processes,
that may be more or less differentiated from other social, political and cultural pro-
cesses. His analysis is primarily concerned with locational movements of physical
goods, writing that appropriation and distribution, the processes of goods chang-
ing hands and changing place respectively, are the pre-eminent and distinctively
economic processes which ”Between them, these two kinds of movement may be
said to exhaust the possibilities comprised in the economic process” (Polanyi, 1957,
p248). This neglect of processes of production and consumption and the immaterial
aspects of economic activity is addressed in contemporary analysis (Harvey et al.,
2002; Randles & Harvey, 2002). Polanyi distinguishes between different means of
appropriation, via physical transaction, or via disposition, i.e. by legal or authorita-
tive decree. As described earlier (p77) the preconditions for economic integration in
a given mode include non-economic institutions, in religion and government for in-
stance, which have persistent and widespread effects. Aspects of a mode may be in-
stituted quite differently and with different social consequences. For example, three
types of exchange are possible, only one of which is associated with market society;
operational exchange which is the change in location of goods through trade, decisional
exchange at an independently set rate and integrative exchange at a bargained rate
in antagonistic market encounters. Empirically, this latter form achieves economic
and social significance as land and food become ”mobilized through exchange, and
labour [is] turned into a commodity free to be purchased in the market.” (Polanyi,
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1957, p255). This is not to imply that there is an inevitable temporal sequence, in
the manner of Marx’s historical materialism; the different modes of integration, reci-
procity, redistribution and exchange do not represent stages of economic develop-
ment and indeed may operate simultaneously.
This anthropological stance disputes the universalist proposition that all trade is
market based, and that all money is exchange money. It distinguishes historical
instances of trade incentivised by personal gain from trade associated with other
social functions, for example as a symbolic act to gain public status or a duty as-
sociated with social status (Polanyi 1957 p259). Similarly, different types of money
can be identified according to social situation of their use and its economic function.
Polanyi specifies three types; payment money to meet diverse but non-market obliga-
tions, such as a dowry, standard money for the equating of different goods in accounts
or taxation systems, and exchange money for use in indirect market exchange of goods
(p265). Each type may be diversely instituted with other norms, for example stan-
dard money may operate in both administrated set-price markets and competitive
integrative markets. These distinctions are drawn out in the IEP approach by ex-
amining the four core economic processes, production, consumption, exchange and
distribution, and their institutional context.
Harvey (2007) provides greater clarification. Production is the transformation of the
qualitative characteristics of objects and activities by the use of labour and technol-
ogy. Consumption similarly concerns qualitative transformation but occurs where
resources, including immaterial services, are used up so that they can no longer be
exchanged. Appropriation and the process of exchange is the matter of ownership,
the instituting and transfer of property rights between individual, collective or social
entities. Finally, distribution is the movement across space and time of objects and
people for economic ends. Whilst being distinct from one another, these core pro-
cesses are mutually dependent which gives rise to their definition as economic. This
forms the basis of a claim to a relational ontology; it is the relations between these
processes that constitutes their economic specificity and reality. For example, a cul-
tural or personal leisure activity such as walking a dog, becomes recognisably eco-
nomic when performed for money and associated with contracts for employment or
services. ’Process’ also emphasises the concatenation of economic activity over time,
in that no single market is self sustaining nor are exchanges unique and timeless. An
empirical case such as the simple can of tomato soup might show, for instance, how
consumption end markets relate to both social institutions such as domestic labour,
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how mass standardisation favoured particular modes of exchange and retail arenas,
how the dynamics of innovation depend upon bio-socio-economic production sys-
tems and how patterns of spatial and temporal availability themselves dependent
upon distribution networks and storage technologies (Harvey et al., 2002, p268).
Whilst IEP does not provide a the basis for universal causal accounts, the analytical
tools applied post facto are able to illuminate economic activity in a unique way.
3.2. IEP and the organisation of exchange
Although founded in economic sociology, the IEP approach has the potential to con-
tribute to analysis of market based instruments for environmental governance, pre-
viously considered predominantly by political scientists and human geographers if
at all outside of environmental economics. The distinctly economic aspects of these
governance structures warrant an economic theorisation. IEP offers a means to bet-
ter understand processes of commodification in this circumstance, admitting a sub-
tlety and diversity to the possible dynamics of ’the market’. As has previously been
noted (p77), exchange processes can be empirically observed to be instituted in a
variety of ways. Taking an anthropological approach to Adam Smith’s proposal that
there is a propensity in human nature to ”truck, barter, and exchange one thing for
another” (Smith, 1993, p21) Polanyi describes how reciprocal gift exchange is his-
torically the first mode of economic allocation and distribution outside of the village
unit. It is on this basis that Dolfsma and Spithooven (2008) refute the NIE claims that
”silent trade”, and that primitive and universal propensity to ”truck and barter”, can
exist between parties that have not previously been in contact, do not share language
and have a very minimal common frame of reference. This substantial disagreement
hinges on the importance of oft overlooked non-economic institutions for the con-
duct of economic activities, in this case language and learning in relation to market
exchange.
Randles & Harvey (2002) develop an analytical framework to systematise this di-
versity and to incorporate non-market exchanges of labour, goods and services in
the same terms. Whilst the IEP framework identifies four core economic processes,
which cannot be entirely ontologically detached and thus ought not to be method-
ologically, exchange bears a more substantial theoretical consideration than produc-
tion, consumption and distribution. Mainstream accounts of market relations typ-
ically conform to Weber’s basic model of two symmetrical buy and sell crowds,
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interacting in isolated, one time, irreversible, unequivocal exchange events Swed-
berg (1994). However, it is clear that exchange processes cannot be instituted in the
same way for all types of market and thus be amenable to the same formal analysis;
labour, capital and end-product markets have substantially different characteristics.
Randles & Harvey (2002) propose a three step analysis to identify the general organ-
isation of a set of exchanges:
1. Identify differentiated and separate classes of economic agent between which exchanges
occur, and detail the nature of entities exchanged. Class in this useage means an
discernible group of agents with a distinct economic function in common with
each other. Mutual dependencies and asymmetries in (diverse) power rela-
tions exist at the level of class to class not agent to agent. It is perfectly pos-
sible for a given entity to be a member of multiple classes; for example I am
currently both a consumer of university tuition and a consumer of electronic
goods. These goods are exchanged in quite different markets, arising from
quite different instituted processes of separation of the parties to exchange.
2. Specify interdependence with other classes of agent and of non-market exchanges, e.g.
public infrastructures funded by taxation. The purpose here is to identify the in-
teractions and reliance between instituted exchanges. For instance, sellers in
a given market need to purchase inputs to their production activities. Buyers
often need to buy a number of goods in combination with one another. These
inter-dependencies also concern non-market exchanges such as the education
provided by the state and the household reproduction of the workforce Thus
it is possible to see how changes to these supportive economic activities may
have multiple downstream ramifications.
3. Describe non-market relationships across an exchange that are economically signif-
icant for that institutional circumstance e.g. producer-user interactions, open book
accounting and collective bargaining. This aspect is especially significant in cases
where the entity to be exchanged is co-produced or specified by interactions
between agents on either side of the exchange. It is this aspect that is closest to
the frequent (mis)use of Polanyian ”embeddedness” (Harvey et al., 2007).
In addition to characterising the organisation of the exchange institutions, Randles
& Harvey (2002) propose that the nature of the agents, entities and modalities of
exchange can have important economic consequences. Broad distinctions can be
drawn between labour markets of labour—capital/employer exchange, intermedi-
ate markets of firm—firm exchange, end product markets of firm—consumer ex-
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change and financial markets between holders and users of capital. The nature of
entities concerned clearly has implications for the organisation and consequences of
their exchange; the sale of factory with its workforce and machinery is quite differ-
ent to the sale of a watch from a market stall. In this way, the IEP approach does
not take Polanyi’s category of the ”fictitious commodity” as essential or universal,
instead detailing the ways in which economic fates of land, labour and money are
institutionalised.
Further, economic phenomena such as competition are not universal and pre-given.
Harvey and Randles offer the example of differentiated models of retailing in con-
temporary Western economies, from specialist retailers to department stores, shop-
ping malls and novel varieties of distribution through internet sales, call centres and
home delivery. Competition in this instance is highly structured on both supply and
demand sides so that whole models of retailing compete with one another as much
as particular products within a given retail environment. Similarly, examining high
pay in the labour market David Bolchover argues that there is a ”talent myth” driv-
ing corporate remuneration, based upon social norms and structural conditions of
work and employment, not idealised market processes (Bolchover, 2010).
Finally, the distribution function of markets which is ”an inherent part of the value
formation of the commodity” (Randles & Harvey, 2002) is interwoven with the pre-
vious two considerations and a key component of structural differences. The pro-
cesses of exchange and distribution may be very tightly bound in the case of live-
stock markets or separated into other distinct institutions in, for example, distance
selling. Harvey et al (Harvey et al., 2002) detail the transformation of the instituted
complex of the Guernsey tomato industry, from small holder producers coordinated
by a state marketing board distributing through regional wholesale markets to gro-
cer retailers, to large producers directly integrated into supermarket supply chains.
The creation and the allocation of products, varieties of tomato in this case, and of
value is shown to be closely related the instituting of production, distribution and
exchange.
The variety observed in the organisation of exchange is not a matter of ’market im-
perfections’, as neoclassical theory would recognise them. Rather, it is better seen
as an outcome of contingent social and economic processes. This naturally begs the
question of what remains of the causal mechanisms identified in both mainstream
economic theory and Polanyi’s original thesis in The Great Transformation? Harvey
and Randles are mute on this point, simply denying that labour, land and money
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have intrinsic, universal or essential properties that lead to regularities. This is not
to say that the approach does not reveal worthwhile insights but that, like actor-
network theory, the neo-Polanyian approach is reluctant to generalise between cir-
cumstances. It is in no sense a predictive science, adhering to Polanyi’s central thesis
that the economy occupies a shifting place in society with causality originating in
the different processes of institution (Harvey, 2007, p165). The explanatory power of
the IEP approach, discussed at greater length in Chapter 4, nonetheless rests in the
proposition of real causative mechanisms and the analytical units which constitute
them and are affected by them. For instance, with respect to labour markets Randles
& Harvey (2002) make insightful comments to the effect that it is the embodiment
of labour power that provides the opportunity for workforce unionisation and bar-
gaining, accounts for the non transferability of ’value’ arising from education, and
places non-market processes at the centre of analysis of labour markets (household
reproduction, education and health care funded by taxation). It is through these an-
alytical developments that we can begin to account for the modern welfare state that
is absent from Polanyi’s work (Harvey et al., 2007).
Whilst not using the ”organisation of exchange” methodology explicitly, Mina (2003)
identifies neo-Polanyian resonances in studying the formation and standardisation
of the European market for mobile phones:
1. Co-existence and co-evolution of market and non-market (’out of-’ or ’before-
the-market’) transactions in the emergence of new economic activities
2. Interactions between public and private agents in determining the form of new
markets and commodities
3. Tension between central planning and self organisation in the creation of new
social spaces for economic activity
4. Competition is an instituted process itself, rather than a universal feature of
all economic activity. Mina argues that one must ask ”...especially in times of
technological and institutional uncertainty who is competing with whom, for
what, by what means and in what way” (2003).
Cases such as this demonstrate clearly how ’economic laws’ of supply and demand
are a result of particular historical circumstance. Likewise, in examining ’carbon
markets’, which are without doubt synthetic and conjunctural, the IEP approach
invites reflection and explanation of the creation of supply and demand crowds, the
definition of the medium of exchange, interdepencies with other economic activities
90
3.2. IEP and the organisation of exchange
and the role of different agents in regulation and instituting of the ’self regulating’
market.
91
3. Neo-Polanyian Perspectives and the IEP Framework
92
4. Actor-network Analysis of Market
Construction
The sociology of market construction (Callon, 1998c) founded on actor-network the-
ory and New Economic Sociology (NES) (Swedberg, 1997), provides a sophisticated
alternative perspective which has already been used to examine carbon trading (Cal-
lon, 2009; Lohmann, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). In this section the ANT sociology of
market construction is discussed in relation to neo-Polanyian IEP.
NES and IEP are not alone in acknowledging the failings of neoclassical axioms. De-
tailed consideration of the market as an institution and of market actors is found in
a range of academic literatures. Behavioural economics allows the rationality, pref-
erences and cognitive capabilities of agents to vary (Brekke & Johansson-Stenman,
2008). Similarly, social psychology examines the influence of social context on the
behaviour of agents, for example in the formation and expression of self interest,
and has been applied in economic contexts (Lewis et al., 1995). However, they say
little about systemic, institutional and historical dynamics, maintain the assump-
tion of the individuated agent, and do not contribute to the understanding of the
integration of socioeconomic and biophysical systems, a key matter in terms of cli-
mate change. Whilst environmental economics attempts to analyse this integration,
it does so by maintaining the neoclassical model of the market (p52). New Insti-
tutional Economics takes mainstream economics away from costless transactions,
equilibrium outcomes and the assumptions of complete markets, but maintains the
core idea of atomised, pre-given agents with static, known preferences and techno-
logical progress that accumulates in the same way as capital. North, Olson, Posner,
Williamson, Elinor and Victor Ostrom and related authors provide adjunct theories
to the neoclassical paradigm and with the public choice school extend its reach into
new areas of social action. Nonetheless, the individual and their actions remain
central features of an ultimately reductionist framework. This matter also persists in
NES but is addressed by Polanyian IEP approach and the constructivist perspectives
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of Callon and related authors. This section concludes by appraising their respective
suitability for the research task at hand, namely understanding the construction and
consequences of novel carbon trading systems.
4.1. The sociology of market construction
A research programme into market construction has recently been built around
actor-network theory (ANT) and the notion of performativity. The theory in ANT
is something of a misnomer as it is espousedly atheoretical in its description of con-
crete social situations, instead providing an ontological framework and methodolog-
ical direction to approach research problems. In this framework, social structure is
not presumed to exist a priori; rather particular ’large scale’ phenomena are merely
micro networks of relations being continuously made, unmade, and extended, iden-
tifiable only in retrospect (Barry & Slater, 2002). Performativity is a concept used
to describe this continuous contingent process and, in terms of market construction,
economics is identified as a performative technology that formats market participants
relations and actions. “Economics does not describe an existing external ‘economy’,
but brings that economy into being: economics performs the economy, creating the
phenomenon it describes” (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003, p108). It is not vulnerable to
the criticism of NES that it does not provide causative mechanisms because it denies
their presence in the first instance. Like the IEP approach it does not seek to detail
an essential capitalism, as Donald MacKenzie outlines:
The social studies of finance builds upon an argument put forward by
(amongst others) the French economic sociologist Michel Callon: that a
politics that is simply ‘pro-market’ or ‘anti-market’ is wholly inadequate.
Markets are plural, and their nature and effects have a great deal to do
with their ‘nuts and bolts’: the details of their design and functioning
(Mackenzie, 2007, Clarendon Lectures).
This section will outline the ANT basis for Callon and others’ work and then outline
the approach and key insights into market construction.
4.1.1. An outline of actor-network theory
ANT is best understood as an ontological position and methodological programme
rather than a specific ’theory’. It was developed initially by John Law, Michel Cal-
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lon and Bruno Latour in the field of science and technology studies but has since
significantly influenced work in organisation and management studies, geography
and sociology. This section predominantly uses Castree (2002) as an entry point and
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Latour, 2005) for fur-
ther development.
Latour provocatively dismisses widely held systems of understanding by redefin-
ing what society is. Rather than being an adjective describing a type of stuff, as for
instance in social context, social factors or social science, he argues that social should
be used to designate a trail of associations between other entities. Whilst accepting
that IBM, France, and Maori culture maybe have utility as concepts, he argues that
in novel circumstances or where groupings are contested, traditional sociologies are
no longer able to simply document actors’ accounts of well known types “to impose
some order, limit the range of acceptable entities, to teach actors what they are, or
to add some reflexivity to their blind practice” (Latour, 2005, p12). The ANT pro-
gramme, however, proposes that the work of a sociologist is to examine the patterns
of associations, the connections between things, which give rise to the world we ob-
serve. In this schema, ’social’ designates a type of connection (Latour, 2005, p5) and
the purpose of a social science is to ’reassemble’ society.
The ambiguity in Latour’s use of ’social’ is deliberate and serves to highlight the
heterogeneity of what might be gathered together in a society, rather than presum-
ing to know this from the outset. Groups are best understood as actor-networks of
both human and non-human entities that are continuously performed and hence,
not static entities at all. Active group formation leaves traces that can be identified
as actors seek to enroll others, distinguish themselves from others, perform actions
and re-create their identities. With a composite, dynamic identity, entities can only
be defined in relation to other entities, rather than a priori belonging to natural or
social realms.
Action is therefore not interpreted as a consequence of an intentional subject able to
act alone, but rather it is a contingent property of a network of relations, hence the
hyphen in ’actor-network theory’. As the social and natural are hybridised, priority
in explanation and causality must be set aside. Without the transcendental mech-
anisms of a structure, of society behind the actors, social scientists must pay very
careful attention to the circumstances and relations which contribute to a particular
situation. Power is an outcome, a relational achievement that must be produced,
and locally accounted for. Methodologically exhaustive documentation of the actor-
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network continues until explanation is present in the convincing description of the
actor-network itself, requiring no underlying, transcendental forces to replace the
actors as causative mechanisms.
Latour argues that accounts need to remain ’flat’ with a complete sequence connect-
ing from a particular local event to global scales as defined by the particular actor-
network. Keenly felt by geographers, a relational account of space is interpreted by
Castree (2002) as the replacement of topographical thinking with a topological vo-
cabulary. Form, and consequently formalism, are described as a type of translation
allowing transport of agency between sites, information literally being the packag-
ing of an entity into an alternative vehicle for displacement1. Latour identifies this
formatting as a key feature of “the sociology of the social” in performing a society.
This is a strong ontological position; entities or groups do not exist as such and in iso-
lation, it is only though connection that they come into being. As a result, the activity
of the social sciences in drawing boundaries ought to be recognised as an agency in
an actor-network which can both rarefy and multiply entities (Latour, 2005, p227).
This notion of actor-network construction is extended to the philosophy of science
and treats ’facts’ not as entities in themselves but rather as an extended and com-
plex actor-network. The creation of standards and the discipline of metrology are
foregrounded in ANT and are of particular relevance to quantification for emissions
exchange (Latour & Woolgar, 1986).
Metrology puts new objects into circulation. It multiplies realities by cre-
ating objects that can be regarded neither as representations of reality
nor as the expressions of the social subjects who created them. Reality is
not a blank screen onto which social categories can be projected. Metrol-
ogy creates new objects that make a difference in the world (Barry, 2002,
p277).
If the local and the global are understood as a continuous circulation then format-
ting activities are central. For example the hybrid material, institutional, convention
of the reference kilogram masses at the International Bureau of Weights & Mea-
sures at Sèvres illustrates ”metrology as the paramount example of what it is to
expand locally everywhere, all the while bypassing the local as well as the universal”
(Latour, 2005, p229). This activity extends to quasi-standards through much less
regimented but no less significant actor-networks typically characterized by “social
1 Displacement describes the occlusion of the real relations between entities by the presence of appar-
ent static and unitary commodities (Castree, 2003).
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explanations”. For instance, without reading newspapers or magazines I would not
be able to identify myself as an “ecotourist”, interpreting my choice of holiday des-
tination as ethical or indulgent, and it is from such traceable documents that ANT
descriptions can be built.
4.1.2. The ’Laws of the Markets’
Callon (1998a) makes two substantial contributions to the understanding of market
construction that deserve attention in this thesis and discussion in relation to the IEP
framework; i) that market economies are constituted by calculative agencies that are
not singular actors, and ii) efforts to calculate inevitably and continuously fail to
completely enclose all relevant features of the world, in effect externalities are irre-
ducible. He initiates his discussion of markets with Guesnerie’s definition that “a
market opposes buyers and sellers, and the prices which resolve this conflict are the
input, but also in a sense, the outcome of the agents’ economic calculation” (1996).
This highlights that a) agents pursue their own interests by calculating in order to
optimise/maximise, b) agents have divergent interests, so they engage in c) transac-
tions in order to resolve the conflict by defining a price. Callon places calculation,
or more precisely calculativeness, at centre of his analysis and elides the distinction
between mainstream frameworks that assume the ability of agents to calculate and
sociological frameworks that place calculation into the realm of institution, habit or
cultural history. Both can be discussed in common in the ANT framework by look-
ing at how, what and why particular modes of calculation exist and change through
time. Calculativeness is the ability to i) establish possible states of the world, ii) rank
them to preference, iii) identify and describe actions to achieve these states. Callon
argues that this cannot solely be a property of a human individual, or of a mind in
isolation, but requires figures, inscriptions, writing mediums and other tools so in
keeping with the symmetrical relational ontology of ANT he introduces the idea of
calculative agencies, once again disrupting the neoclassical notion of a given utility
function. It is therefore not an entirely socially or culturally constructed competence
which determines either selfish/calculative behaviours or generous/disinterested
behaviours.
This leaves the substantial problem of conditions of uncertainty or worse ignorance,
in the sense described by Knight (1921). Callon asks “How can agents calculate
when no stable information or shared prediction of the future exists?” (1998a, p6).
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The solutions to these coordination problems lie in relations between agents, over
and above exchange. For example, contingent contracts through which agents be-
come entangled over time and are no longer able to be strangers engaged in discrete
events. Common knowledge, shared points of reference, shared cultures, rules, pro-
cedures, routines, and conventions are used to guarantee co-ordination. In the ANT
ontology it is not that a network is constructed from pre-existing agents with fixed
identities, but rather ”everything which might stabilize their description and their
being, are variable outcomes which fluctuate with the form and dynamics of rela-
tions between these agents.” (1998a, p8). Agency derives its logic from the connec-
tions and disconnections of its network.
Gift giving is the contrary economic position to calculativeness, an agent engages
in economic activity freely and disinterestedly, and Callon uses this to illustrate a
key process in economic action. It is a persistent anthropological problem to distin-
guish between repeated reciprocal acts that if intentionally engaged in would not
constitute gift giving, and genuine disinterestedness. Callon adopts Bourdieu’s po-
sition that it is the time lag between gift and counter-gift that presents a ”socially
structured amnesia” that distinguishes the two. It is the way that the relationship
is framed to enable a return gift to be accounted for or not that places the agent in
a calculative or non calculative disposition. The importance of framing extends to
other dimensions of economic activity and is prefigured in the mainstream notion of
the externality (see section 2.2). Framing includes identifying and defining distinct
objects and actors; “In short, a clear and precise boundary must be drawn between
the relations which the agents will take into account and which will serve in their
calculations and those which will be thrown out of the calculation as such” (Callon,
1998a, p16). Understood this way, a pure gift represents total externalization as there
is no calculation performed and nothing taken into account prior to action. Callon
introduces the term overflowing to represent the opposite case, or rather the impos-
sibility in attempting to sever all connections and completely frame an exchange. For
example, the sale of a car includes the incorporated ’know how’ in the object so that
reverse engineering is technically possible, the subsequent economic consequences
of which are altered by other intellectual property right regimes. Further, efforts to
disentangle entities to enable exchange can in fact multiply and make conspicuous
connections. Boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) stabilize these contentious
relationships as their plural interpretations connect different actor-networks, but in-
evitably create overflows. For instance, registers of human body parts for donation
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list a great variety of information on life history, sexuality, drug use and other mat-
ters deemed salient. Economics itself, with all its internal disputes and methodolog-
ical variety, serves as a set of boundary objects. Callon et al. (2002) and Slater (2002)
advance the discussion of disentanglement/entanglement describing it as both a
semiotic-material process and also a legal-contractual process. Whilst there are clear
resonances to other Marxian descriptions of commodification, especially through the
idea of alienation, Callon situates this as a dynamic process on an analytical contin-
uum as opposed to specifying an essential aspect of capitalism. Examples of these
processes are performances of the economy and economic techniques and technolo-
gies (Parry, 2008).
From these two positions on the origin of calculative agencies and the persistence of
overflows, Callon argues that economics is a performative activity that formats the
world that it purports to measure and helps agents to conform to its precepts. Per-
formativity here operates in two senses; the first being the ontological recognition of
the continuous repetition of economic and social activity that ’makes’ the economy,
the second, that which Mackenzie describes as the Austinian sense (2004), describes
an utterance that makes itself true. Callon cites the construction of a ’perfect mar-
ket’ for strawberries driven by a young counselor university trained in neoclassical
economics as an archetypal example (Garcia, 1986). One might also interpret the de-
velopment of neoliberalism through a transnational ’thought collective’ of academic
institutions, think tanks, media, politicians and government officials in a similar
way (c.f. Mirowski & Plewhe, 2009). ”The economy is embedded not in society but
in economics, provided one incorporates within economics all the knowledge and
practices, so often denigrated, that make up for example accounting or marketing”
(Callon, 1998a, p30). In this way, he treats economics in the same way Foucault treats
government, not as a series of knowledge claims but rather a set of discourses and
institutional techniques (Slater, 2002). Historically this not a static process; without
making any grand historical claims, Callon draws on others’ empirical work (Meyer,
1994, Miller, 1998) to argue that the growth of the discipline in academic and prac-
tical settings constantly refines its understandings and at the same time enables the
society to act more ’rationally’ by extending the realm of calculativeness.
The normative conclusions he raises, with a nod to Foucault, are limited; what mat-
ters is what counts and hence how society counts, matters. As these processes are
not final and irreversible one gets the impression that he is optimistic of the possi-
bility of refinement to suit societies’ best interests but with a note of caution that this
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requires oversight on the disciplines of metrology, accounting and economics. As
the consequences of markets cannot be predicted in advance, their concrete configu-
rations can only be described ’in vivo’ Callon urges caution in their implementation
and that they should be constantly monitored and evaluated as ongoing experiments
(2009). He takes a similar position with regards to the state. Like the IEP perspective
on the necessity of state participation in the setting of standards, rules governing
the relationships between employers and employees, currencies, central banks and
the like, Callon is concerned with recognising the diversity of configurations that
exchange relationships and market societies can take rather than presenting an a
priori classification and normative prescription. On Fligstein’s proposal (1996) that
economic globalisation is none other than a hegemony of the market structures of
the USA, Callon identifies this with arrangements that specify accountability of the
firm to shareholders as the priority relationship, and that it is opposed diversely is
a direct result of the constitutive role of the state in the economy and the historical
paths that each takes. On Schumpeter, Galbraith and Chamberlin’s discussions of
monopoly and anti-competitive market structures, Callon responds that these condi-
tions should not be seen as market imperfections but that economic agents make de-
liberate efforts to avoid simple market framings and attempt to entangle consumers,
suppliers and the state in their own interests. Competition in this framework is not
a starting point for economic analysis but an historical end point when calculative
procedures are established and identities confirmed to the extent that agents strug-
gle to entangle others. Lock-in as an institutional feature, interweaving governance
structures, material commitments, commercial relationships and public discourses,
is therefore not a degenerate one. Rather, it is a ”compulsory companion” of mar-
kets and represents a situation of ”manageable flexibility” which necessitates closed
or lost options but enables calculative activity. Setting the rules of the economic sys-
tem, including the methods of calculation, is of the utmost significance to agents and
allows them to achieve dominant positions by anticipating other agents’ actions.
The empirical work that has been inspired by this framework has predominantly
been conducted on financial markets. It has been used to address both the im-
plications of a relational ontology and material sociology in trading floors, deriva-
tives pricing, arbitrage and the like (MacKenzie, 2003; Beunza & Stark, 2004; Knorr-
Cetina, 2005; Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Beunza et al., 2006; Hardie & MacKenzie,
2007) and, when highlighting the performative role of economics, its has become
a sociology of economics as much as economic sociology (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003;
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MacKenzie, 2004). The ambiguous role metrology plays in connecting political and
economic activities through the ”technology of government” has been examined by
Barry (2002), particularly the way measurement focuses scrutiny in certain direc-
tions, anti-politically, but also reveals awkward ”brute facts” that necessitate polit-
ical attention. Callon’s subsequent work on the ”economy of qualities” further de-
velops the network ontology with respect to the notion of formatting for exchange
(2002). As well as variously situated supply chain literatures that name check the
economy of qualities (for example Wilkinson, 2006; Raynolds, 2009), the approach
has been substantially operationalised to consider diverse topics. The commodifica-
tion of human organs of various sorts has been shown to depend upon the unsta-
ble connections of various professionals, lawyers, doctors, biochemists, accountants,
their trades and technologies such as surgeries, immunosuppressants and trans-
port networks, and dynamic socio-cultural norms (Parry, 2008). Within the field
of environmental governance, it has been used to examine an ecological certification
scheme for timber products (Eden, 2009), the creation of green consumers of forest
products and associated supply chains (Kortelainen, 2008) and the development of
tradable property rights for fisheries (Holm & Nielsen, 2007). The market segmen-
tation of sub-prime lending in the USA, whose instability contributed to the present
financial crisis, have also been attributed to the calculative agencies, credit scoring
systems, associated with the government backed lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae (Poon, 2009).
The performativity approach to market analysis has received robust criticism on a
number of levels. Taking the empirical example of the use of game theory in the
design of FCC broadcast licence auctions a number of authors dispute the Callonian
interpretation of events whose unpredicted outcomes deny the efficacy of economics
as a performative technique (Nik-Khah, 2008; Santos & Rodrigues, 2009). Miller
(2002) contends that Callon’s disentangling required to perform Homo economicus
is an impossibility, echoing Polanyi’s claim that the disembedded economy is an
utopian ideal. Fine (2003) argues that the framework lacks causative mechanisms
for economic theory to effect material outcomes, without which Callon’s position
is somewhat tautologous. He highlights the point that economic notions such as
capital, class or the necessity of profit are absent from Callon’s framework and that
these weaknesses are not just analytical issues but hold normative significance for
the ability of social science to challenge the hegemony of rational choice models.
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4.1.3. The construction of carbon markets
Much of the academic literature examining carbon trading has been policy specific
with little formal theorisation (e.g. Haites & Yamin, 2000; Jotzo & Michaelowa, 2002;
Asuka & Takeuchi, 2004) or come from either mainstream economics (e.g. Ekins
& Barker, 2001; Newell et al., 2005; Georgopoulou et al., 2006; Grubb & Neuhoff,
2006) or political science studies of the international environmental regimes they
contribute to (e.g. Barrett, 1998; Kim, 2001; Repetto, 2001; Boehmer-Christiansen,
2002). Economic sociology, of any description, has paid little attention to these
new markets, save for a few notable ANT papers. Lohmann was first to opera-
tionalise Callon’s ANT treatment of externalities to analyse the creation of novel
carbon markets (2005). MacKenzie (2007; 2009), Callon (2009) and further work by
Lohmann (2009) have extended analysis of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms and EU
ETS within this framework. The central themes are the means of commodification as
simultaneously material and social, for instance the apparatus of hydrofluorocarbon
(HFC) combustion and the mathematical expressions of global warming potentials
that contribute to the construction of CDM credits, and the instabilities in the fram-
ing processes in the ”hot” situations that are pervasive in nascent market institu-
tions. As Lohmann (2009) remarks, this emphasis on framing ”Instead of focussing
on imagined pre-existing or intrinsic properties of environmental objects and agents,
it focuses on what produces and sustains the objects and agents.” Similarly, Pow-
ells (2009) identifies ”emergent marginalisation” in UK as new measurement and
financing regimes are created with the stated policy goal of reducing emissions and
alleviating fuel poverty. Examining the UK’s Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC)
he presents an example, echoed in other work on the ’new carbon economy’, of the
disentanglement/entanglement of particular events so that they can be transacted
in novel commodity forms.
4.2. Comparison of theoretical frameworks
The central task of this thesis is to examine a particular type of market based in-
strument for climate change mitigation. As outlined in the introductory chapter,
there are profound political, economic and ethical dimensions to the governance of
the means, rate and location of changes to emitting activities. Markets for ’carbon
commodities’, like voluntary offset credits or CDM Certified Emissions Reductions
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(CERs), are denominated in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) but they
are not markets in physical entities, i.e. natural preexisting ’things’ that are external
to society. Actual volumes of greenhouse gas emissions are related in some way to
the instruments being traded, but the commodity form is itself a convenience, a way
of comprehending, organizing and distributing responsibility for pollution (permits)
or abatement efforts (credits). Broadly defined, carbon offsetting is a redistribution
of emissions reduction efforts via an economic transaction; GHG reductions made
by one actor, be that a nation, industry, corporation or individual, are sold to an un-
related actor to defray their expectation or commitment to emissions reduction. The
nascent carbon markets enable these transactions by providing a set of institutions,
represented by credits and allowances, to structure this exchange.
The analytical framework outlined in chapter 2 is the intellectual genesis of these in-
stitutions, so one might assume that it would be an appropriate starting point for the
detailed empirical work in this thesis. However, mainstream approaches also con-
cern themselves primarily with idealized activity inside the market institutions but
have little to say about the inevitable and critical social and political milieu that they
are the result of. As Cangiani succinctly puts it ”economists worry about the quantita-
tive rates, the relative prices of commodities, but do not perceive the price system as
a system of social relations, as a social structure” (2003). The mainstream rationale
also assumes a great deal of homogeneity and determinism in both social action and
natural systems. There are substantial critiques of these modes of analysis regarding
other economic phenomena, so a skeptical approach seems appropriate given the
novelty of the institutions and diversity of systems within which they interact.
The political economy presented in chapter 3 and the ANT in this chapter, are both
critical of the neoclassical assumptions that pervade the environmental economics
and NIE paradigms that inform carbon market development. Both provide reasons
to doubt the efficacy of the neoclassical approaches in addressing ecological con-
cerns but present their critiques in different ways. Institutionalist and substantivist
perspectives object to the reductionism and empirically false assumptions required
for such analysis. In contrast, the ANT approach seeks to answer the question of
how the rational economic behaviour proposed by theory may actually be achieved
in practice (Slater, 2002). For Callon ”homo economicus really does exist” (1998a, p51)
but he must be accounted for. Despite Swedberg and Granovetter’s exhortations for
NES to return to Durkheim’s traditions and examine central features and processes
of the economy (1992), in its elaboration it has tended to be supplemental to the
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neoclassical rational actor model and implicitly adopt much of its framework and
analytical units. It has been content to elaborate extra-economic, contextual issues
of networks and culture even as networks were cited as ”proto-institutions” their full
critical force was not realised (Peck, 2005). The substantial problem with both NES
and ANT descriptions of market construction is that whilst they purport to describe
and explain economic phenomena, neither presents a convincing body of distinc-
tively economic theory. From an opposing starting point, the anti-essentialism of
the ANT project can lead one to ask just what is ’the economy’ in Callon’s frame-
work. The implicit answer is that it is whatever economics measures and defines
as the economy, the clearest illustration of this being Mitchell’s insistence that ’the
economy’ did not exist until the 1930s (2008). The result is a very open definition:
The economy is better seen as a project, or a series of competing projects,
of rival attempts to establish metrological regimes, based upon new tech-
nologies of organization, measurement, calculation, and representation
(Mitchell, 2008, p1120).
Whilst acknowledging efforts that market participants make to entangle other ac-
tors to enable calculation, Slater argues that it is alienability, one result of successful
framing, that is the distinctive feature of market exchange (2002). It is perfectly
possible for all manner of attachments to the entity exchanged to persist, indeed ex-
ternalities illustrate the failings of framing, the distinctive feature of markets is that
buyers and sellers ’are quits’ at the point of exchange. Slater goes on to emphasise
the instrumental rationality that buyer and seller in a market setting pursue because
they are made into strangers by the legal and institutional framing mechanisms.
However, this argument does not adequately deal with social network accounts of
the empirical persistence of familiar relationships existing in tandem with exchange
and Callon’s own notion of overflowing that is presented dialectically with fram-
ing. If framings and boundaries are taken as permanently unstable, ambiguous and
the site of political struggle, how is complete alienability achieved and if not how
do we recognise market from non-market, economic from non-economic? In short,
Callon’s approach tends to dissolve ’the economy’ into society and replaces it with
calculability2.
This raises further uncertainties. Does calculability mean only recognising and con-
sidering, or does it require full commensuration or indeed fungibility? Take the
2 Callon’s selection of commercial externalities and market relationships for further theoretical elabo-
rations seems quite arbitrary (1998, p246).
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example of a car which causes pollution that is not recognised by its driver until it
is ’calculated’ by local government pollution monitoring (Barry, 2002). What does
it matter from the ANT perspective that a fine may be issued, the vehicle seized,
the driver ’named and shamed’, banned from driving, or imprisoned? Arguably
all could have financial costs attributed through another calculative process but it is
not clear that they are in any sense ’economic’ activities or that we should interpret
driver behaviour economically. As a result this approach steers worryingly close the
the totalizing economics of Robbins (1935) and Becker (1976) that seeks to define the
domain by its rationality.
A second concern is that the constructivist ontology of ANT that underpins Callon’s
account of economic activity disavows persistent social structure and so does not
attempt to provide an historical explanation of economic development and social
change outside of specific contingent configurations. Whilst this approach might be
revealing of particular issues and moments in the deployment of carbon markets,
it is not clear how aggregate behaviours might be understood and these are central
concerns given the global scale of climate change and fervent ambition of carbon
market promoters. Although ANT offers a thoughtful critique of theories appeal-
ing to stable object-identities, ’classes of agent’, underlying tendencies and transcen-
dent mechanisms to explain social action (Latour, 2005), it is not entirely convincing.
O’Neill defends essentialist discussions of the market and market economies from
contemporary accounts of contingency, specificity and variability in the institutions,
networks and agents that constitute them (1998, p7–15). He argues that both crit-
ics and supporters of markets, Marx, Hayek, Neurath and Mises for instance, have
appealed to some consistent features within a realist ontology based on empirical ob-
servations. Essential properties are seen as those that an object must possess in order
to be recognised as a particular kind of object, whilst there are accidental properties
that it may also possess but do not detract from it being a particular kind but neither
are they necessary. Objects may have prerequisite conditions, supporting institu-
tions in the case of markets, that are necessary for their realization but that does not
undermine the possibility of essential features. Nor do markets necessarily exhibit
universal outcomes if one recognises the possibility of dispositional properties, that
an object possesses but are not realised in all circumstances. O’Neill argues that in-
stitutional variety does not mean that markets do not share any common features
at all and that the analytical category is not useful. Moreover, essentialism should
not be regarded as synonymous with uniformity (1998, p12). If some theorists make
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universal claims that turn out to be false that is a failing of the claims themselves, not
the possibility of essential underlying properties. He concludes that it is on this em-
pirical basis that essentialist explanations ought to be examined, but not dismissed
tout court. It may well be that there are differences between actual markets but that
comparison is possible and it is scientifically productive to distinguish superficial
difference from systematic similarity.
There are certain similarities between the IEP and ANT approaches to economic
analysis. Indeed, Lohmann’s work on carbon markets has drawn on Callon and
Polanyi in turn (2005; 2009). Randles’ and Harvey’s (2002) attention to variation and
specificity in the institutionalisation of economic activity is at first glance congruent
with Callon’s regard for calculation and the continuous framing and overflowing
that enable market exchange. The diverse and dynamic, asymmetries, dependencies
and relationships highlighted in the first, map onto the performative (generic sense)
framework of the second. In both cases they require the researcher to recognise what
is stable, what is dynamic and what is significant about the identities, rationalities
and relationships within a given case rather than making a priori assumptions. For
example, the concept of fictitious commodities is incompletely developed and not
entirely convincing because of the universal explanation and binary categorization
of real and fictitious commodities that Polanyi presents. However, the arguments for
an entirely relational ontology seem weak whilst there are critical realist approaches,
aware of the issues raised by actor-network theory and sensitive to the contingencies
of actually existing capitalist relations that maintain real transcendent mechanisms
in explanation (Castree, 2002). The concepts proposed by the IEP framework, includ-
ing classes of economic agent, exchange relationships, and the specifically economic
processes of appropriation, production, distribution and consumption, provide a
useful analytical structure, upon which specific details of an empirical case can be
supported whilst being anatomized. They also allow general insights to be drawn
from comparison of historically and geographically distinct cases.
For the purposes of this study, IEP is preferred to both ANT examinations of ’the
market’ and Marxian work on the neoliberalisation of environmental governance or
the commodification of nature. IEP is oriented towards examining the meso scale
organization and institutional arrangement of economic processes in carbon credit
exchange. Chapter 3 has illustrated IEP as a contemporary analytical framework
that provides unique and powerful insights into the organisation of the economy.
Notably, its anthropological origins ensure that diverse ’market imperfections’, such
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as taxation or producer-consumer interactions, are not seen as aberrations but con-
sistent institutional features of actual economies. It does this whilst maintaining a
keen sense for what is distinctly economic and does not reduce all activity to an
undifferentiated social kind (Granovetter, 1985; Hodgson, 1994), unspecified actor-
networks (Callon, 1998b) or generic political action (Fligstein, 2001). Similarly, at-
tention to detail in relationships and processes that constitute the economy is ab-
sent from most Marxian and Polanyian inspired studies of environmental gover-
nance where the emphasis is most often placed on commodification, political ac-
tions and socio-ecological consequences (see for instance Prudham (2004) and Mans-
field (2004))3. This project will be neither a macro scale political economy of meta-
3 This is not to say that Marxian analysis does not detail economic processes but that it predominantly
emphasises an essential capitalism. Castree (2003) outlines the six following features of capitalist
commodification identified as regularities within the geographical ’commodification of nature’ liter-
ature.
Privatization means attributable ownership or legal title, which in Marxist literature is a precondition
of capitalist exchange between parties. However, this is not a feature unique to capitalist economies
in that there are many existing and historical systems of de juro or de facto control that effectively
privatise entities even if they are not subsequently brought into money mediated exchange.
Alienability is the ability of commodities “to be physically and morally separated from their sell-
ers”, distinct from “alienation” in the sense of estrangement of a sentient human worker. Although
an entity may be in some sense privatized it does not automatically follow that it is alienable. Cas-
tree gives the example of indigenous ethnobotanical knowledge, which for moral (or inherent, tacit
knowledge) reasons, could not necessarily be seen as alienable and is to some extent isolated from
market exchange. The difficulties but possibilities of realising a market in human organs provides a
more visceral illustration.
Individuation is the ontological activity of defining boundaries and limits both in terms of legal or
social definition and materiality. This applies as much to the agents, be they individuals, groups or
institutions (firms, the state), which are to participate in exchange as to the commodity itself. Both
aspects are socially determined and this process is fundamental yet subtle; “it involves a discursive
and practical ’cut’ into the seamless complexity of the world in order to name discrete ’noun-chunks’
of reality that are deemed to be socially useful” (Castree, 2003 p280).
Abstraction is in Castree’s sense the opposite of synecdoche. It is the process by which a specific
instance or thing is associated with broader category or classification and as such loses its unique
and specific detail. As such it is similar but different to individuation, in that it emphasises the
process of semiotic homogenisation, i.e. reduction to a generic set of properties, subsequent to an
exercise in the “naming of parts”. He highlights Robertson’s work on wetland banking (2000, p473)
in the USA whereby similarities between actually distinct entities are detailed in order that they can
be rendered equivalent and hence unproblematically spatially exchangeable. The standardization
and consistency necessary for commodity exchange is realized through technical means and the
authority of expertise; in the case of wetlands banking it is the Rapid Assessment Methodologies
that ”function as instruments of translation between science, policy and economics” (Robertson,
2006, p373).
Valuation has two aspects according to Castree, neither requiring a rigidly Marxist labour theory
of value. The first is that in capitalist economies there is the tendency for money to become the
dominant representation of value, overwhelming distinctions made for use-value, existence-value,
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narratives and structural determinism nor an exhaustive, micro social account of
power acting through collective agency.
functional-value, practical, ethical or aesthetic reasons. The second is the role the commodity takes as
a vehicle for the circulation of capital as money in an economy generating residual wealth. He refers
to Neil Smith’s emphasis on commodities as merely a part of an ongoing process of accumulation,
whereby profit is the chief motive force for production, exchange and consumption.
Displacement describes the occlusion of the real relations between entities by the presence of appar-
ent static and unitary commodities. A central feature of capitalist economies is the spatio-temporal
separation of production and consumption such that exploitations of labourers or ecological impacts
are systematically concealed and would remain so without specific intervention.
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This chapter describes the ontological and epistemological commitments of the IEP
framework and details the methodological approaches used in Part III.
5.1. Ontological and epistemological commitments
Critical realism provides a naturalist anti-positivist framework for knowledge pro-
duction in both the natural and social sciences, frequently deployed in geographic
and institutional political economy. It is a combination of Bhaskar’s transcendental
realism (1975), a philosophical position based on a realist ontology, and critical nat-
uralism (1979), an application and qualified extension of this position to the social
sciences. Naturalism, the idea that natural and social phenomena can be analysed
within the same ontological framework, is justified by regarding scientific progress
as the generation of understanding rather than the creation of constant conjunctions.
Critical realist explanations also avoid the epistemic fallacy of confusing epistemol-
ogy with ontology. Statements about knowledge are not statements about being for a
number of reasons. Positivist positions in the social sciences fare even less well than
in natural sciences as social systems are characteristically open, difficult to measure
and frequently irreversible (Outhwaite, 1998) whilst social objects are heavily con-
cept dependent and reliant on the non-universal meanings ascribed to them (Sayer,
1998).
The implied ontology of empirical stances leads to the fallacy of actualism, a conse-
quence of understanding causality as the ”constant conjunctures of events” in exper-
imentally closed systems (Hume cited in Hollis, 1994). Empirical realists hold that
universal causality is inferred from repeated experimentation and such generalisa-
tions of invariance are to be deemed ”scientific laws”. However, such closed systems
are the exception in nature and constant conjunctions are produced rather than found.
In real, open systems, structures, mechanisms, powers and tendencies of nature may
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or may not be actualised and thus generate phenomena available to experience. It
is the business of science to discern theses tendencies from a particular perspective
and not to claim universality. Bhaskar is clear that causal laws are ontologically dis-
tinct from patterns of events (1975). Reality can be considered in three domains; the
domain of the real, or possible, which is greater than the domain of the actual, and
the domain of the empirical which is again a subset of the actual and forms the basis
of all knowledge. Whilst reality must be ordered and structured in order to be intel-
ligible to science, it is a fallacy to say that events must be invariant. This distinction,
termed transfactuality, indicates that laws operate independently of their actuality
or empirical identification.
Historically, environmental degradation has been identified by researchers from
within a non-critical positivistic natural science approaches, but these disciplines
were subsequently found lacking in explanatory power or insight into the com-
plex, human-nature relations at work. Indeed, they naively reproduced assumptions
and common sense narratives of deforestation, soil erosion and over-exploitation of
common pool resources by ’ignorant’ indigenous peoples lacking effective property
rights or knowledge to ’manage’ nature (Forsyth, 2001). However, critical realist po-
litical ecology has offered more robust explanations by adopting ecological represen-
tations from the natural sciences and maintaining a realist ontology, whilst engaging
with social constructions of nature and introducing theoretical insights from critical
social theory. In a similar way, I adopt a critical realist approach to the study of
climate change mitigation, maintaining that GHG emissions are real physical phe-
nomena but critically investigating the social systems that monitor and exchange
property rights over their presence or absence.
The objects of analysis proposed by the IEP approach are the agents, materials and
institutions that constitute economic activity. They are situated within real, open
systems of causative relations. Indeed, it is the intention of agents contributing to
the instituting of new MBIs to have real consequences over the dispositions and be-
haviour of other agents and the material flows of GHGs. However, these very same
agents and flows are part of other overlapping systems and hence unequivocally
identifying causative relationships at the level of the real will inevitably be imper-
fect.
Although briefly outlined in section 2.1 it is worth returning to consider the method-
ological and analytical implications of distinguishing substantivist and formal ap-
proaches to economics. Neither term is associated with unique and entirely coherent
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literatures but broad contours can be drawn that go further than the most basic def-
initions. The formal approach reduces value and welfare to subjective preferences
and allocation of resources to the spontaneous calculative outcomes of price making
markets using logical reasoning. The substantivist approach concerns itself with the
embodied and concrete processes of material provisioning, industrial organisation
and comparative interests of concrete social groups. The distinction results in an
implicit epistemological position in explaining economic reality; either the economy
exists as an isolated sphere governed by its own logic or it is enmeshed in broader
social relations and institutions and must be studied as such. This changes not just
the mode but also the subject matter of the discipline.
The formal approach emphasises the calculative aspects of economics and as a result
makes the allocation of resources to maximise the satisfaction of unspecified, exoge-
nous wants the central goal of the economy. From a formalist perspective the pro-
duction and distribution of goods are considered as economic activity because they
can examined from the perspective of choice and efficiency, not because there is any-
thing inherently ”economic” about them. Conversely, empirically stable economies
can be seen to persist neither with unlimited wants nor persistent scarcity. Skills
and knowledge for instance, increase with application and trust which is essential
to economic activity is not consumed (Hodgson, 2001, p277).
The substantive approach focuses on ”the empirical economy... an instituted process
of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous sup-
ply of want satisfying material means” (Polanyi, 1957 p248). The emphasis is not on
the mode of calculation but on the systemic processes. With this definition, Polanyi
avoids reducing economics to catallactics and recognises the variety of institutions
that economic activity takes place through. It also removes choice and scarcity from
their foundational role. Choice may exist for economic agents and conditions of
scarcity may prevail but they should not been seen as applying to each and every
economic circumstance. Scarcity particularly, is an instituted phenomenon, arising
from the assumption that economic action is always self interested and profit seek-
ing; ”...what was deemed to be general and natural is instead historical and social,
in one word institutional” (Cangiani, 2003).
By re-conceiving the ”economy as an instituted process” and looking to the ”place
occupied by the economy in society” (Polanyi, 1957) substantive analysis extends the
relevant social phenomena that have a bearing on the economy, and hence should
be of interest to economics, but does not presuppose a single analytical method
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and conceptual framework unlike the totalizing approach of Robbins and others
(e.g. Becker, 1976). In Polanyi’s framework, the relationship of society to the bio-
physical environment is an expression of the social relationships that format soci-
ety and structure the actions of those agents engaging in economic activity. Given
the empirical variety of these relationships then there are epistemological implica-
tions of this framework. Abstract general theorizing of ’economic laws’ is of little
use when particular, contingent and dynamic social contexts to some extent struc-
ture economic action. For instance, within Polanyi’s conception of the economy,
money is recognised as a politico-economic institution in its own right and not an
unproblematic medium of exchange (Harvey et al., 2007, p2). Polanyi terms the prac-
tice of using reductive formal approaches universally to analyse concrete economies
the ’economistic fallacy’, echoing Marx’s thinking that ”all the learning of modern
economists” concerns ”the representation of the bourgeois relations as immutable
laws of the society in abstracto” rather than in its historical circumstance (Marx, 1976,
p. 9 cited in Cangiani 2003). Section 3 explores these issues further.
Methodological individualism, related but distinct from formal economics, has a
significant effect on the form of explanatory theory presented by formal economics.
Assuming maximising agents with stable preferences making isolated choices en-
ables logical reasoning in a way that acknowledging variability, context and society
would not. However, macroeconomic theories built on these patently false microe-
conomic assumptions are readily questioned (Hodgson & Screpanti, 1991, p13). As a
trivial example, if consumer behaviour is explained without any reference to fashion
or social norms there is little room for the advertising industry.
All abstract explanatory frameworks will isolate and reduce real phenomena but
some do to a much greater extent than others, with real social and cultural effects of
their own. Normative considerations are not part of formal economic science as in
making choices economic agents exhibit only instrumental rationality; other people
or material things encountered are treated only as means to an end and not of worth
in themselves or subject to other social norms or cultural considerations (Caporaso
and Levine 1992, p23). The intellectual dynamics of an issue can sometimes be re-
vealing of broader social relations of authority, for example, reduction of ecological
complexity to a single numeraire of value is widely articulated in criticisms of cost
benefit analysis (O’Neill 2007) but persists in many Western liberal democracies as
a legitimate means of decision making. New institutionalist and property rights ap-
proaches go some way to acknowledging the social context of economic activity, but
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only so far as different institutions offer alternative incentives to agents. There is
little or no problematization of the institutions themselves, their origin or relation-
ship with broader social processes. That process, change over time and hysteresis, is
significant to economic activity and institutional structure is an important aspect of
the substantive framework.
5.2. Empirical methods and data analysis
Exchanges of emissions reductions credits are conducted for compliance with envi-
ronmental legislation at the national and international scale and also voluntarily for
a variety of reasons. The compliance market is a well monitored, ordered and com-
plex institution that has enabled transactions worth billions of dollars, with a certain
degree of transparency afforded by online data sources. The voluntary market is
much more diverse, diffuse and opaque with very little organised or open infor-
mation. Substantially different research methods and data sources were therefore
employed.
The UNFCCC keeps a full set of documentary references, including rules and reg-
ulations, records of meetings and decisions and a suite of project documents for
those activities submitted for crediting, on its website website www.unfccc.int. This
is supplemented by the CDM Rulebook http://www.cdmrulebook.org/ a database
of CDM rules prepared by law firm Baker & McKenzie, with funding from eight
public bodies, and updated after each CDM Executive Board meeting. There is also
a variety of publically funded, openly available datasets including the IGES publi-
cation CDM in Charts (v11.1, 2010 was used for this work) and the CDM Pipeline
database prepared by the UNEP Risø centre (data cited here was drawn from the
May 2010 edition). These sources, academic and relevant epistemic community lit-
erature provided the material for analysis of the economic activity and institutional
constitution. Grey literature documents were held electronically on an indexed hard
drive where possible and searched for keyword terms iteratively as knowledge of
the trading system was developed. The CDM Pipeline database was manipulated in
Excel and numerical data exported to SPSS for the production of descriptive graph-
ical figures.
I also attended a number of emissions trading events including ”Effort Sharing un-
der the Climate Package. Assessing the role of the Clean Development Mechanism”
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at the European Parliament (4th June 2008) the launch of the Project Developers Fo-
rum (17th November 2008), an Environmental Audit Committee evidence session
(31st March 2009), Climate Camp protest and workshops outside the European Cli-
mate Exchange (1st April 2009) and CarbonExpo 2009, the largest international in-
dustry trade fair of its kind (Barcelona, 27th–29th May 2009). As well as taking notes
at presentations, gathering reports and promotional literature, I informally talked to
a wide variety of market participants.
In order to discuss the voluntary market chapter 9 builds on the previous outline
of the operation of the CDM. Without central authorities like the UNFCCC and the
CDM Executive Board, no one set of procedures has come to dominate and the mar-
ket is fragmented. In this emerging arena there is limited documentary material
that either frames transactions or reviews the market1. Quantitative data are also
scarce and unreliable as most transactions are undertaken confidentially and not ag-
gregated in any way. This chapter therefore examines the ways that carbon market
participants talk about the institutions that they are a part of, and teases out a num-
ber of themes that are echoed by representatives of different classes of economic
agent.
The primary empirical focus is UK based corporate consumers and the intermedi-
aries and developers that supply them. Although subject to much media discussion
and critique, general retail offset provision is a small market by volume of credits
retired. This is noted in Hamilton (2007) and confirmed in interviews with retailers.
Corporates were therefore taken as the major end market and interviews conducted
with organisations that had investigated the market for carbon credits, most having
concluded purchases, and those organisations that interacted with them, including
project developers and retailers.
An initial telephone and website survey was undertaken, in collaboration with Dr
Stefan Gössling at Lund University, to provide a familiarity with the market and
provide a basis for subsequent interviews. This data has been reported in Gössling
et al 2007. I attended a series of workshops related to the UK government’s inter-
ventions in the market (see section 9.3.5) which provided a useful initial overview
of the issues at stake and contact with relevant individuals and organisations. These
were the SDC/DEFRA/UKERC workshop ”Carbon Neutrality” (Oxford, 18th–19th
December 2006), DEFRA Consultation Workshop ” Carbon Offset Code of Best Prac-
1 The bulk of data collection for this chapter was conducted from late 2006 to mid 2008. A number of
the industrial standards that are described have subsequently issued much more detailed guidance.
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tice” (London, 19th March 2007) and SDC Scotland ”Carbon Neutrality and Carbon
Offsetting ” (Edinburgh, 20th April 2007).
Interviews were conducted with 23 individuals, primarily active in voluntary car-
bon markets, in person and over the telephone between July 2008 and June 2009.
These are detailed in Table 5.1. Questions were presented in a semi-structured for-
mat, based around the neo-Polanyian themes identified in chapter 3. Whilst there
were common themes raised with all participants, for instance ”Who does your or-
ganisation conduct business with?”, specific questions were to a large extent tailored
to the type of organisation and its activities in the market. In some cases questions
specifically invoked the IEP analytical framing, ”What do you supply to your cus-
tomers, what services are provided?”, whilst others dealt with issues couched in
vernacular terms of the industry, ”What additionality criteria do you use?”.
Interview schedules were updated as my understanding of the market increased.
Because of the semi-structured format I was able to follow particular lines of enquiry
that individual respondents were knowledgeable of.
Interviewees were identified by web searches, from direct contact at events and by
referral from other participants. All participants were asked if it was possible to
record the interviews for fidelity and assurances were made that any specific quotes
would be anonymized and attributed only to the individual’s position and the type
of their organisation. None objected entirely although two requested that I stop the
recorder at certain parts of the interview and a third interview was conducted over
the telephone, with note taking, as I did not have an adapter available at the time.
Substantial notes were made for all interviews with full transcription was conducted
for approximately half of the total running time across the sample for the purposes
of direct citation.
In basing chapter 9 around these interviews, the intention is not to present an inter-
pretivist view of the subjective perspectives of participants, nor was a formal con-
tent analysis performed to produce a numerical representation of discourses (Ha-
jer, 1995). The rationale for selecting interview participants and the structuring of
questions was intended to yield broad coverage of the institutions, drawing on the
particular expertise of participants. It was not intended to gather a statistically rep-
resentative sample to make inferences about the market as a whole. There is consid-
erably more empirical material than presented here. Issues selected for discussion
were identified to illustrate comparative aspects with the compliance market and
indicative themes from the theoretical framework.
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Semi-structured formal interviews were not conducted with CDM participants be-
cause of time constraints in gathering and analysing data. As outlined above, there
is a great deal of information on the CDM is available in documentary and database
format. Indeed, there was sufficient information to describe the institution ade-
quately without additional qualitative information. It is of course possible that I
have missed quirks, exceptions, particularities and details that arise in interview sit-
uations, however, I did make first hand contact with compliance market participants
in a number of arenas. Furthermore, I believe, although I cannot unequivocally es-
tablish the fact, that the institution is sufficiently codified and formalised that limited
further information could be gleaned from participants. The use of interviews in the
voluntary market case is not a means of gathering subject positions, it is an attempt
to find the patterns of action associated with organisations within larger economic
networks. Were interviews to have been conducted with compliance market partic-
ipants they would have had a similar purpose but one which would have to some
extent been duplicated by documentary records. The approach taken was adequate
to meet the research objectives and knowledge claims are carefully made on the basis
of the evidence presented.
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Table 5.1.: Formal interviews undertaken
Respondent Class of Economic Agent Interview Date Person or
Telephone
C1 Consumer 20081028 In person
C3 Consumer 20090429 Tel
C4 Consumer 20090514 Tel
C5 Consumer 20090521 Tel
C6 Consumer 20090602 In person
C7 Consumer? 20090604 Tel
I1 Intermediary/Consultant 20080716 Tel
I2 Intermediary/Regulator 20081106 Tel
I3 Intermediary/Journalist 20081119 In person
I4 Intermediary/Lawyer 20090305 In person
I5 Intermediary/NGO 20090418 In person
I6 Intermediary/Regulator 20090420 In person
R1 Retailer/Developer 20080713 Tel
R10 Consumer 20090205 Tel
R11 Retailer/Developer 20070716 Tel
R2 Retailer/Developer 20080716 Tel
R3 Retailer 20080731 In person
R4 Retailer/Developer 20080801 In person
R5 Retailer/Developer 20080930 Tel
R6 Retailer 20081029 Tel
R7 Retailer/Developer 20090127 Tel
R8 Retailer/Developer 20090127 Tel
R9 Retailer/NGO 20090305 In person
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6. Enabling the Exchange of Emissions
(Reductions)
Most discussions of carbon trading explicitly or implicitly assume the clear and
unproblematic definition of private property rights or exchange of a simple com-
modity that may be entered into mathematical models as a factor of production or
transferred around national or international emissions accounts. ’Externalities’ are
brought under market exchange as pollution property rights, implicitly understood
as simple commodities free of their own externalities and connections. Chapter 3 has
argued that markets should not be seen as pre-existent, fixed, external phenomena
nor can they be adequately represented as simple set of logical arguments. Rather
they are better and variously described as historically contingent configurations of
agents and technologies engaged in continuous and dynamic exchange relations.
This is most apparent when the property rights or contracts subject to exchange are
novel and separate from a physical entity, and even more so at the genesis of such
markets. Of course, such situations are not unique to the creation of market based
instruments for environmental regulation. Markets for vehicle insurance or indeed
money itself are familiar cases of instituted economic relations where physical en-
tities are incidental to the economic and social consequences of relations they cre-
ate. Concerns about intellectual property rights and the circulation of digital music
through systems of exchange and free distribution offer another contemporary ex-
ample. In this case, the election of the Pirate Party to the European Parliament has
made the political act of instituting the boundaries of property and market especially
conspicuous (Edwards, 2009).
This section uses the Polanyi inspired instituted economic processes approach to
frame the most fundamental features of carbon markets; the accounting units and
quasi-property rights that are subject to market exchange, and the differentiation
of classes of economic agents engaged in trade. This overview will then be built
upon in later accounts of patterns of exchange and the composition of governance
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Table 6.1.: Basic Classification of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
Motivation for Consumption of Units
Required by law, exchange
governed by state
Voluntary actions,
private governance
Production
of Units
Units issued by
regulator, total quantity
fixed
Compliance allowance
market
e.g. EU ETS
Voluntary allowance
retirement
e.g. Sandbag, CCX
Entities can earn new
units by initiating
projects, quantity
potentially unlimited
Compliance credit market
e.g. CDM
Voluntary credit production
and retirement e.g. carbon
neutrality
institutions in compliance and voluntary markets. It is worth briefly considering ter-
minology that has been used loosely in informal discussions of market based climate
policy instruments and presenting a basic classification of the exchange institutions
presently in operation.
Emissions trading systems can be classified into two basic types; ’cap and trade’
and ’baseline and credit’. The primary distinction is the origin and quantity of the
traded units, allowances in the former and credits in the latter. Briefly, allowances are
fixed in number whilst credits are ’manufactured’ and potentially unlimited. Carbon
offsetting is a frequently encountered term that usually refers to the use of carbon
credits to balance emissions arising from a specified activity, for example an airline
flight. However, a broader definition is warranted to include all indirect emissions
reductions achieved through the cancellation, usually referred to as retirement, of
a GHG instrument, including those based on allowances. Carbon markets enable
these transactions by providing participants with a set of institutions and instru-
ments, denominated in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e), to structure
exchange. In abstract terms, GHG reductions are attributed to one agent, be that a
nation, industry, corporation or individual, and sold to a second, unrelated agent
whilst being held as equivalent to emissions reductions achieve by the buyer’s own
actions1. When employed as a noun, ’a carbon offset’ typically refers to a project
derived emissions credit. However the purchase of credits is only one possible form
1 The recently introduced British Standards Institute PAS2060 provides a similar and more widely
used definition.
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of transaction and not exclusively the case; I therefore use ’offsetting’, infrequently
and as a general term. The term carbon neutral is used to connote the status of an
item, action, or organisation that has had its quantified emissions liabilities offset.
6.0.1. Allowance based systems
Allowance based systems are not the focus of this work but provide an important
entry point and background. They are also the most important systems, in economic
and politic terms, at the European scale and arguably at the global scale. The basic
environmental economic formulation of emissions trading proposes that a regulat-
ing authority decide upon a particular quantity of allowable emissions, the entities to
be subject to this restriction and the time periods within which they are to be bound
(Tietenberg, 1990). Allowances are allocated to entities who are allowed to buy or
sell them freely, provided that at various reckoning points they have sufficient to
meet their obligations in relation to real emissions output. An unproblematic, direct
correspondence is assumed between the allowances allocated, which are social insti-
tutions, and the emissions from the scheme participants, which are material entities.
The basic components of a “cap and trade” scheme are therefore:
• A group of polluters to be regulated by and participate in the scheme
• A defined quantity of permissible emissions, the “cap”, inscribed in allowances
to be exchanged between participants
• An accounting system to record ownership of allowances and their subsequent
transfer
• A regulator to allocate and receive allowances and issue sanctions for non-
compliance
• A monitoring and reporting regime to record physical emissions
• A group of intermediaries that facilitate transactions between producers and
consumers
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, EU ETS, globally the most active
carbon trading institution (Capoor & Ambroisi, 2008), serves as an example illustrat-
ing these features. The scheme is divided into phases to allow for alteration of the
terms and coverage at pre-determined intervals, Phase 1 being some what experi-
mental and operating from 2005-2007, Phase 2 from 2008-2012 matching the Kyoto
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commitment period and Phase 3 from 2013-2012 intended to initiate decarbonisation
of the European electricity supply. Approximately 11,500 installations which are re-
sponsible for nearly half of EU carbon dioxide emissions are required to participate.
The EU ETS Directive2 defines an installation as “a stationary technical unit where
one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried out and any other directly as-
sociated activities which have a technical connection with the activities carried out
on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution”. In prac-
tice this means a factory, power station or heating system that is a substantial point
source of emissions. Examples local to Manchester include the Castleton cement
works, Manchester Airport terminal CHP plant and University of Manchester Stop-
ford Building boilers. The majority of allowances, EUAs, are allocated for free by the
30 member state governments3 under National Allocation Plans (NAPs) which must
be approved by the European Commission. The restricted quantity of allowances is
issued annually and installations must surrender to their national regulator a quan-
tity equivalent to their monitored and independently verified carbon dioxide emis-
sions for a given calendar year by April 30th of the following year. If an installation
fails to do so it must pay a fine, €100 per excess tonne of emissions , and make
good the shortfall in the subsequent year. The Community Independent Transaction
Log (CITL) is a publically available electronic database that tracks the movement
of allowances among each of the national registries that log the allowances held by
installations and market participants. The European Climate Exchange (ECX) and a
number of other commodity exchanges provide standardised contracts and clearing
house functions for spot, future and options trades in EUAs. In conjunction with
banks and investment funds, that have no use for the allowances but participate in
trading them for speculative gains, an increasingly the liquid market has developed
over time with 3,093 million EUAs being transacted in 2008 in relation to an annual
cap of 2,083 million EUAs (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010).
The EU ETS allows credits from the CDM to be used as equivalent to EUAs sub-
ject to certain criteria. The first is that only a limited proportion of reduction effort
should be met by the import of CERs. This principle is described in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol as ’supplementarity’ but no numeric interpretation is given in it or the EU ETS
Directive. In practice the quantity of offset credits allowed into the EU ETS Phase
II is specified by each NAP and limited for each installation in a given phase. Cur-
2 Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended by Directive 2004/101/EC.
3 EU 27 plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.
124
rently this allows an EU-wide proportion of 13% of the volume of EUAs to be sup-
plemented by CERs; however in practice the CITL recorded that 82 million CERs,
representing 4% of the total volume of EUAs, were surrendered in 2008 (Elsworth
& Worthington, 2010). The Linking Directive (EC 2004)4 also specifies that credits
generated from nuclear power projects or biological sinks cannot be used in the EU
ETS and that large hydroelectricity projects (20MW) must comply with international
guidance “including those contained in the World Commission on Dams year 2000
Final Report”. EU buyers are the largest source of demand for credits from the CDM,
driven by both the direct compliance requirements of the EU ETS and the prospect
of speculative gains made on the stricter caps of Phase 3.
6.0.2. Outline of credit systems
Credit based systems reward participants for environmental performance that is
quantifiable and in someway an improvement on the status quo. Unlike cap and
trade, there is no maximum quantity of emissions set for the system as a whole.
Participation by an economic agent that wishes to earn credits is voluntary. The
regime authority awards credits, which may then be sold to other entities that are
subject to regulatory obligations, based on a particular set of criteria. In this way, a
financial incentive is created for environmental improvement. For example, an iron
foundry may install a new, efficient furnace and be awarded credits equivalent to
the difference in emissions from ‘business as usual’, had it continued to operate the
old furnace. Once issued, credits may entitle the holder to increase emissions from
a regulated activity, or installation, by a quantity equivalent to the credited reduc-
tions. The aforementioned foundry may sell its surplus to another installation that
has not invested in improvements. In the case of stock pollutants such as greenhouse
gases there is also the possibility of credits being awarded for the removal of pollu-
tion from the atmosphere, for example through afforestation projects producing a
biological carbon ‘sink’. The market mechanism as a whole is therefore intended
to reduce abatement costs and provide flexibility by instituting a new incentive for
participants with low marginal abatement costs to voluntarily change their plans and
make measurable reductions with the expectation that those with higher marginal
abatement costs simply purchase the traded instrument and continue to pollute.
4 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within
the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms.
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From the simplest schematic perspective, I propose that two classes of economic
agent and three core economic processes may be identified in emissions reductions
credit exchange. The selling class is comprised of economic agents who hold emis-
sions reductions credits but have no use for them themselves, whilst the buying class
have a consumption incentive and will make a monetary payment to the sellers for
the property rights to the credits. The three processes are separate but interconnected
and may be mapped to a neo-Polanyian classification:
PRODUCTION: The creation of credits for emissions reductions
EXCHANGE: The transfer of credits for money
CONSUMPTION: The redemption of credits against an emissions reduction commit-
ment
Production is the creation and assignment of new GHG instruments, exchange is
their voluntary sale and purchase accompanied by financial transfers, and end con-
sumption is the ultimate surrender of credits in lieu of some other emissions reduc-
tion requirement5. It is immediately apparent that distribution is not identified as a
core process in these markets. Why is this the case when it is foregrounded in both
Polanyi’s own economics and the neo-Polanyian work that follows? Simply put, the
exchange of carbon credits is not material. There are no physical flows directly impli-
cated in the exchange, indeed even the financial transfers occur almost exclusively
electronically and not as cash money. This is not to say that there are no material
consequences of these acts of exchange. Far from it. The infrastructures associated
with both production and consumption of the credits are often substantial but rights
to them are not directly transferred and no material changes location. The process
of exchange, property ’changing hands’, accounts simultaneously for distribution,
property ’changing place’.
Each of the processes can be broken down further. Crediting necessarily occurs prior
to exchange; it is the origin of the instruments to be exchanged. It is the process by
which an activity is identified as deserving of credit; generically this is the award
5 The simplest case does not even include exchange; if the receiver of the credit retains and uses
the credit directly then consumption effectively occurs without exchange. For example, this may
occur when the receiver is a large organisation with multiple regulated sites. If we consider two
entities, a producer and a consumer, then a single contract may define the project and the emissions
reductions that are to be paid for, but without the creation of a transferable instrument. Neither of
these circumstances can be considered an emissions trading institution because they do not generate
transferable, marketable units.
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of a property right of some sort but specifically in the case of carbon credits it is
for the reductions of GHG emissions. Firstly, an activity must be delimited spa-
tially, temporally, and legally to the extent that ownership or rights can be assigned
to an economically active entity. This is usually regarded as a project and the ba-
sic unit of analysis. Secondly, as emissions reductions credits are earned quanti-
tatively, an estimate must be made of the amount of emission reductions that the
activity has produced or an amount assigned arbitrarily. Thirdly, an external agent
or broader institutional structure must create transferable instruments that can cir-
culate independently of producer-consumer relations. This requires some system of
accounts with which to record the ownership of the credits prior and subsequent to
their changing hands. These tradeable instruments are often referred to as “property
rights”, but as the putative rights conveyed do not pertain to a material entity and
are not recognised in law in the same way, this is somewhat misleading. Typically
the third party is a state agency which creates a regulatory right with legal circum-
stances under which the credit has utility and may be redeemed (Wemaere et al.,
2009, p39). However, this conception needs to be expanded to consider voluntary
emissions exchanges. The regulating third party may in principle be any organisa-
tion that is duly recognised by a broader social institution within which the credit
can be “redeemed”. An example in this case may be the staff of a corporation who
recognise their organisation as being environmentally responsible as a result of en-
gaging in such transactions. Crediting is thus tied to the systems of exchange and
consumption through recognition of the validity and comparability of credits.
The possible and actual use of credits, their consumption, is often taken for granted
but is also empirically open. There may in fact be a multiplicity of specific uses for
the credits available. As much as production, it is this that determines the economic
and biophysical consequences of the institution. In a system of voluntary exchange,
there is no incentive or justification for the production of credits without a comple-
mentary demand side. The quantity and type of projects that are incentivised are
specified by both the demand side agents and also the institutions that recognise the
validity of the credits arising. It is possible to imagine a supply crowd of produc-
tion institutions with variable organisational forms, be they firms, independent stan-
dards organisations, government bodies or whole supply chains, generating credits
and competing for business from members of an equally diverse demand crowd.
The exchange institutions outlined in this way suggest that the mainstream eco-
nomic assumption, that emissions reductions credits are a homogeneous commod-
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ity competed for only on price and entering the macroeconomy as a simple factor
of production, substantially underestimates the institutional requirements of such
a concept nor the possible range of concrete institutional forms that may attempt
to approximate it. The carbon trading systems that have developed in the last
decade illustrate the processes of instituting economic activity and institutional va-
riety within those processes.
6.1. An overview of the Kyoto Protocol flexible
mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol commits the developed countries named in Annex 1, OECD plus
the former communist states of Eastern Europe, to modest reductions of GHG emis-
sions, on average 5.2% from 1990 levels. Emissions caps are placed on a ‘basket of 6’
greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
The quantitative basis of these caps are base year emissions of 1990 with targets to
be met cumulatively over the commitment period of 2008-2012. Article 4(2)(a) of the
UNFCCC, the broader climate governance framework under which the Kyoto Pro-
tocol sits, provides the precedent for “flexibility mechanisms” in stating that “...Par-
ties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may
assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Conven-
tion” and Article 4(2)(b) “...with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their
1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases”. Within the Kyoto Protocol, the “EU Bubble” is a special provision of Article 4
that allows for a group of nations to be able to meet their emissions commitments in
aggregate if a formal agreement is reached and submitted to the UNFCCC. Of course
joint responsibility and the notion of coordinated policies and activities do not imply
or require market exchange of those responsibilities. These ideas were introduced
in supplemental legislation within the Kyoto framework. Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol introduces and Decision 11 of CMP1 (2005) specifies the conditions under
which states can transfer the units of their Annex B commitments amongst them-
selves. These provisions are collectively termed “Emissions Trading” and establish
the Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that entitle states to increase or decrease their
permitted national emissions output through exchange. In order to participate they
must fulfill certain reporting requirements, demonstrate administrative capability
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and at all times hold a “commitment period reserve” of 90% of their original AAU
allocation or most recent reported emissions inventory (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2,
Annex paragraph 6).
The Emissions Trading articles focus exclusively on the transfer of allowances be-
tween parties and have little connection to particular policies or activities that lead
to changes in emissions output. Following the initiation of the UNFCCC in 1992
a number of nations engaged a pilot programme of Activities Implemented Jointly
(AIJ) that consisted of overseas infrastructure projects funded by developed coun-
tries which could not be counted for credit on their future commitments but were
intended to act as capacity building and exploratory activities. The Joint Implemen-
tation (JI, Article 6) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Article 12) are
the formal project based, crediting systems that were subsequently included in the
Kyoto Protocol.
Article 6 provides for the transfer of Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs), new GHG
instruments, which are attributed to project activities in Annex 1 countries, both par-
ties to such trades having quantitative emissions limits. In practice this has meant
the post-socialist ’economies in transition’ of Eastern Europe hosting projects, with
the ERUs to be sold to richer economies to meet their commitments under Annex
B. Article 6 allows for any Party to authorise any other legal entity, including pri-
vate actors or international bodies such as the World Bank, to fund and develop
such projects under the authorising Party. ERUs can be created under the simpli-
fied procedures of Track I, if the host nation meets a series of criteria relating to its
national inventory and monitoring system, or a project by project Track II crediting
process similar to the CDM with a central governing body, the Joint Implementation
Supervisory Committee (JISC).
Supplementing Article 12, the Marrakesh Accords, formulated at the 2001 Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP), explicitly outline the structure and procedures of the CDM.
They detail the procedures and rules for the creation of Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (CERs) that are attributed to projects based in countries without quantified
emissions limits and which can be sold to countries with limits. This possibility, con-
sidered the “Kyoto surprise”, arose as a compromise position between the United
States’ insistence on greater flexibility for large polluters and the Brazilian Green
Development Fund proposal that would disburse the proceeds of punitive fines on
countries failing to meet their targets (Lovbrond et al., 2009). Article 12(2) outlines
the twin objectives “to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustain-
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able development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention,
and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quanti-
fied emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3”. The primary
motivations for its inclusion were to decrease the costs of meeting quantified targets
by integrating a pool of low mitigation cost activities in developing economies and
to direct new investment in clean technology to countries with limited finance and
trends of rising emissions (Grubb et al., 1999, p103).
The GHG instruments created under JI and CDM are attributed to project activities
rather than being allocated by decree to national accounts. A project is a geograph-
ically restricted activity that is specified in a series of documents and may involve
a number of organisations, for example a production facility, a bank and an engi-
neering consultancy. The instruments created through JI and CDM can be held, ex-
changed and used by organisations and individuals not only nation states. Unlike
other aspects of the international climate regime the JI and CDM directly and ex-
plicitly engage private and non-state actors (NSAs) in the deployment of low carbon
infrastructure and the production emissions reduction instruments. They are multi-
lateral in structure but are not grant making funds with their own resource base for
investment. By operating in countries without quantified commitments, the CDM
also increases the pool of instruments with which to meet the overall commitments
of the Parties.
The Kyoto Protocol therefore institutes 3 different units of exchange outlined in ta-
ble 6.2. There are 3 further units associated with Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use
(AFOLU); Removal Units (RMU) that may be claimed by Annex 1 units according
to the GHG inventory guidelines6 and the expiring credits awarded to afforesta-
tion/reforestation projects under the CDM, Temporary CERs (tCER) and Long-term
CERs (lCERs)7. These units are both accounting units to record the GHG output of
the parties and also tradeable instruments, based on a correspondence to a quantity
of material GHG, which carry the entitlement to emit GHG under certain conditions
(Wemaere et al., 2009, p37).
The creation of CDM credits, Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), is regulated
by a centralized secretariat, paid for by Parties to the KP and by fees levied for the
registration of projects. At the top level the CDM is “subject to the authority and
6 For a/r see CMP/2005/8/Ad3, p5 paragraph 1(a)-(d) and other sinks CMP/2005/8/Ad3, p5 para-
graph 1(e)-(h).
7 As detailed in CMP/2005/8/Ad1, p62 paragraph 1(g)-(h).
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guidance” of the COP/MOP (KP Article 12, Point 4) and supervised by an Execu-
tive Board (EB). The COP/MOP, the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), is intended to streamline the activities
of the UNFCCC, the “COP”, and the Kyoto Protocol, the “MOP”, by combining
the two decision making bodies’ annual meetings. The EB consists of 10 individ-
uals elected by the COP/MOP, including one member from each of the five UN
regional groups (Africa, Asia, Western Europe and others, Eastern Europe, Latin
America and Caribbean), two other members from Annex I Parties, two other mem-
bers from non-Annex I Parties and one member from the small island developing
states (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, paragraph 7). Members must have appropriate technical
or policy expertise and may serve up to two consecutive two-year terms. The EB
meets at least three times a year and fulfills a number of roles:
• Approve baseline and monitoring methodologies
• Be responsible for the accreditation of auditors
• Maintain a public database of rules, procedures and methodologies and projects,
project documentation and monitoring reports
• Commission and publish technical reports as required to fulfill its duties
• Maintain the CDM Registry of issued credits
• Make recommendations to the COP/MOP on the overall structure and opera-
tion, known formally as the modalities and procedures, of the CDM.
Project audit itself is undertaken by certified external agencies known as Designated
Operation Entities (DOEs). These independent organisations are typically accoun-
tancy firms, engineering or environmental consultancies in the private sector that
fulfill the inspection and verification roles of the CDM. They are accredited to per-
form these function for specific industrial sectors and must meet a range of criteria
including relevant technical competence and staff, financial stability, internal qual-
ity assurance procedures and demonstrate no conflict of interest exists between its
functions and its business interests (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, Appendix A, paragraph 1).
The performance of each DOE is monitored, periodically reviewed and subject to
spot checks by the CDM Assessment Team.
Creation of carbon credits is described by the CDM project cycle. It begins with a for-
mal proposal, known as a Project Design Document (PDD), identifying the project
participants and detailing location, relevant national authorities, the period for cred-
its to be claimed, and a justification case that the project is additional and requires
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support from the carbon market to proceed. A quantification methodology, selected
from a list approved by the EB, is outlined. This illustrates a counterfactual alterna-
tive future emissions profile under ‘business as usual’ conditions, the savings to be
claimed by the project and the monitoring and auditing procedures to be used. The
project participants must also secure a Letter of Approval (LoA) from the host party
government, stating that the project can proceed. There may also be a period of pub-
lic consultation where comments are invited on the project documents. The proposal
is then checked, in CDM terminology “validated”, by a certified third party referred
to as a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for completeness and compliance with
the CDM procedures and methodologies.
Once approved, the project is submitted to the EB for registration by the DOE and a
fee is paid. The EB has 28 days to make a request for review or clarification. As the
project enters operation, the monitoring programme begins and further verification
audits, conducted by a different DOE to the validating DOE, check that monitoring
data is reliable and as specified in the registered PDD. The DOE is then able to submit
a request for issuance to the EB for the quantity of CERs that the project has earned.
There is again a period where the EB can request further review of the project before
reaching the final stage where credits are issued to the designated project partici-
pant’s account within the CDM registry. The registry is an independent database
of uniquely numbered credits and accounts. Ownership is transferred from non-
Annex 1 entities that earn credits to accounts in Annex-1 national registries via the
International Transaction Log (ITL), itself a publically accessible electronic database.
An administration fee is deducted by the CDM at issuance and 2 per cent of issued
CERs are assigned to a fund for climate change adaptation in vulnerable countries.
The registry system is the ultimate arbiter of ownership and reduces the likelihood
that buyers may be defrauded by the ‘double selling’ of emissions reductions from
a given project. It also provides the means for regulated entities under the EU ETS
and the Kyoto Protocol to demonstrate compliance with their mandated emissions
targets.
Parallel to these documentary procedures the project may commence construction
according to the project participant’s access to up-front capital. By definition, this
ought to be related to their confidence in securing CDM registration and subsequent
carbon credit revenue. The CDM project cycle has little control over the material
aspects of the project and project planning, save for requiring compliance with the
details presented in the PDD. If the project itself or the monitoring plan are to be
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revised, the DOE must submit a request for deviation to the EB and according to the
decision reached may render the project ineligible for credits.
The outline presented here describes the institutions and processes that are arranged
to enable the exchange of emissions reductions between a variety of parties. There
are a number of aspects that deserve attention as they are key to the outcomes of
the market; i) defining a project and its eligibility to receive credits, ii) establishing
its additionality, i.e. that the project’s outcomes are the result of the incentives pro-
vided by emission trading, iii) quantifying emissions reductions attributable against
a counterfactual case, iv) quality control systems that are intended to ensure compli-
ance and v) assigning ownership and legal title to the credit instruments. It is these
procedures that mediate between the economic activity of the material projects and
the economic institutions that organise and incentivise them. Their development,
through variation and stabilisation, is ongoing. The Marrakesh Accord sets out the
broad principles, the “Modalities and Procedures”, but many of the details are ar-
rived at in a stepwise fashion as rulings are made and precedents set by the EB8.
The information presented below provides a snapshot as of 2009-2010 as work was
undertaken was on this project.
6.2. Earning credits: defining a project and its eligibility
One of the most distinctive features the CDM is notion of a project. The orderly and
regular exchange of emissions instruments requires a procedure through which par-
ticular entities are assigned the rights to CERs. In cap and trade systems, liabilities
and allocations are oriented around agents at a specified scale, a country, a company
or an installation for instance. In the CDM participation is voluntary so no liability
is defined, rather credits are earned for a defined activity: the project.
8 The CDM also contains a less exacting set of procedures for small scale (SSC) projects with the ob-
jective of increasing supply by reducing registration and quality assurance costs which would other-
wise be prohibitive and relaxing some of the criteria for determining a project’s eligibility to receive
credits (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, Annex II). The advantages include, the ability to “bundle” multiple sites
with similar activities into a single package for quality assurance, a simplified PDD, standardised
baselines for particular types of activity, reduced stringency in determination of additionality and
permission to contract the same DOE for validation and verification. Because of these incentives,
the definition of scale has been a controversial topic with amendments to the Marrakesh Accords
made at COP8 and COP11 (Michaelowa 2007). The current terms are that estimated emissions re-
ductions are less than 60kt p.a. or the power of the equipment to be installed, if a renewable energy
project, is less than 15MW or produces less than 60GWh p.a..The May 2010 CDM Pipeline lists 943
SSC projects with an anticipated yield of 134,911 kCERs by 2012. This represents 43% of the total
number of projects but just 8% of the expected total 2012 yield.
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Physical quantities of greenhouse gases are not directly exchanged in emissions
trades. However, the instruments that are exchanged are associated with economic
activity that releases or sequesters these gases, for example, electricity generation,
landfill waste disposal or home cooking. The buying and selling of credits is in-
tended to reduce overall compliance costs by allowing consumers to take advan-
tage of low cost mitigation opportunities outside of their own sphere of operations.
Therefore to create instruments for exchange, a clear link needs to be made between
particular, specified mitigation activities and the actions of the economic agents who
will be given ownership of the instruments. For instance, the distribution of compact
fluorescent lightbulbs involves not only the manufacturers, marketers, financiers,
distributors and users of the bulbs but also the grid and electricity generating sys-
tems which is actually burning fossil fuel, each of whom may wish to make a claim
to the emissions reductions (Broekhoff, 2007). Similarly when biofuels were con-
sidered by the CDM a decision had to be made as to whether the manufacturer or
consumer of the fuel is able to claim reductions (EB 26, Annex 12).
In the case of the CDM, mitigation activities are outlined in Project Design Doc-
uments (PDD) a standardised template that includes the information upon which
the audit and governance bodies, Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), Desig-
nated National Authorities (DNAs) and the CDM Executive Board (EB), will make
decisions to validate the project award credits (section 7.3 details these quality con-
trol procedures). It is also the main source of publically available information on a
project for local stakeholders and wider scrutiny9.
The current version of the CDM standard PDD10 requires the following information:
• Identity of project participants i.e. the Parties (countries) involved and the
public or private organisations from each that are participating in project and
who will received the CERs awarded.
• Technical description of the project activity including relevant operating per-
mits and approvals.
• Location of the project activity, including Host Party(ies), and details of precise
physical location.
9 A project developer may circulate a Project Information Note / Project Idea Note (PIN) to raise
finance and discuss technical aspects of a project with potential collaborators. However, these are
private documents and not standardised to the same extent as a PDD.
10 Version 03, Approved at EB 25, 28 July 2006, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/PDDs/index.html
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• Category(ies) of the project activity under the CDM scope and classification
scheme11.
• Technology to be employed by the project activity, including construction se-
quencing, operational plans and arrangements for training.
• Estimated amount of emission reductions over the chosen crediting period.
• Details of any public funding of the project activity, and where relevant a state-
ment and justification that this is not a diversion of ODA.
• Identification and justification of a baseline and monitoring methodology, the
sources and gases included in the project boundary and a description of how
the baseline scenario is arrived at and how the project activity is additional.
• Identification and justification of data and measurements for baseline study
and ex-post estimation of reductions.
• Identification and justification of monitoring methods, calculations and proce-
dures to be applied for ex-ante calculation of emission reductions.
• Specification of the start date, duration of the project activity and the period
for which credits will be claimed.
• Estimation of the environmental impacts of the project and if considered sig-
nificant an environmental impact assessment as required by the host Party.
• Brief description how comments by local stakeholders have been invited, com-
piled and accounted for and a summary of comments received.
These documents are essential to the functioning of the credit market. They pro-
vide the basis for creation of the credits and a central means of communicating and
coordinating between stakeholders. Producing PDDs is a technical task that the or-
ganisations that host projects typically have no existing personnel capacity for or ex-
perience in. A class of consultants has arisen that provide technical services in both
designing the project activity and writing documentation. These consultants may in
some cases also actively take a stake in the project and act as a project developer.
PDDs are made publically available on the UNFCCC website after submission to
the CDM. The data that they contain is collated and circulated in the ’CDM Pipeline’
a database prepared by the UNEP Risø centre, a publically funded research insti-
tution. These data illustrate the types and locations of projects that are currently
11 http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/ scopes.html
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receiving credits under the CDM (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). Examples include; ’end
of pipe’ projects such as hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) incinerators which reduce GHG
emissions from industrial plants, fuel switching projects where biomass waste such
as bagasse from the sugar industry is used to fire boilers, methane capture projects
which cap landfills and coal mines and may burn the gas to produce electricity, and
grid connected renewable electricity projects such as wind turbines and hydroelec-
tric generators.
Subject to meeting its twin top-level objectives, of meeting the emissions targets
of the Kyoto parties and achieving sustainable development (see p129), the CDM
is ostensibly open to a wide variety of projects with very few outright exclusions.
The Marrakesh Accords prevent Annex 1 countries surrendering CERs generated
by nuclear facilities and specify that land use change credits can only be claimed for
afforestation and reforestation (CP/2001/13/Ad2). The first COP/MOP, Montreal
2005, specified that broad local, regional or national policies or standards cannot be
considered as individual CDM projects but rather as part of a Programme of Ac-
tivities (PoA) which may be eligible under different rules. Subsequent Executive
Board decisions have emphasised location specific, infrastructure focused projects
that can act as a focal point for measurement and calculation. The following broad
approaches have been precluded:
• Projects exclusively based on training or capacity building for technology trans-
fer (EB23 Report, para 80)
• Projects intended to reduce the consumption of aviation and shipping fuels,
specifically citing shortened shipping routes as an example (EB25 Report, para
58)
• Projects relating to capacity building to enforce or police a standard or law (EB
33 Report, para 30)
• Projects whose products are intended to reduce emissions outside of a moni-
tored project boundary (EB35 Report, para 22). This is in accordance with an
earlier ruling specifically on the substitution of biofuels for fossil fuels; con-
sumers of biofuel are eligible for CERs but producers are eligible only if con-
sumption is within the reported boundary (EB 26, Annex 12, para 1)
Outside of these exclusions, project eligibility is broad but dependent upon the use of
Approved Methodologies (AM). Methodologies are documents describing the base-
line against which emissions reductions are to be calculated and how monitoring
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Figure 6.1.: Distribution of registered CDM project types, May 2010 CDM Pipeline
Figure 6.2.: Distribution of registered CDM project locations, May 2010 CDM
Pipeline
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and data collection are to be carried out. There are many technologies, policies and
interventions that a project participant could claim would reduce emissions but in
order to be eligible to receive CERs a project must demonstrate its implementation is
in accordance with the CDM rules. New projects and new methodologies enter the
CDM from the bottom up, via private entities and NGOs with direct project inter-
ests but also NGOs and networks with wider geographic or sectoral concerns such as
HEDON or SouthSouthNorth. Public finance from bodies such as The World Bank,
state owned corporations like MASDAR, and overseas development agencies such
as DFID, has also initiated and funded pilot projects and methodology development.
The CDM publishes all approved methodologies and project participants must adopt
one of these or submit a new methodology (NM) to the EB’s Meth Panel (MP) along-
side the PDD. The Meth Panel is a group of 16 technical experts selected by the EB
and tasked to provide recommendations on the appropriateness of new protocols,
provide tools to assist project participants to choose appropriate methodologies and
identify sectoral experts to contribute to the approval process. The procedure for
approval is substantial, involving the CDM’s secretariat completing a desk review,
a period of public consultation, production of a report by two members of the MP,
consideration by the whole MP which then issues a recommendation to approve, or
not, or seek further clarification from the project participants, that ultimately the EB
considers and acts upon (http://www.cdmrulebook.org/521 20101116).
Projects and methodologies are classified according to a numbered “sectoral scope”,
based on the sources of emissions listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. Illustra-
tive project types from the UNFCCC Methodology Booklet (2010) and CDM Pipeline
are provided:
1. Energy industries (renewable / non-renewable sources) – Displacement of a
more emissions intensive energy source with renewable energy, biomass or a
less intensive fossil fuel. More efficient power plants producing electricity and
district heat.
2. Energy distribution – Reduction in losses in transmission of electricity or dis-
trict heat.
3. Energy demand – Energy efficiency improvements in industrial facilities, do-
mestic houses, industry, public & private sector buildings.
4. Manufacturing industries – Waste heat or waste gas used for electricity pro-
duction in industry.
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5. Chemical industries – Recovered CO2 from waste gas substituting for fossil
fuels in chemical processes, reduction of N2O from production of nitric acid,
adipic acid, caprolactam.
6. Construction – None as yet.
7. Transport – Construction of new bus rapid transit systems efficient transport,
shift of cargo transport from road to rail.
8. Mining/mineral production – Methane collected and destroyed from coal mines
or coal beds.
9. Metal production – Upgrading industrial plant to greater efficiency or less
emissions intensive processes.
10. Fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil and gas) – Recovery in place of flaring
of methane from oil wells, gas pipeline leaks.
11. Fugitive emissions from production and consumption of halocarbons and sul-
phur hexafluoride – HFC-23 and SF6 destruction at industrial facilities .
12. Solvent use – None as yet.
13. Waste handling and disposal – Biogas from manure, waste water, industrial
solid waste, palm oil solid waste, by composting or aerobic treatment. Collec-
tion of landfill gas, composting of municipal solid waste, or incineration of the
waste instead of landfill.
14. Afforestation and reforestation – Restoration of degraded land with trees or
shrubs with or without silvipastoral activities.
15. Agriculture – Irrigation, alternative low N2O fertilizers, rice crop methane re-
duction.
The development of methodologies is a time consuming and expensive activity with
no guarantee of success. As of May 2010, 131 methodologies had been approved, 172
rejected with 32 new methodologies pending. There are substantial variations in the
distribution of projects amongst sectors, see figure 6.1 on page 138. This uneven-
ness is also seen in the numbers of methodologies developed for each sector, there
being none in construction, mining or solvent use but thirty three within energy in-
dustries. There is also substantial variation in the use of methodologies by projects;
for example 1606 of the 5955 projects submitted to the CDM (including those re-
jected and withdrawn) have used ACM0002 ’Grid-connected electricity generation
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for renewable sources (no biomass)’. A fee of US$1000 is required at the time of sub-
mitting a new methodology but this can be regarded as a prepayment if the project is
subsequently registered. This cost is small in comparison to the time, expertise and
resources required to initially develop a methodology which may be a substantial
burden for projects yielding low volumes of credits. There is therefore an incentive
for project developers to seek repeated, similar projects rather than a diversity of
types (Chadwick, 2006).
If the core components of a new methodology are similar to an existing approved
methodology, for example in terms of technology used, calculation of emissions,
they may be combined to form an Approved Consolidated Methodology (ACM).
The EB instituted this procedure in order to have a more concise set of documents
and avoid inconsistencies of treatment between projects (EB 27 Report, Annex 10,
para 8). As an illustration, ACM0002 is applicable to a wide variety of renewable en-
ergy projects including new installations and capacity increases, retrofit and replace-
ment of existing facilities. The technology involved can be hydroelectric (run-of-the-
river or reservoir), wind, geothermal, solar, wave or tidal provided that it is grid
connected as emissions reductions are calculated in relation to the electricity system
that the project connects to. ACM0002 (version 12.0.0, 2010) combines and super-
sedes 8 previous methodologies submitted with projects including a wind farm in
Jamaica, a hydroelectric scheme in Panama and a geothermal plant in Indonesia. It
is not applicable to projects where the energy produced from the new equipment
displaces fossil fuel use on the site of the project, or includes the use of biomass for
power generation, or hydroelectric projects with an energy:reservoir area ratio of
less than 4W/m2; these circumstances have separate methodologies.
There are also requirements for a Party to be eligible to host CDM projects. It must
have signed and ratified the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, established a Designated
National Authority (DNA) with the capability of examining and approving CDM
projects, and develop a set of project approval criteria that implement the sustain-
able development requirement of the CDM. DNAs may have different organisa-
tional arrangements either; i) within existing government departments; such as in
Malaysia where the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment has been ap-
pointed as its DNA, ii) constituted as an inter-ministerial committee; for example
China’s DNA, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which
approves Chinese CDM projects in consultation with the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), based on the as-
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sessment results of the National CDM Project Examination Board, or iii) or existing
as an independent body; such as Indonesia’s DNA, the National Commission for
Clean Development Mechanism (NC-CDM) (Curnow & Hodes, 2009, p20).
DNAs also act as the main point of contact for investors looking to participate in
CDM projects within the Party and may contribute to identifying, promoting and
attracting finance and work within national government to foster supportive legal
and administrative conditions. Their capacities may be a significant influence on
the geographical distribution of CDM projects. As of May 2010, just 58 of the 5955
projects submitted to the CDM (including those rejected and withdrawn) are located
in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)12. 32 of the LDCs host no CDM projects
at all, with 16 of those having no DNA in place. De Lopez et al. (2009) suggest
that the costs of operating an effective DNA are higher than fees levied on such low
numbers of projects and in reality LDCs frequently operate ’paper DNAs’. This is
by no means the only barrier to LDC participation in CDM projects although it is a
procedural necessity.
Finally, it should be noted that the CER yield of different projects varies over eight
orders of magnitude ranging from an LED lighting scheme in a single building that
is projected to generate just 2,260 CERs in its ten year crediting period (Project 4759,
Bucheon Fawoo, Korea) to a HFC-23 project that is expected to produce an incredible
219,182,229 CERs over a 21 year period (Project 0472, HFC-23 Decomposition Chang-
shu 3F, China). For context, the 10 million CERs awarded annually to the Changshu
3F are claimed to represent reductions equivalent to the annual GHG emissions of
Kenya or Luxembourg, ranked 94th and 95th of 213 nation states with data available
(UNSTATS 2010). Issuance up to 2010 has been dominated by very large early entry
industrial gas projects with 76% of credits issued being based on reductions of HFCs
and N2O. As more projects have entered the pipeline and they begin earning then
this balance will change but it is expected that reductions in CO2 emissions will only
account for 54% of total CERs earned before 2012 (derived from CDM Pipeline May
2010). Whilst burning fossil fuels for energy is the most economically ubiquitous
and pervasive source of GHG emissions, more than half of CDM credits will come
from projects that reduce methane N2O and HFCs.
In summary, there is a hierarchy of institutions that determines the eligibility of ac-
12 There are presently 49 nations recognised by the United Nations as LDCs representing “the poorest
and weakest segment of the international community”. The classification is based on population,
gross national income and two composite indicators of economic vulnerability and human assets.
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tivities presented as mitigation projects to receive credits. The possibility of emis-
sions trading and crediting was initiated in the Kyoto Protocol, the general princi-
ples of the CDM were broadly set by the Marrakesh Accords with further guidance
issued by COP/MOPs, methodology approval is given by the EB and MP setting
the framework for acceptable types of projects, whilst DOEs make the recommenda-
tions on individual cases. Methodologies and hence project eligibility have evolved
through a “case law” procedure13, as project participants make submissions and the
Methodology Panel and Executive Board assess them setting precedents with con-
sequences for other similar projects.
6.3. Owning credits: issuance, registries and legal title
As credits are intangible entities a system for recording their existence and owner-
ship is necessary. When they are issued, the instruments come into being in a single
database known as the CDM Registry. Title a credit is assigned uniquely and en-
ables regulators to check that multiple entities are not claiming the same emissions
reductions, an issue know as double selling or double counting. As a condition of
participating in the Flexibility Mechanisms, Annex 1 nations must have their own
compatible national registries to record their holdings of different Kyoto units and
receive CERs. Each CER carries a unique serial number, documenting the Party of
origin, project identity and commitment period, and can be recorded in only one reg-
istry account at any one time (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, Appendix D). The
self standing CDM registry allows Parties that have not yet developed their own
registries, i.e. some non-Annex 1 Parties, to hold an account and take possession
of credits. Once credits have been received they can be transferred to a buyer’s ac-
count in the national registry of another Party. The transfer is conducted via the
International Transaction Log, a computerised system that records the movement
and cancellation of instruments and verifies that transactions are compliant with the
13 It should be noted that the legal accountability of various participants in the CDM is not clear, espe-
cially the Executive Board itself and individual members of the EB who act in personal capacity and
not as representatives of their Party. The EB has received threats of legal action from project develop-
ers unhappy with its rulings, however it has not yet been tested in the courts despite the substantial
financial interests at stake (Streck and Lin 2008 Making Markets Work). There is no appeals process
so the possibility of apparently arbitrary and final decisions is of concern to private investors and a
repeated source of requests for reform either through rules on due process, opportunities to request
review of decisions or the creation of an independent ombudsman.
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terms of the Kyoto Protocol (Barreca, 2010)14.
A key feature of the CDM is the participation of non-state actors in the exchange
of instruments. The Letter of Authorisation, required for registration of the project
initially, transfers the right to the CERs subsequently issued to a project from the
national government to the project participants. Individual accounts can be held in
national registries by legal entities if approved by their respective DNA. It is in this
way possible for CERs to be issued to any public or private organisation named on
the PDD which can then transfer title and use rights to the CERs to another organi-
sation or surrender them for national regulatory compliance.
The CDM Registry, national registries and ITL allow secure assignment of owner-
ship and confidence in the accounting of the CER instruments once they have been
created. The registries contribute to framing property rights in the CERs, not in the
emissions or emissions reductions themselves. Use rights, the effect that possession
of the unit achieves, are subsequently developed in national jurisdictions (Wemaere
et al., 2009, p42). As a result of a stable ownership structure, exchanges between
agents can be conducted without fear of dispute, loss or theft. Contracts between
independent entities can then be drawn up for the delivery of CERs, at a particu-
lar point in time and at a certain price with confidence. This is the basis of market
exchange and can occur entirely separately from the processes of production and
consumption of the instruments.
14 Records of issuance to projects are publically available through the UNFCCC website
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Issuance/cers_iss.html.
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7.1. Establishing additionality
CDM credits are awarded on the basis of putative reductions from a baseline rather
than on measured GHG emissions to the atmosphere. Logically, for such instru-
ments to stand for emissions reductions in exchange, it must be shown that the
difference between the baseline situation (discussed further in section 7.2) and the
actual measured circumstances, defined in the PDD as the project, would not have
happened under “business as usual” conditions. If the project would have been ini-
tiated regardless of the award of credits then any claimed reduction is materially
meaningless; all that remains is a monitoring and accounting process1.
There are two problematic aspects to awarding credits in this way; firstly whether
or not the project activity occurs as a result of the crediting, the issue of additional-
ity, and secondly what quantity of credits should be awarded to a particular project,
the issue of quantification. It is impossible to directly measure the alternative case
without the credits as it does not occur. A subjective decision is always required in
deciding whether an activity is additional or not. This has been recognised by regu-
lators and researchers since the start of the CDM. Investigating what was, prior to the
Marrakesh Accords, referred to generically as “joint implementation”, Jackson et al
(2001, p4) note that “JI labours under an almost intractable epistemological problem,
namely; the irreducible uncertainty arising from the counterfactual baseline against
which emissions reductions and costs are measured.”. Or, as Dan Welch memorably
phrased it “Offsets are an imaginary commodity created by deducting what you
hope happens from what you guess would have happened.” (Welch, 2007).
1 The biophysical and economic consequences of this ’false positive’ also depend upon how the credit
is consumed. If it is simply recorded in an account and plays no role in social or individual decision
making then there is little problem.
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A case for additionality may be presented in different ways but ultimately a judge-
ment must be made by a consumer, auditor or management board to accept that
the emissions reductions claimed are meaningful. Within the CDM, claims to addi-
tionality are determined in the first instance by the DOE checking the PDD prior
to submission for registration (see section 7.3). The canonical definition is that
“A CDM project activity is additional if GHG emissions are reduced below those
that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity”
(CMP/2005/8/Ad1, p16 paragraph 43). That is to say, emissions reductions claimed
by a project should only be rewarded with credits if the savings claimed are the re-
sult of the award of credits and are not ’business as usual’ (BAU). Whilst the Mar-
rakesh Accords offered general guidance on the approach to be taken, the detailed
interpretation of additionality was left to the CDM EB. In 2004, the EB introduced
a standardised tool kit2 that can be specified in project methodologies and which
presents a series of questions that must be addressed by project participants. A
synopsis of the additionality toolkit flow chart, adapted from CDM in Charts v11.1
(Mizuno et al., 2010) is presented in Box 7.1.
7.1 CDM Additionality Tool
Participants must identify alternatives from which to choose a single business
as usual case against which to define emissions reductions
(a) Describe realistic and credible alternatives investments that project partici-
pants or similar developers might make to achieve the “outputs or services com-
parable with the proposed CDM project activity” (EB39, Annex 10, page 4). For
example different electricity generating infrastructure, alternative manufactur-
ing processes or equipment for a given product, often including, and justifying,
no change to present circumstances.
(b) Establish regulatory additionality; if a project is implemented to meet ex-
isting legal obligations then it is not additional. This is not sufficient alone to
demonstrate additionality. Illegal activity can be consider as an alternative if the
project participants “show that those applicable legal or regulatory requirements
2 Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality v1 (EB 16, Annex 1). If the addition-
ality tool is specified in a methodology then it is mandatory when using that methodology so there
are multiple incentives to use it rather than make individual justifications and submit a bespoke
methodology.
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are systematically not enforced and that noncompliance with those requirements
is widespread in the country” (EB39, Annex 10, page 5).
Investment analysis to determine whether the project is a financially attractive
option without the revenue from CER sales or is likely to be financially attractive
in comparison to alternatives in the same market. If the project is shown to be
financially attractive then the barriers test is required. This section is further
augmented by “Guidance on the Assessment of Investment Analysis v2” (EB41,
Annex45).
(a) Determine appropriate method; where the project generates no financial gain,
such as the installation of “end of pipe” abatement technology in existing plant,
then use Option I, otherwise II or III.
(b) Apply analysis, gather data for:
Option I: Simple cost assessment, document the costs associated with the project
and the alternatives outlined. If the project is more costly than at least one alter-
native then step 3 is not required.
Option II: Investment analysis where project generates revenue outside of sales
of credits, such as from the sale of electricity. “Identify the financial indicator,
such as IRR , NPV, cost benefit ratio, or unit cost of service most suitable for the
project type and decision-making context” (EB39, Annex 10, page 6).
Option III: Benchmark analysis, identify an appropriate indicator as per Option
III but make comparison against “the market” and not a specific developer’s
decision making rationale or profitability.
(c) Calculate financial indicators and make comparison between alternatives
documenting and justifying relevant parameters in the PDD. This section is fur-
ther augmented by “Guidance on the Assessment of Investment Analysis v2”
(EB41, Annex45).
(d) Apply sensitivity analysis to test robustness of conclusions to variations in
key assumptions such as credit rate, discount rate on future revenue or project
costs.
Barriers test to determine if there are barriers that prevent the project specified
from going ahead but not one of the alternatives. The CDM must be shown to
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alleviate one of the following barriers to the project progressing. This should be
supported by with independent data or expert reports.
(a) Investment barriers, other than simple profitability as detailed in 2, for exam-
ple equivalent projects using the same technology in the same region have only
been commissioned on non-commercial terms or that private capital is witheld
due to perception of host country risk demonstrated in credit rating or credible
reports.
(b) Technology barriers, in terms of skills or additional infrastructure that are un-
available or present a risk to the project’s success and justify greater investment
returns.
(c) Prevailing practice, the project is the first of its kind and cannot secure sup-
port.
(d) Other barriers as detailed and justified by project participants.
Common practice test to show the project to be disimilar to other activities in its
locality or industrial sector as a ’credibility check’. All projects should describe
analysis of other similar activities, outside of those involved with the CDM, and
if they exist provide a justification why there are financial or other barriers spe-
cific to this project.
As Chomitz notes “Additionality is an inherently unobservable characteristic of
projects. Conceptually, a perfectly accurate additionality test implies a perfectly ac-
curate behavioural model which specifies the conditions under which the project
would be undertaken” (Chomitz, 2002, p36). The CDM’s procedures attempt to
collate sufficient information on which to characterise these conditions and a be-
havioural model. Whilst being framed as ’tests’ and accompanied by more specific
guidance in documents such as ’Guidelines for Objective Demonstration and As-
sessment of Barriers’ (EB50, Annex 13) or the Validation and Verification Manual
(EB44, Annex 3), there are rarely unequivocal answers to the questions posed even
when the content of the tests is prescribed (Michaelowa, 2005). This is the case for
each component of the additionality tool. Even compliance with national legislation,
which would appear to be relatively straight forward to determine is vulnerable
where such legislation is not finalised or effectively enforced.
For instance, Africa’s largest CDM project, the Pan Ocean Gas Utilisation Project in
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the Niger delta (Project 2029), is anticipated to earn over 2.6 million CERs annually
on the basis that it destroys methane released from oil wells that would be otherwise
combusted in open flares. The “business as usual” case presented in the PDD is that
the flares continue as they have done for the previous thirty years despite the well
documented impacts on human health, local agriculture and ecosystems (Jike, 2004).
Although there are national regulations were enacted in 1979 to prevent such pol-
lution (Eweje, 2006) the PDD itself notes “...that gas flaring in Nigeria is an issue of
concern to the Nigerian Government and numerous proposals have been discussed
for many years as to how to limit such flaring. Options that have been discussed
include a legal ban on flaring and substantially increasing the fines for flaring. De-
spite these discussions, it is clear from the volumes of gas flared that this continues
to be the common practice in Nigeria and will continue so for the foreseeable future”
whilst “...the payment of the fine is economically advantageous to investing in any
other option” (Project 2029 PDD 2008 v05 p13). The PDD goes on to indicate that the
CDM “incentive” to prevent flaring would supplant legislative processes towards a
ban (Project 2029 PDD 2008 v05 p15). In registering this project the CDM endorses
the legitimacy of the claim to additionality; that flaring would not be controlled de-
spite the World Bank identifying Nigerian gas flares as the continent’s largest source
of emissions, Shell, the region’s largest producers, announcing in 2004 that it would
voluntarily stop all flaring by 20083 and the Nigerian national government having
made repeated declarations that it would enforce an end this harmful practice.
Financial data are difficult to verify and the final justification for investment is
known only to the individuals responsible for taking the decision. This is especially
the case for projects which generate direct or indirect revenue streams in addition
to sales of CERs for example through electricity production, reduced costs of meet-
ing other pollution regulation, increased efficiency and reduced fuel costs (Chomitz,
2002). The test is vulnerable to manipulation because of information asymmetry be-
tween proponent and regulator as the “hurdle rate” for initiation of the project is set
by the investors and the financial data for comparing cases supplied by consultants
in the pay of investors (Fischer, 2005; Haya, 2007). These microeconomic consid-
erations are subjective and especially problematic where credit revenue is a small
component of total project funding and may only make a small difference to the in-
ternal rate of return. These two points can be illustrated by examining the UNEP
3 A target that it has subsequently failed to achieve, see Shell (2008) The Elusive Goal to Stop Flares
http://www.shell.com/home/content/environment_society/shell_world_stories/2008/flaring/
accessed 23/11/2010.
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Risø pipeline for projects which provide financial data in their PDDs.
To May 2010, the total investment in projects registered with the CDM, is recorded
as approximately US$64 billion (table 7.1). It is argued that this has been levered by
the total anticipated yield of 1.8 billion CERs. The proportion of funding for projects
received as credit revenue can be calculated using basic price assumptions, in this
case the indicative range given by the World Bank State of the Carbon Market Re-
port 2008. The contracts for the purchase of CERs are typically made before their
issuance so price information is not typically available in the public domain4. Al-
though evidence of the prices paid for CERs ought to be subject to CDM scrutiny
via the validation checks made by DOEs, Schneider (2007) found that 30% of PDDs
sampled presented “black box” financial additionality cases with very little infor-
mation disclosed. Nevertheless, by working through estimations in an appropriate
range, the variation between projects in the proportion of money from CER revenue
can be seen to be substantial. Solar projects, are indicated to receive just 1% of to-
tal project investment from CER sales, which may go some way to explaining why
there are just 20 projects registered. In the categories with the greatest number of
projects, wind and hydro, CDM revenues make up about 10% of project investment,
i.e. the bulk of the economic resources to develop the project do not come from the
exchange of credits. However, in the categories generating the greatest proportion
of credits, industrial gas destruction and coal mine methane, CER revenues pay for
project investment costs many thousands of times over.
These figures suggest two things. Firstly, it is frequently difficult to ascertain whether
the financial influence of CDM was decisive in many cases. Profitable projects may
be ’sweetened’ by CDM revenue but it is often too small a proportion and comes
with too much of ’cost’ given the time required to transit the CDM process and the
risk of not being registered or not earning the quantity of credits as estimated, to be
unequivocally financially additional. For example, Hultman et al (2010) present ev-
idence from South America and India that project managers place greater emphasis
on the price and trends in electricity and fuel than CER revenues. Secondly, there are
those cases where financial additionality is clear but where CERs command market
prices that are very much higher than the projects’ marginal abatement costs. Indus-
trial gas projects involving N2O, SF6 and HFCs are likely realising substantial gains,
of the order of hundreds of millions of dollars, through scarcity rent, an economi-
cally inefficient situation (Wara, 2006).
4 See chapter 8 for discussion or market structure and types of transaction.
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Table 7.1.: CDM Investment in Registered Projects
Project Type Number
of Projects
Total
Project In-
vestment
/Million
US$
CERs An-
ticipated
by 2012
/1000
% of
Investment
as Carbon
Revenue at
US$10/CER
% of
Investment
as Carbon
Revenue
US$15/CER
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass energy 283 3422 97576 29 43
Cement 19 278 21502 77 116
CO2 capture 2 60 139 2 3
Coal bed/mine
methane
26 524 62626 119 179
Energy
distribution
2 12 739 62 93
EE households 7 107 967 9 14
EE industry 57 734 9582 13 20
EE own
generation
136 3537 108848 31 46
EE service 5 81 330 4 6
EE supply side 19 2393 9951 4 6
Forests 14 61 110288 1818 2726
Fossil fuel switch 45 8970 44332 5 7
Fugitive 12 828 10101 12 18
Geothermal 9 543 476448 877 1316
HFCs 21 73 220143 2996 4494
Hydro 599 18486 154577 8 13
Landfill gas 159 1305 65537 50 75
Methane
avoidance
323 622 246897 397 596
N2O 62 468 3754 8 12
PFCs and SF6 6 371 2312 6 9
Solar 20 1325 1228 1 1
Tidal 1 0 1104 3 4
Transport 3 457 1978 4 6
Wind 341 19081 143938 8 11
Total 2171 63,739 1,794,941 N/A N/A
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For many projects, marginal revenue from the sale of credits is argued to be decisive
in gaining investment in the project. Figure 7.1 displays the spread of the internal
rate of return (IRR)5 of 2678 projects and the difference claimed by the incorporation
of the revenue from the sale of CERs. Whilst this is an incomplete sample, not all
projects present such detailed information within their PDDs6, as a whole the data
may be regarded as illustrative of those projects claiming financial additionality. The
majority of such projects are quite profitable without CER revenue, the inter quartile
range for IRRs is 6.0% to 9.0% with a median value of 7.0%, and as Shrestha and Tim-
ilsina term them they are “economically no regret” projects that may be free-riding
(2002). There are four far negative outliers, with an IRR of -25% or less, but only sev-
enty eight projects that are not profitable before the addition of CER revenue. The
most profitable project, a heat recovery scheme at a chemical plant (CDM4521) has
an IRR of 61.8%. When CER revenues are included the IQR increases and broadens
from 9.7% to 14.7% with a median value of 11.6%. Only five projects are still not
profitable, two solar, two wind and one landfill gas. However, there are 211 projects
with rates of return greater than 20%, the highest being an SF6 destruction project
at a magnesium casting plant with an extraordinary IRR of 195% (Project Ref 2486).
It seems to be fair to fair to say that, certainly for renewable energy projects that
make up the majority of CDM activities, already profitable projects become more so
and non profitable projects do not proceed far enough to be considered for CDM.
This phenomenon is know is adverse selection, a feature of incentive institutions
with information asymmetries and where participation, in this case submission to
the CDM, is voluntary for participants (Tietenberg, 2003).
Independent sensitivity analysis of CDM projects has shown that carbon market pa-
rameters (the price of CERs and baseline emissions factors) are much less signifi-
cant to the financial viability of renewable energy projects than major features of
the project (load factor, electricity tariff, investment costs) (Diakoulaki et al., 2007).
This may not be the case for projects whose type has produced much more vari-
able issuance, for instance coal mine methane or landfill gas where projects have
5 The IRR is a common metric for assessing the profitability of capital projects. It is the discount rate
that makes the net present value of a project (NPV) zero and as such is an indicator of the rate of
profit on a project, rather than the magnitude.
6 By citing no source of non-CER revenue in Investment Analysis test 2a projects do not need to
demonstrate financial additionality. For example, none of the 23 HFC destruction or 69 N2O projects
provides this data. It must also be noted that the figures presented here are subject to the verac-
ity and completeness of the financial case even where data is presented. Section 7.3 illustrates the
processes for examining project documentation and some of the difficulties faced by DOEs.
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received just 45% and 35% of anticipated CER yield (CDM Pipeline May 2010). Fi-
nancial analysis shows how incorporating such variance with price dynamics raises
the sensitivity of the project case (Patel, 2008). The profitability of projects may also
be highly dependent upon local corporate and income tax structures and other in-
centives offered to promote renewable energy such as guaranteed electricity prices
and whilst PDDs are required to present sensitivity analysis there are question marks
over the efficacy of DOE’s assurances and whether these analyses are sufficiently rig-
orous (Schneider, 2007). These conclusions relate to an intractable problem known as
Grubb’s paradox (Sugiyama & Michaelowa, 2001) whereby “the most ‘cost-effective’
projects may be the least ‘additional’ and strict project additionality would give per-
verse policy incentives... any project that would only require a small incremental
benefit (such as a CER at low cost) to make it proceed would also only require a
small shift in market conditions to make it viable without crediting” (Grubb et al.,
1999, p xxxix). This raises serious doubts over the espoused efficiency gains of the
CDM over non-market policies.
The obvious response to the aforementioned problems is to suggest that the CDM
strictly enforces a financial additionality criterion with a high threshold to reduce
the likelihood of non-additional projects. This policy option would be an impedi-
ment to credit revenues being able to leverage other economic resources. It would
also result in the exclusion of many projects that would not have gone ahead for
quite different reasons than profitability. Such a situation is not tolerable to those
who emphasise the CDM’s role in delivering investment for activities that increase
well being and access to energy in the poorer communities of developing countries
(Shrestha & Timilsina, 2002). It is for this reason that the other components of the
additionality tool, the barriers test and common practice test, are present but they
face similar difficulties of knowledge of the counterfactual case and asymmetric in-
formation.
For example, improved cooking stoves (ICS) and biogas digester community devel-
opment projects have been shown to have negative incremental costs as they save fuel
wood which has a recognised market value (Begg et al., 2000). The projects are finan-
cially justifiable at the outset but would not be expected to occur given the lack of
financial capital, distribution of materials, dissemination of designs and techniques.
The authors judge that “For projects at the household level or medium scale sup-
ply projects, relying on financial assessment to judge additionality in areas where
access to money is low, is not useful in determining whether a project is additional”
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Figure 7.1.: IRR for CDM projects with and without CER revenue.
Boxes indicate the interquartile range (IQR), the horizontal lines within boxes indicate the
median value, circles represent outliers (>1.5 x IQR) and asterisks extreme outliers (>3 x
IQR). Data from UNEP Risø CDM Pipeline May 2010 “CDM_Projects” table, n=2678
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(Begg et al., 2000, p22). However, in these cases this wood was not traded so savings
were realised in time for the users of the stoves. Access to high grade energy can
contribute substantially to quality of life and economic productivity for the commu-
nities involved but there is little sense of what project participants do with liberated
time and what the emissions consequences of this are (see section 7.2.2 on leakage).
A sample of CDM PDDs found that the barrier test was the most frequently used
means of claiming additionality, being cited in 74% of proposals (Schneider et al.,
2009). However, all construction projects must to some extent overcome barriers of
skills, siting, risks with equipment reliability and so on, or as Michaelowa recognises
“Otherwise everybody would start projects everyday” (2005). To ascribe one to be
the decisive factor will inevitably remain subjective especially in situations where
government provides multiple supporting frameworks such as planning conces-
sions, favourable taxation or proportional requirements in electricity supply (Schnei-
der, 2009). For instance, an in depth review of hydro-electricity projects registered
under the CDM in China raised concerns over multiple aspects of additionality. New
projects registered with the CDM represent 5.1GW of capacity, a substantial propor-
tion of total installation of 9GW in 2007, which should be considered against pre-
vious annual installations of around 7.7GW without CDM support (Haya, 2007).
In this case, political and economic conditions are manifestly supportive, and the
technology difficult to deny being “common practice”, raising significant questions
of any specific claims of additionality7. CDM documents do not clearly defined
what proportion of existing similar projects constitutes common practice nor even
the scale, “relevant region”, appropriate for comparison (VVM EB39 Annex 2 p27).
Lewis (2010) concurs that many RE projects in China are not additional but that
the CDM EB is beginning to reject projects, including ten simultaneously at EB51
(November 2009), on the grounds that government subsidies had been lowered to
increase the financial case for additionality. In response, the Chinese DNA and
EB members pressed for greater clarity and transparency in the decision making
process. While the CDM remains without numerical thresholds then there will in-
evitably be case by case variation. Ultimately, while introducing thresholds may
increase the uniformity of judgements it would merely move the matter of subjec-
tivity to a different location in the governance framework, from DOEs or individual
EB meetings to the arena that makes the initial threshold ruling. The intractable
7 That many such projects pass DOE approval seems largely explicable by the presence of the “E- rule”
i.e. they are assessed against a counterfactual policy framework of legislation prior to the Marrakesh
Accords (see page 248).
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difficulties of asserting and determining additionality mean that it is the most fre-
quent reason for the rejection of projects by the EB, a recent survey concluding that it
was the cited in 67% of those projects reviewed and 82% of those ultimately rejected
(Green, 2008).
7.2. Quantifying units of account and exchange
Traded GHG instruments are almost universally defined as representing a tonne of
carbon dioxide equivalent and exchanged and surrendered at single, uniform rates.
However, as noted earlier the instruments exchanged are not material commodities,
not property rights over material commodities. The calculative procedures of the
CDM examines economic activities, such as the operation of a wind turbine, and as-
sign quantities of instruments to them. These quantities of instruments can then be
subject to market valuation and exchange. There are a number of aspects to this cal-
culative process; i) describing a baseline, ii) fixing project boundaries, iii) estimating
leakage, and iv) verifying reductions.
7.2.1. Baselines & Calculations
As part of the process of establishing additionality, a range of alternative develop-
ment scenarios must be outlined for each project and a credible business as usual
case chosen. An emissions profile over time, the baseline, for the project is deter-
mined by making assumptions about the actions of the project participants and the
“anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur in the
absence of the proposed project activity” (CMP/2005/8/Ad1 paragraph 44). For
example, in the case of a landfill site methane capture project, all methane sponta-
neously generated by the decomposition of waste is assumed to be released to the
atmosphere, or for a renewable electricity project a fossil fuel plant is assumed to
supply the same quantity of electricity to the grid. Figure 7.2 illustrates the baseline
assumption (blue line), emissions monitoring (red line) and calculation of credits
(blue area). The baseline may be defined as a constant output of emissions, or an
extrapolation of current trends, or dynamically refer to economic conditions over
time.
In the case of grid connected renewable electricity for instance, it is common for the
baseline to be defined as the ’combined margin’ a composite metric which assumes
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an increase in capacity and combines the emissions factor of the existing grid, the
’operating margin’, and the most recently constructed infrastructure, the ’build mar-
gin’ (Michaelowa, 2005). But no such phenomenon exists in material terms. That a
new plant is built and enters operation is undeniable but how the grid responds, in
terms of the day to day supply of electricity and the decisions to built new facilities,
according to inter alia marginal production costs in a competitive dispatch market,
long run contracts, political commitments and physical constraints on the ability to
respond to demand, depends upon strong knowledge claims from what amounts to
a predictive social science. To enable crediting, these responses are modelled to gen-
erate a counterfactual case. This provides a basis for quantification but the data re-
quirements for the best econometric dispatch models are high and may not be avail-
able in some countries, their epistemological foundations also being questionable, so
ultimately baseline cases become a matter of expert judgement. This matters a great
deal as i) such a high proportion of the pipeline uses grid displacement methodolo-
gies, 3592 of 6785 proposed projects, and ii) it can have substantial implications for
the quantity of credits each project is eligible to receive and hence subsequently the
financial case, the price of credits and the strength of an additionality claim.
Baselines calculation procedures for each project are outlined in the PDD and must
adhere to an approved methodologies that have been examined by the Meth Panel.
Baselines are defined in such a way that reductions due to simple cut backs in gen-
eral activity at the project site are not credited. This procedure is best illustrated
through an example. Taking AM0001 Incineration of HFC Waste Streams, the busi-
ness as usual case is that the operators of a plant producing the refridgerant HFC-22
release HFC-23, an unwanted GHG byproduct, to the atmosphere because they are
under no regulatory or normative obligation to contain this harmful pollutant. The
project is to install an incinerator which combusts the HFC-23 waste stream. Reduc-
tions are calculated by monitoring the quantities of HFC-23 produced and destroyed
and the quantity continuing to be released, the quantity of HFC-22 produced, and
the quantity of other GHGs released due to energy consumption in the incinera-
tor. The amount of credits that can be claimed are restricted to a fixed proportion
of the total output of HFC-22 to prevent gaming of the system and increasing the
proportion of the byproduct in the waste stream. This would no doubt be profitable
as such projects earn enormous revenues; each tonne of HFC-23 measured as being
destroyed is credited with 11,700 CERs as it is defined to have a global warming po-
tential (GWP) of 11,700 times carbon dioxide over a 100 year period. That is to say,
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Figure 7.2.: Quantification of emissions reductions against a counterfactual baseline
one tonne of HFC-23 is said to trap the same amount of energy in the atmosphere
over 100 years as 11,700 tonnes of carbon dioxide under assumptions of particular
atmospheric conditions. This process of commensuration, i.e. homogenising differ-
ent greenhouse gases despite their different chemical fates and scientific uncertainty
over their impacts, and by implication the making equivalent reductions in the re-
lease of these gases from whatever the source, has been highlighted by MacKenzie
(2008) and Lohmann (2006, 2008) although with contrasting normative conclusions.
For MacKenzie “making things the same” is a political process that displays the vari-
ation within contemporary capitalism and the importance it places on stabilising
scientific outputs by confining them to a ’black box’. For Lohmann, the processes
of calculation are unstable and illusory, with carbon markets very unlikely to de-
liver the changes required to avoid dangerous climate change. That calculation is
sustained, so that a market functions, reveals pre-existing inequalities in power over
knowledge and economic resources.
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Because they are associated with additionality, baselines are similarly problematic.
Methodologies are required to be transparent and conservative, i.e. that assump-
tions are clearly stated and justified and where there is uncertainty over parameters
a value that produces a lower baseline should be employed (EB 41 Report, Annex 12,
Part III, para 4). However, as Jackson argues (2001 p4) “[the baseline] refers neither
to what is happening, nor to what has happened, nor even to what might happen in
future. Instead, the baseline is an estimate of what would have happened if the inter-
vention had not taken place - an assertion which is impossible, in principle, either to
verify or falsify. What makes it worse is that the indeterminacy of the baseline pro-
vides significant incentives for gaming by those involved in he buying and selling of
emissions reduction credits.” Lacking empirical knowledge of the non-existent sce-
narios, the regulator is subject to presiding over conditions of moral hazard whereby
the project participants have an incentive to inflate the baseline in order to be able
to claim more credits. For instance, in the case of HFC-23 destruction, the revenues
earned by CER sales are so substantial that there were concerns that they would cre-
ate an incentive to construct new HFC-22 plants or reinstate closed plants simply to
destroy waste byproducts. AM0001 therefore specifies that the plant must have been
in operation from 2005 until the start of the project and also for three years between
2000 and 2004. However, this still leaves the possibility that the cross subsidy on
HFC-22 production could decrease prices and hence increase quantities produced.
At the time of approval of the methodology this was not considered to be the case
(MacKenzie, 2008). However, subsequent monitoring data has revealed patterns in
HFC-22 production that would suggest it is being manipulated simply to yield CERs
(Filzmoser, 2009) and that historically the baseline has been inflated in some cases
so that a greater quantity of reductions can be claimed (Wara, 2006).
7.2.2. Leakage
Boundaries for the impact and influence of projects must be set to enable calcula-
tion of reductions, both in time and space. The emissions to be included within
a project boundary are defined by the CDM as those “under the control of the
project participants that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project”
(CMP/2005/8/Ad1, paragraph 52). The approved methodologies detail the sources
of emissions to account for within a given type of project and may vary considerably
in complexity and scope. They may or may not include adjustments for direct con-
nections with uncertain boundaries, such as GHG emissions from the production
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and transport of fossil fuels to the project site or the release of methane from anaer-
obic decomposition of flooded vegetable matter in hydroelectric reservoirs (Kartha
et al., 2004).
Projects do not operate entirely independently of wider product and energy mar-
kets and political networks so there is also the possibility of a given project having
an indirect influence on emissions outside of its defined and monitored boundary.
For example, projects which protect or reforest large areas of land are recognised
to displace people and deforestation to other areas so that the net change in for-
est cover is lower than that measured within the project boundary (Schlamadinger
et al., 2007). These counterproductive effects are termed leakage and are not unique
to offset projects. They have been discussed predominantly in relation to emissions
reductions from LULUCF (Schwarze, 2002; Ebeling & Yasue, 2008) and the incen-
tives for heavy industry to leave regions governed by stringent emissions standards
or policies (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006; van Asselt & Brewer, 2010).
Within the CDM the matter has received comparatively little attention. Millard-Ball
and Ortolano (2010) attribute this result to the disciplinary heritage and analytical
predispositions of the sectoral specialists involved in the Meth Panel; engineers had
dominated the early stages of the CDM as project proposals centred on industrial
plants and energy technologies and they were unfamiliar with the economic tools
used to recognise and account for rebound effects. Rebound effects are a general
economic phenomenon whereby increasing efficiency of a process, e.g. insulating
to reduce the costs of heating a home to a given temperature, leads to increasing
demand so that the reductions in consumption are less than anticipated8. These
phenomena are well recognised in transport planning, where for example, increas-
ing road capacity may reduce congestion but also induce greater volumes of traffic,
and so have been a thorny issue in the development and approval of proposed CDM
transport project methodologies.
As an example of what is included within boundaries and what is not, AM0021 for
the Decomposition of N2O from Existing Adipic Acid9 Plants, takes a baseline sce-
8 The rebound effect was first recognised by William Stanley Jevons in 1865 and has more recently been
characterised in the Khazzoom-Brookes (K-B) postulate which formally statement that “with fixed
real energy prices, energy efficiency gains will increase energy consumption above what it would
be without these gains”. Sorrell (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the issue, including a
taxonomy of direct, substitution and income effects, and indirect, due to embodied emissions in
efficient technologies and secondary rebound effects.
9 Adipic acid, 1,6-hexanedioic acid, is a simple chemical intermediary used in the production of nylon.
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nario of ongoing production with unregulated release to the atmosphere of N2O
waste. Boundaries are set at the scale of the plant and the year of monitoring.
Projects using this methodology earn credits for removing N2O from the adipic acid
waste stream in a number of ways; catalytic destruction, thermal decomposition
and by separation for use in another industrial process. In general then, eligible
emissions reductions for a plant in year y are calculated as:
ERy = BEy − PEy − Ly (7.1)
Where BEy is the baseline, PEy the emissions from the project implementation and
Ly emissions increases due to leakage. These variables are expanded and defined
against a host of measured process parameters and defined constants over 6 pages
and 18 equations. Briefly, baseline emissions in year y are calculated with formula:
BEy = QN2O,y×GWPN2O + Q_steamp,y×EFCO2,Steam,y (7.2)
Where QN2O,y is the measured quantity N2O destroyed by the facility in year y,
GWPN2O is a constant, the 100 year GWP of N2O, Q_steamp,y is the measured quan-
tity of steam generated by the project in year y that would otherwise have been
produced using fossil fuels, and EFCO2,Steam,y is a constant, the emissions factor of
steam production in the absence of the project. There are then two way of quantify-
ing the N2O that is destroyed in the plant, QN2O,y , indirectly by the measurement of
nitric acid consumed by the plant, or directly by measuring the N2O stream at the
inlet of the catalytic reactor. The direct measurement method includes an arbitrary
correction of -5% for the uncertainty inherent in the measurement and a weighting to
prevent artificial increases in adipic acid during the period the project earns credits:
QN2O,y = QN2O,m,y × 0.95×
PAdOH,y
PAdOH,Pr,y
(7.3)
where PAdOH,y, the maximum eligible quantity of adipic acid production, is the low-
est of either production in year y, PAdOH,Pr,y or the maximum annual production in
the three years prior to the start of the project.
Project emissions are calculated from the measured parameters of remaining N2O
emissions10, fossil fuel consumption on site (with reference to the “Tool to calculate
10 Where the process is not 100% effective at removing N2O from the waste gas stream and the equip-
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project or leakage CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion”), grid electricity con-
sumption, ammonia emission from the decomposition process and direct emissions
of hydrocarbons from the plant:
PEy = PEN2O,y+PEFC,j,y + PEEC,y + PENH3,y + PEHCE,y (7.4)
The remaining variable in the emissions reductions equation 7.1, Ly, accounts for
leakage and is very straight forward requiring only the measurement of the steam
consumption of the plant, QSt,c,y, and an estimation of the CO2 emissions factor for
the production of steam EFSt,c,y if steam is produced outside of the project boundary:
Ly = QSt,c,y×EFSt,c,y (7.5)
Despite going to these great lengths to capture, measure and calculate the various
chemical flows at the project plant and its connection to grid electricity, there is no
requirement for any of the four projects that implement this methodology to con-
sider any market economic consequences of the CDM on their industry. However,
these are pertinent as the industry is highly concentrated; there are just twenty three
adipic acid plants in operation world wide and all bar one of those that are eligible
to participate in the CDM have done so. There is evidence that during the 2008-2009
recession production of adipic acid shifted from plants that had fitted N2O abate-
ment equipment prior to the CDM to those that had done so afterwards and were
earning credits (Schneider et al., 2010). At a carbon price around US$15 per tonne,
CDM eligible plants can earn an order of magnitude more profit from the production
of CERs than from the production of adipic acid. CDM eligible plants are therefore
at a strong competitive advantage and during the recession did not reduce output
whilst the rest of the industry fell by 26% (Schneider et al., 2010). This is significant
as these four projects, of more than two thousand registered, account for 3.6% of
the total CERs issued to date, and represents a clear case where the economic re-
sources transferred through crediting serve to increase net emissions when wider
interactions of a project and its economic context are taken into account. Schneider
et al. (2010) conclude that the creation these credits is inflated by approximately
20% meaning the net effect on emissions when consumed will be an increase of 13.5
MtCO2e.
ment is not necessarily operational all of the time, for example when it is subject to maintenance
work.
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Nevertheless, such indirect leakage effects have historically been overlooked in the
development of methodologies on account of the difficulties in calculation ex ante
(Boyd et al., 2007). The extent and transmission of such effects will always remain a
contingent and variable phenomenon, dependent upon the concrete features of the
economic systems concerned such as the scale of distribution and exchange itself
related to technology, history and physical properties of the commodities concerned.
Millard-Ball and Ortolano (2010) suggest a variety of possible mechanisms including
energy equipment price effects where production capacity is limited, the realisation
of “suppressed demand” in energy systems that suffer brownouts and intermittency,
and production price effects due to reduced raw material demand at project sites.
Quantification is reliant first upon the identification of changes in rates of emissions
but then also upon attribution of causative mechanisms. It is clear to see why these
effects are overlooked; by definition leakage occurs outside of the physical project
site and so it is not trivial to identify or explain. Information asymmetries are also
significant in the relationship between regulator and project proponent; without the
recent recession the distortions in the adipic acid market may have been present but
remained unnoticed. Vohringer et al (2006) argue that indirect leakage through eco-
nomic effects is small for any given CDM project and estimates should be made and
implemented at the sectoral scale. However, in relation to rebound specifically, Sor-
rell’s review of over 500 studies (2007) noted that although variable it is wrong to
assume that the effects are small enough to be negligible; in some cases they have
been founded to be over 50% and when considered over the long term efficiency
improvements are recognised as one of the major drivers of capitalist economic ex-
pansion (Prudham, 2009).
As noted previously leakage is not a problem restricted to crediting regimes. Any
sort of emissions reduction intervention or policy can have secondary effects outside
of its defined arena. However, most other interventions do not make strong quan-
tified claims about their effects. A CER is intended to represent a physical tonne of
GHG which is materialised when the credit is consumed in place of reductions in
another time or place. Carbon taxes or performance standards are not measured for
performance so directly. Although there may be times when estimates of their ef-
fectiveness are made in terms of physical quantities of emissions, they do not make
claims to accurate correspondence.
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7.2.3. Temporality
Emissions reductions instruments institute the possibility of exchanging emissions
reductions not only between locations, agents and activities but also through time.
The purchase of credits, the construction of a project, the award of credits and the
consumption of credits are not simultaneous acts and need not occur in a strict lin-
ear fashion or in immediate succession. For instance, in 2008 primary contracts to
produce new CERs outweighed their consumption CERs 4:1 because of the anticipa-
tion of future demand11 Temporality is also relevant to additionality, quantification,
leakage and the arrangement of contracts and finance.
Temporality can be illustrated with an example project timeline. Box 7.2.3 details one
of the first projects to enter the CDM pipeline and one which is being considered for
renewal into its second 7 year period12. It shows a relatively simple case of project
design through to renewal of the crediting period but one which also illustrates that
the sequential, production line nature of crediting is out of step with the physical
processes of GHG mitigation. The project starts collecting the waste GHGs over
three years before any credits are assigned to the project participants and over six
years before they are consumed in Europe. It is worth considering that this need
not be the case; the temporal conditions are a feature of the crediting institution,
there are variations where forestry projects are concerned and indeed the voluntary
market is ’innovating’ to provide upfront capital with forward sales of credits to a
range of project types (see section 9.3.2 on the disputes arising).
11 State and trends (2009) records 389 million CERs were contracted in 2008 and that 87% of combined
primary CDM & JI contracts were signed by European buyers, both states and private sector. As-
suming proportionality in JI and CDM contracts this implies that 338 million CERs were contracted
for, more than four times the 82 million listed as surrendered in the CITL.
12 The project timeline has been assembled from the public documents on the CDM website
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JQA1094478108.13/view.
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7.2.3 HFC Decomposition Project in Ulsan, South Korea (Project 0003)
26/09/2002 First contracts drawn up between project participants.
01/01/2003 Plant begins storing HFC23 from operations. PDD records this as start of crediting
period as HFC23 is no longer being released to the atmosphere.
03/07/2003 Project announced in local newspapers.
21/10/2003 Project participants hold local stakeholder meeting.
12/12/2003 Documentation submitted to CDM to open period of public comment.
Construction of waste treatment facility
23/04/2004 Thermal destruction of HFC23 begins, with monitoring as per PDD.
02/06/2004 Letter of Approval from South Korean DNA for commencement of CDM activity.
Validation of documentation
24/03/2005 Formal registration as CDM project.
Verification of monitoring reports
16/01/2006 First request for issuance of credits to CDM EB for period 01/01/2003 to
31/03/2005.
03/02/2006 937,238 CERs issued to project participants.
Further cycles of verification and issuance follow with sale to companies regulated
under the EU ETS.
30/04/2009 CERs are surrendered by power stations and industrial facilities in Europe to meet
EU ETS requirements for 2008.
Request for renewal of crediting period submitted
31/12/2009 Expiration of first crediting period.
22/05/2010 Request for review of renewal submitted by CDM Watch to EB
17/09/2010 EB states that it will examine the possibility of baseline inflation (EB 56 Report An-
nex 46)
In the CDM, the time period over which a project should measure emissions and
claim credits is defined in its methodologies and documented in its PDD. The archety-
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pal sequence for crediting would be as per the project cycle outlined on page 132.
Participants plan and agree the activity they will undertake, raise capital to finance
the implementation, have their documents validated by a DOE, make a request for
registration to the CDM, construct, operate and monitor the activity, have a DOE
verify the monitoring data, receive credits for the period of operation and then sell
these credits to another entity to meet a compliance requirement. In actuality, there
can be some considerable variation in the sequence of these actions but because the
CDM awards credits for emissions reductions ex ante, i.e. after a project has been
in operation and after it has been inspected for compliance (see 7.3), there is a fun-
damental production sequence. While forward contracts for credits, typically in the
form of an Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA see chapter 8), enable
the financing of the project prior to the award of credits, and a certain lee-way in the
CDM regulations gives project participants confidence to commence construction
and operation, the sequence of verification prior to issuance prior to consumption is
rigid in the CDM to EU ETS production-consumption route.
Temporality is important in the cause and effect relationship implicit in the distinc-
tion between business as usual baseline and the additional project activity. By defini-
tion, for a project to be additional, the award of CERs must be central to the initiation
of the project. Solely the presence of, relatively, low emissions infrastructure is in-
sufficient to earn credits under the CDM; there are no savings if the infrastructure
was built for business as usual motivations. However, it has been possible under the
CDM to retrospectively apply for registration of an operational project if it can be
argued that CDM support was ‘seriously considered in the decision to proceed with
the project activity’ (CDM: Guidelines for Completing the PDD Version 6.2, p. 11), a
window that was closed on 31 March 200713.
The idealised model of additionality is that a project is implemented or not imple-
mented through a binary decision and that this presence/absence position is main-
tained indefinitely. However, some projects which have low or negative marginal
abatement costs will likely be undertaken at some point in time. Upgrading indus-
trial equipment to achieve higher energy efficiencies may be in the long term eco-
nomic interests of a project owner but often there is neither the impetus or access to
finance to effect these changes. Likewise national electricity infrastructure and such
13 The date had previously been set as 31st December 2005; the substantial time taken to submit, revise
and approve methodologies meant that many projects were only able to make formal requests for
registration after the executive board moved the cut off deadline back on a number of occasions
(DEFRA Perspectives Guide 2007 p11).
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cases often use the barrier test to justify additionality. It is these projects that might
also be expected to apply for credits retrospectively, as a ’bonus’ income stream but
not one that was essential to the initiation of the project. With rising energy prices
and increasing awareness of climate change, credit revenues may only serve to bring
such projects forward by 10 or 15 years (Begg et al., 2000 p39). As infrastructure like
a hydroelectric dam may be in operation for many decades this raises the question
of how long a baseline is valid for. Is it reasonable to use present day emissions as
the basis for calculating reductions earned in 2020? It is possible to calculate the ex-
pected variation in project output as a result of shorter periods of validity in order
to assess its importance in setting baselines (Begg & Van der Horst, 2004), however,
these conditions must be arbitrarily assumed. There can be no ad hoc or post hoc
means of determining when a project stops being additional.
This matter is addressed to some extent in the CDM by restricting projects to a choice
of either a single crediting period of 10 years or a shorter 7 year crediting period with
the possibility of renewal twice more (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, p17 paragraph 49). At re-
newal a DOE must inspect the project documentation and confirm to the EB that they
believe the assumptions within the PDD’s additionality case and baseline to still be
valid (EB 43 Annex 13). If, for instance, legislation has been introduced requirement
the control of a particular source of emissions then a project may no longer hold
regulatory additionality. The converse of this is that there is a disincentive for non-
Annex 1 countries to introduce such legislation as their project participants would
lose their CER revenue streams. The ’E+/E- rules’14 are intended to mitigate this
moral hazard somewhat by allowing contemporary regulations that incentivise the
project to be overlooked in the assessment of additionality and conversely offer no
advantage to the introduction of rules that promote emissions intensive fuels to en-
hance the additionality claims of others by default (EB22 Annex 3). Were crediting
periods to be short and re-evaluation of additionality to be frequent then the antic-
ipated returns to a project would become more uncertain. This could then have an
effect on the investment case, potentially deterring project participants due to low
rates of return or high risk of losses and driving them towards safer projects less
dependent upon carbon finance which are arguably less additional for other reasons
(see section 7.1 p7.1).
14 E+ refers to policies that give relative economic advantage to more emissions intensive technologies
and fuels that would tend to increase emissions in the baseline case. E- policies, such as subsidies
which promote less intensive technologies or fuels, would tend to weaken an additionality case.
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A project may in some cases only earn CERs for a short proportion of its lifespan.
This clearly has a bearing on the financial calculations that contribute to securing
funding but also the additionality case. Aside from eligibility to receive credits,
project participants and investors must consider whether there will be any value
in credits produced decades hence. Their worth, either as a use value in meeting
regulatory commitments or as exchange value on a market is dependent upon future
political economic circumstances. Substantial uncertainties remain in negotiations
of the post-Kyoto UNFCCC or successor agreements (2012+) and Phase III of the
EU ETS (2013–2020) over the quantities, sources and vintages of CERs that will be
eligible for compliance (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). As a result, prices for CERs to be
delivered or issued post-2012 are heavily discounted on markets if not in PDDs. For
example, one of the most recent entries into the CDM pipeline, the 140MW Shiyazhi
hydroelectric plant in Guizhou Province, China, CDM6316 submitted April 2010,
has an anticipated lifetime of 35 years from the date construction started, August
2007. The investment analysis is presented in the PDD on the basis of three seven-
year crediting periods with a CER price of €8.20 and a discount rate of just 4%. From
the documents presented on the CDM database it is not possible know if the contract
to buy the CERs it produces, signed September 2009, is guaranteed at this price for
the whole period, however it seems very unlikely given the regulatory uncertainties.
There is also a broader question of the appropriate time scale over which to attribute
the consequences of a project. This is most obviously considered in the discussion
of permanence of carbon sequestered in biological stores. If a project’s methodology
was to plant trees, that would not have been planted as business as usual, and give
credit for additional carbon sequestered in above and below ground stores, then
there is there is a reasonable possibility that the trees may die at some point and,
through decomposition or combustion, release the carbon stored back to the atmo-
sphere. However, the emissions released by the agent consuming the credit remain
in the atmosphere continuing to contribute to radiative forcing. The Kyoto Protocol
addresses this by issuing temporary CERs (tCERs) and long Term CERs (lCERs) to
afforestation and reforestation (A/R) projects. tCERs are accounted for on the basis
of carbon stored since the start of the project and lCERs on the basis of carbon stored
within the present crediting period. When surrendered as part of an Annex 1 target
both must be replaced or re-validated at the end of a commitment period, unlike
regular CERs which permanently defray liability for emissions. In effect, liability for
the impermanence of storage is passed to the buyer with this mode of credit eligi-
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bility. The information problems and asymmetries that beset crediting are displaced
and potentially compounded by moving responsibility to the buyer who may know
very little about the structure and terms of the regime, nor the details of a particular
project, nor have the ability to effect the progress or outcome of the project (Danish,
2009). As a result the CDM A/R mechanism has received very little uptake, with just
one project registered in the CDM pipeline and eight at validation (as of May 2010).
Alternative proposals include rental of credits, creation of buffer zones, seller lia-
bility and various forms of insurance policy some of which are under discussion in
the related topic of avoided deforestation (Marland et al., 2001; Schlamadinger et al.,
2007; Ebeling & Yasue, 2008). However, it is questionable whether these institutional
arrangements would be able to handle synchronous bio-regional scale losses as an-
ticipated in some climate models towards the latter half of the 21st century (Scholze
& Prentice, 2006; Betts et al., 2008).
In the voluntary market where ex post crediting is not rigidly enforced, there is the
further weakness that it may be many decades before the sequestration claimed by
ex ante credit sales is biologically realised. Credits are presently being sold from
the time of tree planting on the expectation that over the trees’ lifetimes the carbon
value of the credit will be sequestered (Gössling et al., 2007). Forward crediting is
not unique to sequestration projects; it is perfectly possible to sell credits to raise
capital to implement an energy efficiency or RE project, although it is not accepted
in any extant compliance regimes (see section 9.3.2).
Presently within the CDM, biomass is more frequently encountered as an energy
source, rather than as a carbon store. Indeed, ACM0006 Consolidated Methodology
for Electricity and Heat Generation from Biomass Residues is one the most popular,
with 287 registered projects (CDM Pipeline May 2010). A number of such biomass
projects have received substantial criticism for their impact on local communities
and loses of biodiversity, where tropical forest, or marginal land described as sec-
ondary or degraded, has been cleared for mono-cultural plantations of palms for oil
in Borneo or eucalyptus for charcoal in Amazonia (Lohmann, 2006; Friberg, 2009).
The CDM is accused of supporting such projects in the name of emissions reduc-
tions but leading to a variety of other unaccounted for consequences. A quirk of
these projects is that because of concerns about permanence, projects of these kinds
have not generally earned credits from sequestration in the plantation itself, nor
even from the use of biomass as a substitute for fossil fuels. The controversial Plan-
tar project in Minas Gerais, Brazil, uses a methodology that calculates emissions
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reductions from improvements in the charcoal manufacturing facility which reduce
methane emissions (AM0041), making an explicit claim that it has no effect on the
type and source of fuel to the facility. The disputed plantation and the pig iron mill
it supplies are claimed to be business as usual and not isolated from the emissions
reducing activities (PDD Project 1051).
Palm oil related projects in the CDM claim credits from their waste stream, empty
fruit bunches (EFB), palm kernel shell (PKS) and mesocarp fibre, both for the substi-
tution of fossil fuels in heat and electricity production but also for avoiding methane
releases from rotting vegetable matter. ACM0006 specifies that only waste material
may be used and that the project should not lead to changes in the primary agri-
cultural product market e.g. for the sugar, palm oil or rice that the waste is derived
from. This avoids a vulnerability that other carbon accounting systems have regu-
larly fallen in to, the assumption that biomass is renewable and as such results in net
zero carbon emissions through a continuous cycle of regrowth. This cannot be sus-
tained when the timescales of regrowth, dependent upon the original land use prior
to use for biomass and the type and productivity of biomass grown, are significant
in comparison to the time period of GHG radiative forcing (Zanchi et al., 2010). In
the long term the assumption may well be justified but on decadal scales account-
ing for the sequence of flows has been instituted inappropriately by ignoring “the
up front carbon debt of bioenergy” (Zanchi et al., 2010). It remains to be seen if the
CDM addresses these and other inconsistencies in its land use change rules (Blujdea
et al., 2010) particularly under increased political pressure to promote afforestation
and reforestation projects.
The temporal implications of rebound effects and market leakages from energy and
fugitive emissions projects are often not considered so carefully as for sequestration
projects. In direct comparisons of biomass and energy projects, researchers typically
assert that “...if emissions reductions are clearly permanent (e.g. fossil fuel is not
burned), then emissions credits might be bought and sold. If emissions reductions
are not clearly permanent (e.g. carbon is sequestered in a forest), then emissions
credits might be rented instead.” (Marland et al., 2001, p260), see also Chomitz,
2002). This is to overlook the fact that energy infrastructure and energy efficiency
investments necessarily have temporal elements, the operation of a project in the
present day having effects in future economic patterns and consumption. Of spe-
cific concern are rebound effects from investments that increase productivity and
economic activity in economic activities associated with credited projects. From the
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basis of the time period of radiative forcing from long lived GHGs Kevin Anderson
argues that “Carbon dioxide and its warming effect remain in the atmosphere for 100
years. Because it is there for 100 years we need a high degree of confidence that the
offsetting investments do not increase emissions over that 100 year period. Which
offset broker can do a 100 year prediction? Offsets investments have absolutely no
confidence limits that can be applied to them over 100 years” (Minns, 2007). Whilst
there are well documented micro and macro rebound effects, see previous section
7.2.2, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the inter-temporal consequences of
CDM projects.
Arguably it may be more appropriate to judge the indirect effects of the institution
as a whole which will again take care to identify and for consistency with the market
approach, quantify. Proponents of the CDM contend that it has stimulated the Chi-
nese renewables industry, acting as an incentive to innovation and increases in ca-
pacity, with an uncalculated positive leakage effect (Lewis, 2010). Conversely, there
are those who argue that the likelihood of specific and economy wide rebound ef-
fects from CDM and other low carbon projects is an insurmountable challenge to
quantification and that it is a poor basis for a system of exchange (Lohmann, 2010).
Finally, the inter-temporal exchange of credits has implications for overall reduc-
tions achieved by a trading institution because of the incentives it provides for leak-
age of a different kind. This issue was discussed in the pilot phase of the flexibility
mechanisms, Activities Implemented Jointly running from 1995 to 2001, as it had the
potential to reduce the stringency of Annex 1 targets. If emissions reductions credits
from the interim period, 2000 to 2008, were allowed to count as equal to emissions
from Annex 1 parties in the commitment period, 2008 to 2012, then there was less
incentive for domestic action in Annex 1 parties in the pre-compliance period. By
increasing the supply of credits available for the commitment period the exchange
relaxes the annual emissions output necessary to achieve compliance. Annex 1 party
emissions may therefore have been permitted to continue unabated or on a rising
trajectory in the years preceding compliance than otherwise would have been the
case. Parkinson et al (1999) made quantitative estimates that suggested that Annex
1 “lost action” in the interim period would likely be 30% to 60% of the quantity of
credits carried over into the commitment period. The implication was that a country
like the Netherlands with target of a 6% reduction from 1990 levels would actually
realise the cumulative equivalent of a 2.2% to 8.3% increase (Jackson et al 2001, p220)
if one considers the whole period 2000 to 2012. There is a certain “production line”
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sequence and economising logic that projects must be initiated early if CERs are to
be credited in advance of the opportunity for consumption i.e. the Kyoto commit-
ment period. CERs accrued over eight years from a smaller number of projects will
be cheaper than the same quantity produced over five years from a greater number
of projects. However, the “early start rules” (Kyoto Protocol Article 12.10) have per-
sisted and allowed projects to claim credits for their operation from January 2000,
with the likelihood that this has further weakened the Kyoto targets15.
7.3. Quality assurance procedures
Alongside the framework of rules that outlines CER production, specifying what
activities are to count and how calculations should be performed, there are quality
assurance procedures to ensure compliance with the CDM’s rules. Appropriate doc-
uments are also made available for transparency and accountability of participants
and the regime. These activities are primarily to ensure the effective functioning of
the regime but to some extent they serve the interests of market participants. Were
confidence in the instruments and accounting systems of production to fail, then
substantial investments may prove worthless as they could not be relied upon for
consumption purposes. As one guide to the CDM puts it, with the ultimate power
and responsibility in awarding CERs, the EB “acts like a guardian of the ’currency’
that the CERs embody (Michaelowa et al., 2007, p6)”.
The CDM has a limited secretariat based with the UNFCCC in Bonn providing a
range of administrative and clerical functions that contribute. This has grown from
just six staff at the outset to approximately sixty, both clerical and technical, in 2008
(Purdy, 2009). Substantial backlogs in registration of projects and issuance of credits
led to a recruiting drive through 2009–2010, but it has proved difficult to recruit staff
with sufficient expertise whilst respecting policies on geographic and gender bal-
ance, meaning for example that 36% of posts in some programmes remain unfilled
(CDM Executive CDM Executive Board, 2009).
The EB acts the central coordinating body that sets the CDM’s rules and has the fi-
nal say on most matters. However, it delegates a number of technical and review
tasks to subsidiary panels. Whilst the secretariat supports the EB’s activities the
15 Emissions data for the period up to 2008 will soon become available which will allow this analysis
to be repeated empirically, rather than on the basis of projections.
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bulk of project level monitoring and assurance is conducted by privately contracted
DOEs. These are independent auditors, predominantly profit making multinational
firms, some with historic involvement in accountancy, legal and financial services,
Ernst & Young Shin Nihon for instance, and others that have previously focussed on
environmental management, consultancy and compliance, like ERM Certification
and Verification Services. Others are business specifically set up to provide services
in this market, JACO CDM for instance, and a few, such as Asociación Española
de Normalización y Certificación (AENOR) and Japan Quality Assurance Organisa-
tion (JQA) are non profit making associations dedicated to industrial standardisation
and quality. There are 51 organisations presently accredited as DOEs, however, the
bulk of validations and verifications are carried out by just three; Det Norske Veri-
tas (DNV), TÜV Süddeutschland (TÜV SÜD), and Société Générale de Surveillance
(SGS) had performed 61.3% of validations and 74.9% of verifications. Each DOE
must be accredited by the EB on the recommendation of the Accreditation Panel,
which also advises on suspension, withdrawal and reinstatement of accredited sta-
tus (EB 3, Annex 1, paragraph 4)16. Like the EB, the AP members are volunteer
experts, appointed by the superior body, in response to advertised positions. Over
time, the AP has been given the powers and funds to recruit ad hoc Assessment
Teams with particular technical or geographic expertise to examine the performance
of DOEs through desk reviews, observation and spot-checks (EB 9, Annex 1). The
requirements for accreditation include retention of suitable personnel with demon-
strable expertise in the sectors (as outlined on p139) and geographic areas in which
they wish to work, suitable legal and administrative composition, appropriate in-
surance coverage, and internal frameworks for QA and maintaining impartiality.
7.3.1. DOE Tasks
DOEs are involved throughout the CER production process and perform a number
of specific activities:
Feasibility Prior to contracting for emissions reductions and submitting for regis-
tration, a project developer may employ a DOE to examine the proposal and
PDD.
Methodology Validation When submitting a new methodology, which must be in
combination with a PDD, then a DOE must review the submission against the
16 The current accredited list of DOEs is available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html
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guidelines for new methodologies and perform a completeness check on all
documentation and forms prior to submission to the Meth Panel (EB 52, Annex
9).
Project Validation A DOE examines a project’s documentation PDD and LoA, makes
site visit(s), interviews project participant staff and local stakeholders, and as-
sesses the additionality case and monitoring plans presented in PDD for con-
sistency and conformity with CDM rules. If found to be satisfactory, the DOE
can request registration from the EB, in which case the project will automati-
cally enter the CDM with little further scrutiny unless 3 EB members make a
“request for review”. If the DOE finds the project proposals to be wanting it
can specify a) clarification (CL) that more information be provided to make a
judgement, b) corrective action request (CAR) where the project does not meet
CDM regulations and project and/or documentation must be amended, or c)
forward action request (FAR) for an matter that is not a problem at present but
should be reviewed at the first verification.
Stakeholder Consultation The DOE should make the PDD publically available
and both via the CDM website and more locally and invite comments during a
statutory 30 day period. It must then include and account for these comments
in its registration report but is not required to enter into a dialogue with any
concerned parties.
Project Verification After implementation a DOE, independent of the DOE that
registered the project, must review the project documentation and any CLs,
CARs or FARs and verify on site that the project participants have adhered
to the plans set out. The monitoring equipment, procedures, data and docu-
mentation are checked for accuracy and quality. The outcome is that the DOE
rejects verification or produces a verification report.
Requests for Deviation If circumstances have changed to a small degree, such that
the methodology still holds but a detail of monitoring cannot be performed
as specified in the PDD, the verifying DOE can request permission from the
EB for deviation. Such requests are only valid for the period of monitoring
verified unless a request is made to revise the whole monitoring plan
Request for Issuance Once satisfied with all documentation, data and calcula-
tions, the verifying DOE can produce a certification report that “during a spec-
ified time period, a proposed CDM project activity achieved/resulted in the
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reductions in anthropogenic emissions by sources of GHGs as verified” (VVM
01 para 214). This constitutes a request for issuance from the CDM and CERs
will be forthcoming provided that three or more EB members do not initi-
ate a request for review of issuance within 15 days. They can do so only on
the grounds of “fraud, malfeasance and incompetence” of the verifying DOE
(CMP/2005/8/Ad1, paragraph 65).
Within the process, DOEs act as intermediaries between the EB and the project par-
ticipants, handling all formal communications relating to clarifications, reviews, re-
quests for issuance and other interactions. This may be an administrative conve-
nience to reduce the risk of a cacophony of requests frustrating the EB’s operation.
However, it begins to reveal the importance of the DOE organisations to the func-
tioning of this exchange system.
As the CDM Secretariat has grown in number and capability, and decisions have
been made by the EB and various panels, the basic procedures have been embel-
lished somewhat. The CDM Validation and Verification Manual was introduced in
draft form in 2008 at EB39 and adopted formally at EB44, setting out the standard
procedure for assessing projects. It had been developed jointly and spontaneously
by three of the largest DOEs, DNV, TÜV SÜD and KPMG. Prior to its introduc-
tion there had been concerns about the consistency of different DOEs’ interpreta-
tions of the CDM rules and concerns about competitive pressures and DOE liability.
The Registration and Issuance Team was created and has a formal role between the
DOE’s request for issuance and the delivery of CERs. It has increasingly asked for
corrections, outside of the full EB review procedure, to the frustration of project de-
velopers (Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007). The PDD template itself has been ’beefed
up’ to include greater detail on monitoring methods and plans at the outset, with
the intention of forcing project participants to consider these issues thoroughly in
advance to avoid delays and requests for deviation at a later stage (Michaelowa &
Purohit, 2007).
DOEs are commissioned by project participants but are effectively regulators, acting
as an extension of the EB. Their purpose is to ensure compliance and maintain the en-
vironmental and economic integrity of the system. As a result the EB has the power
to immediately suspend or withdraw the status of a DOE. To further underline this
responsibility, DOEs are liable to replace within 30 days any unwarranted CERs is-
sued on their recommendation if an EB initiated review finds significant deficiencies
in a project and the DOE’s assessment (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, paragraph 22). This is
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could have substantial financial implications with one issuance request potentially
for CERs with a spot market value of millions of euros. The liability will of course
vary with the scarcity and value of the instruments, the penalty being denominated
in the same (emissions) accounting unit as the failing, not a currency fine. The most
serious sanction is the withdrawl of accreditation, however, neither of these two
measures have been enacted in practice. Whilst there have been 150 cases of projects
rejected by the EB following successful validation reports (CDM Pipeline May 2010)
the EB has been remarkably lenient on DOEs. It has initiated just 11 spot checks and
as a result has issued temporary suspensions for four DOEs, including the largest
three DNV, SGS and TÜV SÜD (Schneider & Mohr, 2010). A variety of reasons were
cited including poor internal review, inadequate staff experience and expertise, and
most significantly an absence of independent technical review (in essence the DOE
had taken the proponents claims at face value). There has been ongoing criticism
from NGOs and civil society groups that there is little will from the EB to operate
a more robust assurance system to the extent that WWF has commissioned its own
metric and ongoing audit scheme for DOE performance (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009;
Schneider & Mohr, 2010).
7.3.2. Economic Implications of Audit
The costs of employing DOEs for these sequential steps must be met by the project
and may be a substantial economic consideration for small projects (Michaelowa &
Jotzo, 2005). DOE fees for validation are in the region of US$8,000–30,000 for a large
scale project and US$6,500–10,000 for a small scale project with its reduced complex-
ity and depth (CD4CDM, 2007). Verification fees are approximately US$5,000–25,000
with a supplement for the first verification as the DOE employed must check the
work of the other DOE that previously validated the project. Whilst there is also a
DOE charge to validate and submit a new methodology, this is dwarfed by technical
development costs which can be more than other quality assurance and consultancy
costs combined (Chadwick, 2006). While there are simplified regulations and pro-
cedures for approval of small-scale projects (those generating less than 60,000 CERs
per annum), employing auditors for validation and verification is still costly. A re-
cent Delphi study of experts in the field estimated average total transaction costs of
a small-scale project is in the order of $US45,000, which by extension represents a
US$0.70 per tCO2e generated, in comparison to $US0.05 for large scale, and a mini-
mum viable size of between 20,000 and 50,000tCO2e p.a. (Cames et al., 2007). This
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incentive towards large projects has led to criticism from commentators as one rea-
son for the low sustainable development benefits of projects implemented thus far
(Cosbey et al., 2006; Olsen, 2007).
There is a tension between the economic status of DOEs as predominantly profit
making businesses and the regulatory role they play in the exchange system. This
is presents a certain conflict of interest as their fees are paid by the organisations
they validate, a situation intensified in a market that is so concentrated (Lund, 2010).
As one close study of DOE performance notes “...though the CDM was designed in
a way to maximize the Executive Board’s control over the Designated Operational
Entities, in practice, we cannot be assured that these private agents are not pursu-
ing their own goals, at the cost of those delegated to them.” (Green, 2008, p22). The
UNFCCC AWG KP, which is negotiating the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, has dis-
cussed the possibility of the EB selecting and paying DOEs itself rather than allow-
ing project developers discretion (Stehr, 2008, p68). This approach would remove
restructure the institutional incentives, however other more drastic reform would
have the EB vastly increase its secretariat and perform all audit directly, removing
market exchange entirely.
DOEs are active economic participants in the production and exchange of credits in
other ways than as procedural auditors. Whilst they must maintain independence
and guarantee no commercial or financial conflict of interest in their audit and other
consultancy roles their accumulated knowledge of i) the technical details of the field
they specialise in, ii) the administrative procedures of the CDM and iii) the success
and failures of previous projects submitted to the CDM, places them in an ideal posi-
tion to assist in “carbon asset development”. With so many ways a project can fail to
earn credits profitably, risk management is a key part of the production process. As a
result DOEs market their services strongly, TÜV SÜD for example use the strap-line
“Choose certainty. Add value”. Whilst there may be no formal violation if DOEs
consult on projects that they are not engaged with, these activities raise question
marks about their broader regulatory disinterest.
The measurable and economically valuable output of the CDM is not material emis-
sions reductions but credible financial instruments. Whilst the particular audit pro-
cedures of the CDM are intended to describe the material effects of a project, consis-
tency and conformity with administrative guidelines themselves are the priorities.
It is seemingly in neither the DOE’s, nor the participants interests to actively pursue
anything more. Rather than questions remaining as to a simple financial conflict of
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interest, it would appear from my experiences talking to DOEs and project devel-
opers at trade events and workshops, that there are more subtle incentives for all
parties to align themselves to the performance of regularised and repeatable audit
procedures even if those procedures struggle to fulfill their promises. Even the EB,
constituted by individuals representative of nation states that seek to gain politically
and economically from the success and persistence of the CDM is not invulnerable.
Flues et al (2008) note that the location of approved projects can be correlated to the
national composition of the EB.
7.3.3. Role of National Government
A notable feature of the quality assurance procedures of the CDM is that it includes
an element of national government involvement and discretion. There is a multi-
step process between submission of project proposals and the issuance of CERs, to
ensure that projects meet the CDM’s criteria and a project must first seek Letters of
Approval (LoA) from the governments’ of the entities involved in the contracting
of the project17. At this stage the Designated National Authority (DNA) of the host
party must be satisfied that the project meets the sustainable development require-
ment of the CDM. This is one of the few aspects of the CDM where sovereignty
and national priorities are ostensibly protected in the interpretation of the rules.
National governments have taken different approaches to the methods and crite-
ria for discriminating projects, for instance Brazil and Mexico use simple checklist
assessments against submitted PDDs whilst China has drawn up national priorities
and set preferential and discriminatory rates of taxation (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008).
However, the practical consequences of this governance structure have been to re-
duce the broader benefits of CDM projects to host parties to a minimum through a
combination of limited DNA capacity and expertise, relative to project developers,
and a competitive “race to the bottom” to produce the cheapest CERs. Whilst the
broad concept of sustainable development is contested, multiple surveys of PDDs
and project operations have found that the CDM is failing simply to deliver against
a range of non-carbon benefits to host communities (Cosbey et al., 2006; Sutter &
Parreno, 2007; Schneider, 2007).
17 Unilateral CDM projects are also permitted where the host party and project participants proceed
without a buyer for the CERs (see chapter 8), however an LoA must still be submitted at some
later date when an entity wishes to receive CERs in an Annex 1 national registry account (EB 18,
paragraph 57).
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As noted previously (p6.0.2) the utility of a CER is determined by its consumption
route which has so far been dominated by the regulatory requirements of the EU
ETS. The terms of the Linking Directive which allow CERs to be used to meet emis-
sions liabilities place very little restriction on CER origin and no requirement for
local benefits over and above putative emissions reductions. The result is that under
these competitive pressures, the host DNA is the sole arbiter of a project’s contribu-
tion to sustainable development. Whilst protected sovereignty allows some degree
of national differentiation in favoured project types and terms (Michaelowa, 2003) it
allows the demand side to determine the degree of supplementary benefits supplied
by projects (Pearson, 2007). The Chinese state has the ability to set an approximate
floor price for all primary ERPAs in the region of €10, requires that the project owner
be a Chinese controlled company, and approves projects that accord with national
development priorities (Ganapati & Liu, 2009). However, there is little interest in
using the mechanism to forward objectives other than industrial investment. Its
influential position in the market exerts downward pressure on prices for other na-
tions that may wish to have more stringent operational criteria. The status of the
DNA also privileges the national government over local communities when the im-
plementation of projects is very rarely of national strategic importance. In contrast,
the concept of subsidiarity in promoting accountability, transparency and effective
environmental governance has been espoused by the European Commission in its
approach to climate finance (Communication from the European Commission to the
European Parliament et al., 2009) and recommended in response to the calls for re-
form of the UNFCCC financial mechanisms post-Copenhagen (Muller, 2009).
Over time, the CDM EB has increased the scrutiny on additionality claims, for in-
stance rejecting Indian wind turbine projects where the project owners have pub-
lically lauded their profitability regardless of CDM (Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007).
Figure 7.3 illustrates the fate of projects entering the CDM pipeline proportionately.
Over this time the absolute numbers requesting registration rose from 143 in 2004-
2005 combined to 717 in 2008, falling slightly to 650 in 2009. Many fewer projects
were accepted unconditionally although the underlying data suggest patterns in the
types of projects that were submitted being dominant rather than simply increasing
scrutiny. For example, of 34 projects submitted under the Cement sectoral scope
by May 2010, fourteen were rejected by DOEs, and nine by the EB under review, a
remarkably high failure rate.
Whilst emphasised as essential for the environmental integrity of the system, the
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Figure 7.3.: Fate of CDM projects entering the pipeline
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quality assurance procedures of the CDM are regarded by some in the industry as
burdensome and bureaucratic (see Krey (2005) and the interview data presented in
Chapter 9), preventing many low carbon technology projects from going ahead ei-
ther by directly discriminating against them or by placing too high a transaction cost
barrier, particularly in the case of small and distributed projects which are econom-
ically advantageous to the beneficiaries (Michaelowa et al., 2009). Both these per-
ceived failings cannot be dismissed as particular to specific projects, project types or
auditors, nor do they invalidate the CDM as a whole but they do point to inevitable,
systemic weaknesses in crediting systems that are necessarily reliant on some form
of additionality claim.
One further outcome of the assurance procedures and the requirements for public
documentation is that the pipeline has been open to independent scrutiny outside
of DOEs. The tension between transparency and commercial gain means that ex-
clusions can be made in the publication of sensitive proprietary information in DOE
reports, although this should not exclude necessary evidence for an additionality
case or data for an emissions baseline (CMP/2005/8/Ad1, paragraph 27). The tech-
nical and bureaucratic complexity is clearly a barrier to much public engagement,
but a few academic groups and large environmental NGOs with the resources to
hire staff or external consultants have produced a number of critiques of the process
from these sources (Haya, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Wara & Victor, 2008; Wara, 2008).
The EB has acted or begun to act on a number of issues thus raised, and whilst it
is superficially appealing to account for this as a result of the external scrutiny it is
very difficult to tell what the UNFCCC and CDM’s own quality assurance proce-
dures would have realised independently.
7.4. Summary
This chapter has described how the CDM defines the boundaries of a project, its
eligibility for credits and the volume of credits that it may earn. It has also identified
difficulties in establishing i) the presence or absence of a project’s additionality, ii)
the counterfactual baseline from which credits are to be calculated, iii) leakage, the
increases in emissions that are not accounted for in the project documentation, iv) the
temporality of crediting on the project scale and the whole Kyoto Protocol scale, and
v) quality assurance and the role of government. These empirical phenomena may
be interpreted within the IEP framework to posit connections to broader underlying
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tendencies and make comparisons with other examples of the process of instituting
markets.
In looking at the first four of these issues, that together might be considered as mat-
ters of commodification, we see a fundamental difficulty with the mainstream eco-
nomics ideal of pricing externalities in this way. Crediting creates property rights
for claims to emissions reductions based on subjective assessments of additional-
ity. The entities that are exchanged are themselves contingent social institutions and
not property rights over physical commodities as is implied in environmental eco-
nomics theory. The exchange of these credits has physical consequences but this is
not through the movement of material quantities of gases around the world, nor the
exchange of property rights over quantities of gas. Definitions of additionality, base-
lines, leakage and temporal boundaries are determined against dynamic social ac-
tivities, intentions and incentives, not by looking for static, regular natural scientific
laws. It is clear from the evidence presented in this chapter that the ’right quantity
of credits’ cannot be calculated solely by an engineer. The substantivist, institutional
approach of IEP allows us to think about the social activity of instituting new ways of
regulating economic activity. It problematises the issues of defining the commodity
and moves beyond the emphasis that ANT economic sociology places on calcula-
bility and towards an understanding of the constellation of economic agents that
participate in economic and non-economic relationships.
Each of these four commodification issues are matters of interest to carbon mar-
ket participants and regulators, receiving attention in specialist news media, such
as Point Carbon, ThomsonReuters, and First Climate Market Report. However, the
problems are typically framed here as technical issues that may be resolved by inves-
tigation and the authority of the CDM Executive Board. The basic model of crediting
as a political and subjective process is not articulated; the mantra of ’real, additional
and verifiable’ reductions is repeated by all agents with a common interest in the
persistence of the institution. The IEP framing shows how issues such as the valid-
ity of profitable and ’economically no regret’ projects for crediting (p150) and the
emissions consequences of the Kyoto commitment period on the policies of govern-
ments before it (p171), hinge on the connections between the economic activity of
projects or nations and the exchange of credits. This is clearest in the case of leakage
from adipic acid project methodologies that do not fully consider the incentives af-
fecting the project participants or the wider economics of the industry (p159). The
IEP and the organisation of exchange approach (section 3.2) foregrounds these mul-
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tiple economic relations. Indeed, the problems of quality assurance and the role of
DOEs in the CDM becomes more explicable when one considers how an ostensi-
bly regulatory institution has become an economic activity in itself. The following
chapter goes on to deploy this framework fully, examining the various relationships
between classes of agent.
Finally, it is worth noting the importance of national governments in exchange insti-
tutions, a theme emphasised by Polanyi. States and markets are often juxtaposed in
discussions of the organisation of economic activity but the CDM demonstrates the
role of states in instituting systems of exchange and then also in directing aspects
of their operation. The EB and the expert panels commissioned by it are both state
sanctioned and directed through the UNFCCC COP/MOPs and also populated by
state civil servants. DNAs regulate the approval of projects within their borders and
also have some discretion over the economic aspects of project operation. Section 7.1
illustrates the other ways states have influence over the regimes of subsidies, taxa-
tion and utility pricing that are so important to project additionality. This theme will
be picked up again in the following chapter.
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8. Patterns of Exchange
With the foregoing outline of the institutional arrangements I will turn to consider
the exchanges that occur within existing carbon markets and begin to build up a
general conceptual model of the economic agents engaged in exchange and their
various institutional relations. Exchanges are typically classified by market partici-
pants as occurring within the primary market and the secondary market, the distinc-
tion being made on the presence or absence of the CER at the time of exchange. The
possibility of exchange occurring without the entities on one side of the exchange be-
ing absent may seem peculiar but there are a great deal of commodity and security
markets that trade in forward contracts, futures and options. In emissions trading,
a great many contracts are of this kind because of the nature of the consumption
process. This is related to the more significant question of the motivations for the
different agents to participate in emissions trading at all.
The Kyoto Protocol places no requirement to hold or surrender CERs on private en-
tities, only the Parties to it. Why then, should private entities wish to acquire CERs?
During the compliance period 2008-2012, states with emissions over their Annex B
targets will need to purchase tradeable units from other Parties either as CERs, ERUs
or AAUs. There is substantial oversupply in AAUs, ’hot air’, from the former So-
viet Union and associated economies which collapsed in the early 1990s. However,
purchase of such units would be regarded as illegitimate in the international arena,
failing to meet the normative agenda of the Kyoto Protocol even whilst technically
remaining in compliance. Green Investment Schemes, programmes of associating
AAU purchases with low carbon policies and investment in central and eastern Eu-
rope, have attracted interest. The Japanese government has made recorded pur-
chases and as the majority of OECD countries are emitting more than their own
AAU allocations it seems likely that there will be further interest despite concerns
about the environmental efficacy (Grubb et al., 2010). Purchasing ERUs via Joint
Implementation would be considered a more legitimate means of securing AAUs.
The JI has a similar regulatory framework to the CDM although this reduces its
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economic attractiveness by placing a greater technical and administrative burden
on the seller. CERs are likely to be a substantial part of Annex 1 Party compliance
and the CDM pipeline lists 512 projects with a public sector investor and 28 fur-
ther projects initiated by the World Bank administered carbon funds out of a total of
4534. The bulk of CERs are contracted to investment banks, industrial chemical and
cement manufacturers, utility companies, oil companies, engineering firms, invest-
ment funds and specific carbon developers. Whilst some of these buyers will sell to
Annex 1 Parties, demand for CERs from states represented just 10-14% of CER pur-
chases in the period of peak activity 2006-2008 (Capoor & Ambroisi, 2008; Capoor &
Ambrosi, 2009). The remaining demand originates in the EU ETS from installations
that will exceed their EUA allocations and cannot use AAUs for compliance with a
tiny amount from companies and individuals participating in voluntary offsetting.
As a result, the bulk of exchanges are between private entities and the majority of
consumers are also private entities.
8.1. Primary market
The primary market represents the first set of exchanges which initiates the produc-
tion of CERs. Primary trades, that are conducted before the issuance of the credits,
exist between the cited project participants i.e. developers who wish to purchase
CERs, and hosts who control a facility or company which can implement the project.
The most basic reciprocal obligations are therefore the supply of CERs in exchange
for a defined price. The purchasing party may desire the CERs for their own com-
pliance purposes, as in the case of Annex 1 countries or large utility companies, or
they may be investing with the intention to sell on the credits at a later date, such as
an investment bank commodity desk or a special purpose vehicle created solely to
bear CER risks. These first contracts may then facilitate a project host and developer
in securing the often substantial remaining finance to initiate the project. The impor-
tance of CER revenue in securing external investment is often cited in additionality
cases and it is the ERPA that is practically used by project developers and prospec-
tive investors as the basis of other financial arrangements. It must be remembered
that in cases where carbon revenue is a very low proportion of total project finance
such claims should be regarded sceptically or in conjunction with other “barriers”
that award of credits surmounts (see p154)
Whilst there is no one standard contract for the exchange of reductions credits there
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are a number of templates that are frequently employed by market participants. The
Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) was first used by the World Bank
and then subsequently developed by the International Emissions Trading Associ-
ation (IETA) and is frequently used as a template. As the ERPA was developed
primarily by an institution seeking to buy CERs for its early Prototype Carbon Fund
(PCF) and IETA’s interests are more closely aligned with Annex 1 entities, an alter-
native document, the CERSPA, with clauses and considerations more favourable to
sellers was funded by the Korean and Swiss governments (O’Sullivan, 2007). The
CERSPA also includes detailed supporting documentation to guide sellers who are
typically much less familiar with the procedures and requirements of the CDM than
developers involved in multiple projects.
By definition all primary contracts for credits are forward contracts for future deliv-
ery and rely upon an uncertain institutional process for issuance of credits, typically
crossing national and hence juridicial borders. As a result there are substantial risks
to project participants on both sides of the exchange so contracts contain clauses on
timing, consequences of late, non or partial delivery and participants obligations to
managing the project construction, monitoring and progression through the CDM
process. Delivery may be a fixed volume, a minimum volume with option to pur-
chase any surplus, or a proportion of total project yield. Prices may be fixed in
advance, indexed to another market price such as the current EUA spot price or
mean price over a specified period on a named exchange, or an index with a floor
and a ceiling. Compliance buyers that intend to surrender the resulting CERs for
their own purposes are typically happy to pay a fixed price and adopt the risk of
variation as they can assess the exchange in relation to their own, known, abatement
costs (Michaelowa, 2007). Speculative buyers and those looking to profit on the sec-
ondary market may be more inclined to set a floating price thus securing a rate of
profit. Prices are typically denominated in dollars or euros to mitigate the risk of
currency fluctuations especially where local currency is known to be volatile. Pay-
ments from the buyer may not directly go to the project host but may be scheduled
to be split, with a proportion paid directly the project’s financiers so as to mitigate
the risk of default and reduce the cost of credit (CD4CDM & EcoSecurities, 2007).
Contracts will also detail responsibility towards the settlement of taxes and fees, re-
spective liabilities and indemnities for example in relation to staff or local laws, the
legal system under which the contract is to apply, and provisions for the settlement
of disputes.
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To participants already involved in international commodity trades the terms and
potential difficulties are often little different to their other activities save for the var-
ious risks in commodity yield that depend greatly upon social and political pro-
cesses in the institution (Knox-Hayes, 2009). As a result ERPAs typically contain
’conditions precedent’ to the buy and sell obligations to mitigate these specific risks;
whilst advance payments may be made at the time of the contract being signed, fu-
ture obligations may be conditional upon the project being validated and registered
with the CDM, or that the CERs are eligible for use in the EU ETS at the time of de-
livery. ERPAs may also be structured to manage delivery risks by guaranteeing the
sale of the first CERs up to a threshold and then providing an option to purchase on
any further CERs issued.
To clarify, an ERPA defines the terms of exchange between agents rather than be-
ing a fundamental part of the genesis of the instrument1. This evident in that the
ERPA template specifically contracts not just for CERs but also “Emissions Reduc-
tions” and “GHG Reductions”. The distinction is made that CERs are the units is-
sued by the CDM, whilst “GHG Reduction means are the removal, limitation, re-
duction, avoidance, sequestration or mitigation of GHG emissions”, i.e. the physical
change due to the project (IETA ERPA v2.0, 2004). Between these are the “Emissions
Reductions” which are “any right, interest, credit, entitlement, benefit or allowance
to emit (present or future) arising from or in connection with any GHG Reduction
by the Project and includes any right that may be created under any regulatory or
legal regime as a result of the GHG Reductions whatsoever”. Whilst the assertion
that GHG Reductions exist outside of a regulatory regime is unsupportable despite
the claims of market participants, see previous sections 7.1 and 7.2, there are two
important implications; i) that terms of the contract clearly situate the entity pur-
chased as a right within a social institution2, and ii) more prosaically imply that
1 In their otherwise excellent account of carbon credit markets Bumpus and Liverman (2008) make the
mistake of attributing the privatisation and abstraction of GHG emissions to the ERPA rather than
the PDD.
2 Whilst this is not a universally held view, in the course of interviews a number of participants of dif-
fering classes emphasised the physical nature of the emissions reductions that they were exchanging,
confusing the activity of a project with a tangible quantity of gas. For instance one reported “These
reductions, they’re physical. So for example if you have a straw burning project, a biomass project,
the fact that the project is operational, you burn the straw, there will be some CO2 or whatever gas,
saved. You’re right you can’t trade anything on the back of that until these are verified but there are
a number of reasons why you wouldn’t be able to get these verified e.g. wasn’t operated in com-
pliance with monitoring plan or conducted as best practice, or whatever reason, you may take the
project to a DOE and the DOE may say no, I’m not going to verify that. And so practically speaking,
something has happened, so what can you do with these then?” (I4).
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such contracts sustain ’regime shopping’. Contracts drawn up in this way facilitate
exchanges despite uncertainties in the project undertaken and the status of the entity
to be exchanged in a developing framework, in this case before and after the period
governed by the Kyoto Protocol (Carr & Rosembuj, 2007). If project participants fail
to get registration and issuance under the CDM then the ERPA can remain in place
for participants to submit the project under an alternative standard and complete
the exchange.
There are also variations on the contract structure according to the participants’ pref-
erences for different sorts of risk in price, volume, instrument ultimately delivered
or involvement in the project activity itself (Nordseth et al., 2007). Upfront payments
for CERs prior to delivery are reported to be rare but may be provided by some de-
velopment banks, ADB is noted for this model (Bakker et al., 2007), and incur a sub-
stantial discount on the CER price. Simple ’ERPA off-take’ contracts guarantee the
future terms of sale of CERs for participants, however, the degree of financial com-
mitment and involvement in delivery of a project and its progress through CDM
registration is variable. ’ERPA developer’ structures require the buyer to provide
technical input and guide the project in the CDM process, preparing documents,
commissioning DOEs and the like in return for a reduced unit price of CERs. This
structure is typically associated with small projects and the new specialist carbon
market companies like EcoSecurities, AgCert and CAMCO that are, for a price, able
to manage and deliver projects with hosts that would otherwise lack the technical
and financial capacity (Meyrick, 2007).
Joint ventures, a more complex type of primary exchange where the CER buyer also
takes an equity stake in the project as a whole, are becoming increasingly impor-
tant with buyers potentially also sharing risk and reward from non-carbon revenue
streams (Castree, 2009, p33). Joint ventures may be arranged through the creation of
a new company with the sole purpose of delivering the project with equity invest-
ment from the project host and CER buyer. Equity positions are more likely where
the CER buyer already operates facilities similar to the project host, has identified
the potential for technology transfer or can secure finance on good terms (Barreca,
2010). For buyers, such arrangements mitigate both counterparty risk, that the seller
does not fulfill their financial obligations, and project risk, that the project is not de-
livered effectively for one reason or another and fails to realise the anticipated CER
yield due to mismanagement. For sellers, they can provide upfront capital, reduce
risks and assist in securing investment from other investors or lenders. Increasing
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the proportion of debt financing in a joint venture can also increase the return to
equity investors provided that the IRR is higher than the interest rate, especially if
interest payments on debt are tax deductable (CD4CDM, 2007). The degree of equity
that is taken may be restricted by national legislation, China for instance through its
DNA mandates that all CDM projects must be 51% owned by a Chinese entity. Else-
where it may be possible for foreign project developers to buy out whole facilities
and manage them for CER production. Project developers reported to me that they
had purchased or were in negotiations to purchase whole landfill sites in the USA,
Mexico and Brazil in an effort to increase CER yield in a historically under perform-
ing sector3.
CDM modalities and procedures do not mandate the involvement of an Annex 1
Party prior to the issuance of credits. Non-Annex 1 project developers are therefore
able to initiate project with their own capital, or loans secured on the anticipated CER
revenue stream, and name a buyer Party at a later date in what is know as ’unilateral
CDM’ (EB 18, paragraph 57). The project developer may expect a higher price for
CERs generated this way as they will be sold directly to the secondary spot market
without any delivery or regulatory risk (see following section 191). There are those
who regard unilateral CDM favourably as it permits developing country agents a
greater autonomy in emissions trades and enables a greater proportion of revenue
to remain in country (Del Rio, 2007). However, there are concerns that such projects
do not promote foreign investment and technology transfer and Malaysia has en-
acted rules through its DNA that exclude unilateral projects by requiring a non-
Annex 1 entity to be named on the PDD before an LoA will be provided (Curnow
& Hodes, 2009). Unilateral projects are also likely to dispersed unevenly, because of
the high benchmark for technical expertise and financial capital, being situated pre-
dominantly in China, India, Brazil and South Korea which already host the majority
of CDM projects (Michaelowa, 2006b).
As noted earlier, states and public investors represent a small proportion, just 12%,
of primary buyers. The CDM pipeline classifies 2066 of 4534 buyers as ’Carbon
Market’ which is assumed to mean that their economic activity is predominantly
3 Without more detailed research it is impossible to say if the under performance of landfill gas projects
in terms of CER delivery has any general emissions implications. It seems likely that methane evo-
lution rates have been overestimated in the baseline in which case there is no ecological detriment.
However, it is plausible that landfill sites could be biophysically “managed” to increase rates of
methane evolution over “business as usual” and hence inflate CER output.
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or exclusively based in emissions trading4. The largest 25 are listed in table 8.1. If
banks, financial institutions and investment funds are included, it can be seen that
the majority of primary contracts are signed by organisations that will not use the
credits for their own compliance purposes but for sale on to others in the secondary
market. However, it is not always clear where boundaries lie between compliance
and financial motivations for some participants. There are a few companies, like EDF
Trading, operating as subsidiaries of larger compliance purchasers buffering their
exposure to price volatility. The Prototype Carbon Fund, the first primary market
buyer was initiated in 1999 by the World Bank, is also a hybrid, pooling finance from
Annex 1 Parties and the private sector. And a recent survey identified €10.8 billion
invested in 96 “carbon funds”, expected to deliver about a sixth of the total CDM
yield, 300 million CERs by 2012, with an emphasis on securing CERs for compliance
objectives rather than direct profit, 61% intended for the former and 38% the latter
(Alberola & Stephan, 2010).
Within the primary market there also exists a class of agents frequently referred to
as ’aggregators’ that buy ERPAs, or forward contracts for CERs on the basis of ER-
PAs, and then sell other forwards contracts, futures and options, to consumers with
a compliance requirement for CERs. These agents create derivatives, assets whose
value is based on another entity that is not exchanged, but do not primarily operate
as financial speculators trading in uniform contracts on exchanges. Rather they act
as a bridge between primary and secondary market making trades for commercial
gain. Whilst this activity may have no direct material consequence and hence no
climatic implications it may increase the flow of primary CERs, by allowing devel-
opers to realise profits in the short term, and alter the temporal flows of resources
around the system.
8.2. Secondary market
The other group of exchanges, the secondary market, relates to CERs that have al-
ready been issued into registry accounts and can be delivered immediately (sCERs).
The delays in implementing the ITL meant that the first exchange with delivery did
not take place until November 2007 although a few exchanges had been made con-
tractually beforehand (Capoor & Ambroisi, 2008). As can be seen in fig 8.1 there has
4 Unfortunately, the methodological notes that accompany the pipeline do not detail their classifica-
tion method.
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Table 8.1.: Top 25 entities listed on PDD as buyer by number of projects
Entity Country Type Number of Projects
EcoSecurities UK Carbon market 291
Tricorona Carbon
Asset Management
Sweden Carbon market 169
EDF Trading UK Carbon market 110
Mitsubishi Switzerland Technology 105
Vitol Japan Oil 105
RWE Ireland Utility 96
AgCert Germany Carbon market 96
Carbon Resource
Management
UK Carbon market 86
CAMCO UK Carbon market 71
Trading Emissions UK Carbon market 67
MGM Carbon
Portfolio
Luxembourg Carbon market 64
Danish Ministry of
Climate & Energy
Denmark Public 62
ENEL Italy Utility 62
Cargill International Switzerland Agriculture 62
Kommunalkredit Austria Public 60
Marubeni Japan Carbon market 59
KfW Germany Public 58
Agrinergy UK Carbon market 55
Essent Energy
Trading
Netherlands Carbon market 50
Noble Carbon Ireland Carbon market 49
Climate Change
Capital
UK Carbon market 48
Endesa Spain Utility 47
IBRD World Bank Bank 47
Deutsche Bank Germany Public 45
Energy Systems
International
Netherlands Carbon market 45
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been a distinct peak period of primary contracting followed by subsequent rapid
increase in the secondary market. Uncertainty surrounding the nature of a post-
Kyoto agreement, which may or may not have quantitative targets that can be met
by tradeable instruments or may include programmatic and sectoral crediting that
could drive down the price of credits, combined with uncertainty around the criteria
for the use of CERs in the EU ETS Phase 3 (2013–2020) has reduced the incentive for
new projects to be developed. CERs that have already been issued or will be issued
before the end of 2012 therefore make up the bulk of recent transactions.
Prices in the EU ETS varied widely in Phase 1 due to overallocation and substan-
tial uncertainties in emissions data between regulators and installations and also be-
tween market participants (Ellerman & Buchner, 2008). Phase 1 was recognised to be
’learning by doing’ so the overallocation problem was contained from the outset by
preventing EUAs from being banked into Phase 2. Phase 2 prices fell from a record
high of €28.73 in July 2008 to a low of €7.96 in February 2009, recovering to maintain
approximately €13–15 to April 2010 (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). Prices of sCER have
been closely linked to EUAs with a spread in the region of €9–11 before July 2008,
that created a strong incentive for even ETS participants that held sufficient EUAs to
match their emissions to purchase CERs up to the proportion allowed in their NAP.
Profits were made by selling the equivalent quantity of EUAs to another installa-
tion with short of allowances in what is known as a ’strip and swap’ trade (Bailey
& Maresh, 2009). These trades increased the proportion of CERs surrendered in the
EU ETS towards the total limit set under the NAPs rather than limiting CER con-
sumption to installations with short positions. For Phase 2, this was 13% of the total
quantity of EAUs allocated but if the EU moves to a 30% reduction target, from 1990
levels by 2020, as it has tabled in the Bali twin track negotiations to a Kyoto succes-
sor, it will rise to represent 50% of the reduction effort (Bows et al., 2009)5. Phase 2
of the EU ETS is thought to be oversupplied due to the present economic downturn
(Morris & Worthington, 2010) so excess EUAs will suppress the secondary market
for CERs. However, the ability to bank EUAs out to 2020 means that there is in-
centive to continue to purchase and surrender CERs, even with a two to three euro
spread, because of the added certainty the EUAs provide.
Secondary market transactions for immediate delivery can occur via a trading plat-
form such as the European Climate Exchange (ECX), known as “spot trades”, or bi-
5 As the allocations for Phase 3, 2013-2020 were not available at the time of this work, this intention
cannot be expressed as a proportion of total EUAs, however, it will be a minimum of 11%.
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Figure 8.1.: CDM Primary and secondary market dynamics. Data collated from
World Bank State of the Carbon Market annual reports.
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laterally between market participants on unique terms, know as “over-the-counter”
trades (OTC) do not. Whilst these market and volume data indicate the dynamics
of trade, only the primary market should be regarded as having any direct emis-
sions reduction effect. CERs may change hands a number of times in the secondary
market as a result of speculation by financial institutions or hedging by compli-
ance consumers but they do not have any emissions implications. They do, how-
ever, generate public price information which had previously been only available to
those directly engaging in trades. The secondary market also redistributes financial
risks around market participants. Whilst it is cheaper for end consumers of large
volumes of CERs, national governments and large EU ETS installations with antici-
pated shortfalls, to contract their own primary CERs (pCERs) there is always the risk
of the project failing to achieve CDM registration or under performing in operation.
Insurance providers have begun to provide specific policies against low yield or
non-delivery for a variety of political, regulatory or breach of contract risks (Capoor
& Ambrosi, 2007) as although ERPAs may situate the bulk of this risk with the seller,
the buyer will have faced expenditure on due diligence, search costs, technical staff
costs and opportunity costs in the deployment of its staff and capital. Financial in-
stitutions and investors supplying the secondary market take on this risk and price
volatility but charge a mark up to end consumers. Increasingly, sophisticated struc-
tured trades are being undertaken to reduce risks to financial institutions by selling
from a portfolio of CERs with guaranteed delivery for senior tranches, a middle
tranche with a guaranteed percentage of delivery and a lower tranche that would
take any remainder (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009, p45).
Contracts for future delivery of CERs may be sold ’back to back’ from a portfolio
ERPAs, freeing up capital for further primary market transactions. The involve-
ment of speculators in such trades have been criticised for increasing systemic risk
through market bubbles and securities based on projected cash flows from a col-
lection of ERPAs have been developed in a model akin to that which obscured the
risks of sub-prime mortgage lending (Chan, 2009). Whilst these secondary and spec-
ulative transactions do not make any claim to affect final emissions budgets they
undoubtedly alter the political and regulatory environment by generating powerful
coalitions for the expansion of market activity per se. The financial value of both
credits and their consumption regime are determined to a large part by political and
social processes making the regime especially vulnerable to lobbying. The novelty
and technical complexities provide further opportunities for regulatory capture and
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’revolving door’ movement of officials and experts between regulators, public in-
stitutions and private participants (Lang, 2009). Indeed, there are those who cite
the creation of a class of economic agents holding carbon units whose interests are
positioned against the fossil fuel lobby as a primary motivation for the creation of
the EU ETS (interview respondent R9). Whether this claim is valid or not, business
models that are founded on the circulation of credits and profits generated from bro-
kerage activity, create incentives for the maintenance of lax environmental criteria on
the production of credits in order to increase volume. In addition to the economic
outcomes of another finance driven recession, the complexities that abound in such
markets also lead to difficulties in effective regulation and greater opportunities for
fraud and manipulation with climatic consequences (Lohmann, 2010).
Primary CER price data is hard to come by because contracts are signed bilaterally
and confidentially so secondary sources such as the World Bank market survey are
the only guide. The price of pCERs had been volatile prior to 2006 when the Chinese
DNA began to provide LoAs only to projects that secured a price around €8–9 per
CER (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2007). Whilst this is an informal policy, China provides
such a large part of the available supply that other sellers have also been able to
hold their ERPA prices at this level given the gap between CER and EUA prices. The
largest economic “losses” from the exchange of credits occur as scarcity rent in the
gap between primary and secondary CERs. Primary market prices have historically
remained within a band of €7–12 stabilising at €9 per CER since mid 2009 (Kossoy
& Ambrosi, 2010) with a consistent spread of approximately €4 to the sCER price.
The primary to secondary CER spread represents about a third of the purchase price
for those consumers not contracting pCERs and has been highlighted in the volun-
tary market as being responsible for the largest cost to consumers, greater than the
money spent on project construction and operation. A recent value chain survey
revealed that typically just 27% of the final retail price of a CER is spent on project
implementation, the remainder being accounted for in retailer mark up and interest
and dividend payments to project investors (Carbon Retirement, 2009). However,
the project implementation cost elements of a pCER should not be seen as rigid or
representing an objective marginal abatement cost given the complexities and sub-
jectivity in defining additionality (see section 7.1).
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8.3. Relationships between classes of economic agents
involved in the CDM
Exchanges of CERs and complimentary economic flows are be represented diagram-
matically in figure 8.2. The economic activity, that in its simplest form was a bilateral
exchange, can now be seen as just part of a complex economic arrangement involv-
ing state, private and civil society actors in the definition, production, transfer and
consumption of credits. Distinctive classes of economic agents can be identified:
Project Entities Organisations, variously privately owned companies, state owned
companies, NGOs, government agencies, communities or municipalities that
engage in polluting activities and can host a project i.e. an intervention or
alteration that changes their GHG emissions. The entity is responsible for the
construction and operation of the project.
Regulated Consumers Organisations bound by emissions trading regulations who
are permitted to surrender CERs as equivalent to other traded units for their
pollution liabilities. In the case of the CDM this is presently just EU ETS instal-
lations.
Annex 1 Parties Industrialised nation states with commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol to hold a quantity of tradeable GHG units equivalent to their emis-
sions caps from 2008–2012.
Non-Annex 1 Parties Developing nation states participating in the Kyoto Protocol
but with no emissions caps. Designate National Authorities are mandatory
government agencies that oversee CDM activity in a Party. May receive fees
or taxes from project entities for carbon market or broader economic activi-
ties. May have influence over state owned companies that host or interact
with project entities, for example electricity generators and distributors.
Project Developers & Carbon Funds Companies or NGOs that act as intermedi-
aries between project entities and CER consumers. Developers may pro-actively
seek project entities, prepare CDM documentation, manage submissions pro-
cess and arrange project finance. They contract to buy the credits earned by
the project. Carbon funds contract for CERs on behalf of consumers and spec-
ulative investors who do not have expertise or volume requirements to enter
primary market directly or who wish to spread risks.
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Brokers & Aggregators Private companies that buy and sell CERs both issued
credits (sCERs) and futures contracts (ERPAs). These participants have no di-
rect use for the CERs they hold.
Carbon Market Investors Private or public financial institutions that provide loans
and equity to carbon market participants in return for interest payments or a
share of revenues.
Product Markets Not strictly a class of agents but the wider system of economic ex-
change that the project entity and regulated consumers sell their outputs to, for
example electricity or industrial products. For project entities these economic
connections typically provide the bulk of earnings. For regulated consumers,
the consumption of CERs enables them to supply to product markets at lower
cost than otherwise.
Suppliers Companies that provide goods and services to project entities and regu-
lated consumers that may be related to emissions reductions activities or the
broader economic activity of the project entity.
Consultants Specialist organisations that provide technical, legal or financial ad-
vice to project entities and project developers for a fee. For graphical simplic-
ity, law firms are omitted from the diagram as they are potentially involved
anywhere that a contract is drawn up between participants.
CDM EB Body that governs the rules and procedures of the CDM. Receives pay-
ments from project entities for administrative functions and contribution to an
Adaptation Fund for Non-Annex 1 Parties.
DOE Audit firms contracted by project entities to demonstrate compliance with
CDM rules to the EB. May also act as consultants on risk management and
project documentation.
UNFCCC COP/MOP Top level institution constituted by Parties to the UNFCCC.
Issues guidance to EB, sets emissions limits and trading terms for Parties.
Civil Society Groups Diverse companies, trade associations, charities and not for
profit organisations that represent particular groups’ interests to Parties and
the EB. May have general environmental or development agenda or more
specifically address carbon markets. In terms of the latter the International
Emissions Trading Association (IETA) is the largest and most active (Lovell,
2007), other examples include the Project Developers Forum (PDF), the Car-
bon Market Investors Association (CMIA) and Carbontradewatch.
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Voluntary Consumers Businesses and individuals, predominantly operating in An-
nex 1 countries that offset their emissions by purchasing and retiring CERs.
Figure 8.2 is a gross simplification of actual economic activity but broadly illustrates
the relationships between key agents involved in the production, exchange and con-
sumption of CERs. Whilst offering little additional insight, it provides an overview
and summation of a number of the issues outlined in the preceding chapters. It
clearly illustrates the multiplicity of interconnections between participants and the
possibility for novel externalities arising from these exchanges. They may be posi-
tive or negative but it would be naive to assume that system succeeds in completely
internalising the effects of GHG emissions that are backed by tradeable accounting
units.
Economic connections of market participants on both the buy and sell sides of the
primary market may have emissions implications not accounted for in the calcula-
tive processes. On the sell side, leakage resulting from the project activity can occur
temporally or spatially as described in section 7.2.2, with emissions increases from
stimulated activity or decreases from enhanced technology penetration. Research
suggests that the CDM is responsible for vibrant hydroelectric and wind turbine
manufacturing and installation industries in China and India, with impact outside of
CER trades and similarly high efficiency bagasse co-generation has been normalised
across Brazilian sugar mills (Carbon Trust and Climate Strategies, 2009). One would
expect such material and social developments to have emissions reductions conse-
quences but that is very difficult to prove or quantify.
On the buy side, the economic consequences of credit exchange needs to be seen in
combination with cap and trade systems, like the EU ETS. At the crudest level it is
reasonable to assume that the lower cost of CERs in comparison to EUAs is reducing
the burden for high emissions technology and activities. As a result there is less of
an incentive for innovation and transformation in the socio-technical energy system
which remains ’locked in’ to fossil fuels (Unruh, 2000, 2002). This is especially likely
to be the case when a large proportion of promised emission reductions effort is to be
met by imported credits (Bows et al., 2009). Buyer side economic conditions also feed
back through the primary and secondary CER markets in the opposite direction in
times of recession. For instance, the ArcellorMittal Carbon Fund that was intended
to secure 100 million CERs closed when the downturn in the European steel industry
meant fewer tradeable units were required by the parent company and the wider
recession provided surplus EUAs (Alberola & Stephan, 2010).
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Figure 8.2.: Relationships of exchange of CERs
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8.4. Non-market economic flows
In addition to the variety of market transactions that surround credit exchange
there are a number of non-market flows that sustain the operation of the vari-
ous crediting organisations. A fee of US$0.10/CER for the first 15,000 CERs per
year and US$0.20/CER for any CERs above 15,000 CERs anticipated per year is re-
quired in advance at registration of a project (EB 23, Annex 35). This is capped
at a maximum of US$350,000 but at the time of issuance it is recalculated and de-
ducted without a maximum restriction. These charges are to cover the running
costs of the secretariat, although partly as a result of its recruitment difficulties the
CDM is presently running a healthy surplus of $11m p.a. with a reserve of $45m
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16). Also at issuance 2% of CERs issued are retained as a
Share of Proceeds for an adaptation fund for non-Annex 1 parties administered by
the COP/MOP (SOP-Adaptation). These credits are subsequently sold on the sec-
ondary market by the World Bank predominantly as OTC trades.
The operation of the exchange system incurs other administrative costs that may
be recouped from participants. National registries typically charge fees to create
and maintain accounts in addition to the brokerage and legal fees to conduct trades
(CD4CDM 2007). DNAs may also levy a fee or national governments directly tax
CER earnings. These may be revenue raising or serve to incentivise project types
that are seen as national priorities. For example, the Chinese state taxes CER rev-
enues from HFC projects at 65%, N2O projects at 30% and renewable energy, energy
efficiency and methane destruction projects at 2% (Schroeder, 2009a). India in com-
parison makes no charge, funding its DNA from general taxation. Such taxes may
be levied by withholding a proportion of CERs in the host national registry or as a
financial tax on the revenues generated by their sale.
The organisations that host the projects are of course also liable to various corporate
taxes and depending upon the treatment of CERs as goods or securities general sales
taxes may be payable. Conversely and as has already been mentioned in section 7.1,
state regulated economic incentives through preferential taxation, loan guarantees
and feed-in tariffs may promote particular sectors and reduce the cost of credits
from certain project types. South Africa, for example, is currently amending its tax
laws so that earnings from the sale of primary CERs are exempt of income tax and
VAT which are expected to increase project earnings substantially, and in Vietnam,
CDM projects enjoy a four year income tax exemption with a 50% discount for the
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following five years (Curnow and Hodes, 2009). In some respects, this may be re-
garded as the broader tax base of developing economies subsidising the creation of
credits for sale to rich economies.
DNA fees, CDM fees and the SOP-Adaptation, as well as the payments to DOEs
at various stages, are typically borne by the seller and included in the larger pack-
age of project financing (Degouve, 2007). To the parties to the CER exchange they
are production costs like any other but they represent another financial hurdle to
smaller projects. As their levels and purposes are not determined by another set
of market exchanges it opens the possibility for restructuring to favour particular
types, locations and sizes of projects through negotiated political means. Indeed,
projects in LDCs are exempt from CDM fees as an incentive to spur projects in these
Parties (EB37 Annex 20, paragraph 5). The existence of these non-market flows also
provides an incentive for reduced scrutiny of the environmental integrity of the pro-
duction of credits. As noted in section 7.3.3, Annex 1 Parties have demonstrated
little will to enforce sustainable development criteria when approving projects, in-
stead tending to favour high yielding industrial projects.
8.5. Summary
The CDM market is comprised of multiple sets of exchanges; between entities that
can earn credits and those that choose to use them to meet compliance obligations,
between Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 states, between private entities and states,
between sub-national government and private entities. Credit exchanges are de-
scribed by participants as belonging to primary or secondary markets on the basis
of whether or not the credits are already in existence or are being contracted for
production. In this chapter, the IEP framework has been used to outline the organ-
isation of these different exchanges, identify classes of agent and depict economic
relationships diagrammatically.
Within the primary market, section 8.1 shows the variety of the ways of contract-
ing and setting prices that are predominantly not conducted through oppositional
market exchange. It is only the primary market that makes any claim to emissions
reductions, the secondary market facilitating the circulation of credits between com-
pliance users and operating as an arena for commodity speculation and increasingly
sophisticated financial strategies. Very little of the money exchanged for credits in
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the secondary markets is seen to be invested in emissions reductions projects. By
combining these outcomes with the observations made in chapter 7 we can see how
credit institutions organise flows of carbon finance. The majority of economic re-
sources invested in renewable energy projects originates from the projects’ existing
economic activity rather than credit sales. In these circumstances then, the financial
resources flowing from end credit consumers are predominantly dissipated by finan-
cial intermediaries and the multiplicity of economic agents associated with project
design, operation, permitting and audit. In effect, a regulating institution has be-
come an economic activity in itself with incentives to increase the volume of credits
produced and exchanged regardless of environmental efficacy.
The IEP framework also directs us to the non-economic aspects of relationships be-
tween exchange participants and the returns to a theme identified in chapter 7, the
role of the state in governing economic activity. On the first point, the provision
of technical expertise by primary market buyers, both public and private, in deliv-
ering projects and ultimately credits is the strongest indicator that exchange does
not occur between atomised agents. In the most obvious case of the second point
the China is known to have set informal price criteria for CERs being sold (p178).
Project approval hinges on this matter, over and above any project quality oversight
the DNA is mandated to perform. Because of the proportion of production originat-
ing in China there is effectively a pCER floor price not set by market equilibrium.
Paradoxically, this elevated price may in fact have increased the volume of credit
production and exchange by reducing price volatility and guaranteeing returns in
the nascent market.
Finally, it is worth noting the substantial non-market economic flows associated with
credit exchange. The anthropological approach advocated by Polanyi sees such
flows as unexceptional in empirical economies. They are important both for the
maintenance of the institution, for instance DNA fees and CDM fees, but also, re-
turning to the themes of the previous chapter, to a large extent influence claims of
additionality that are so central to crediting.
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Voluntary Carbon Market Exchange
In recent years concerned air travellers, well meaning celebrities and environmen-
tally sensitive brands have engaged in carbon offsetting to mitigate the climate im-
pact of their actions. The premise is that for a small payment, the atmospheric con-
sequences of a holiday, home delivery or business trip can be ‘neutralised’ through
dealings in the carbon markets. Retailers of carbon credits have sweetened the trans-
action by adding the prospect of non-climate benefits to those locally involved with
the offset project; an Indian community may gain access to a regular mango crop
through carbon forestry or UK pensioners enjoy warmer housing as the result of an
insulation programme. Enthusiasts for voluntary offsetting argue that it engages
polluters outside of existing regulation in issues of environmental sustainability,
physically reduces emissions and provides a new source of investment in a range of
worthy causes, biodiversity conservation, low carbon technology and international
development for example. However, accusations of fraud and allusions to ‘indul-
gences for climate sins’ (Smith, 2007), have been echoed in words of caution from
government, academia and campaign groups as they witnessed very rapid growth
and innovation in the retail voluntary offset market during 2006 and 2007 (Adam,
2006; DEFRA, 2007; Gössling et al., 2007; Economist, 2007).
This chapter focuses on voluntary carbon offsetting. In its simplest terms this is
an economic exchange between two participants: a transaction with money moving
in one direction and a commitment to reduce emissions, often manifested in finan-
cial instruments quantified in tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e), in the other. The
voluntary aspect of these exchanges are that neither the producer nor consumer of
credits is compelled to curtail their polluting activities by legal mandate. Volun-
tary exchange has grown rapidly and spontaneously, with an estimated US$258 mil-
lion worth of transactions in 2007, up from US$58.5 million in 2006 (Hamilton et al.,
2008), demand for the service coming from individuals, corporations and govern-
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ment agencies. These are global developments with new emissions trading schemes
developing in the US, Australia and New Zealand and international transactions
in credits linking polluters in rich nations to project developers in Asia and Latin
America.
An example exchange might be an airline passenger flying New York–Amsterdam
paying a contribution towards the installation of a new hydroelectric dam in China
that displaces coal generated electricity from the local grid. Carbon credits are typ-
ically regarded as regulatory rights; they provide a means of meeting a mandated
target and avoiding sanction. However, voluntary credits confer no such right in
law. This then raises a number of questions:
1. What entities are traded or services provided in voluntary markets? Why are
consumers making payments if they receive no property or other right in re-
turn? Is the idea of a uniform carbon commodity borne out in practice?
2. What other activities are associated with buying emissions instruments? How
do participants calculate the appropriate quantity to consume? Does this pro-
cess increase or decrease their direct emissions output?
3. How do participants decide what transactions to engage in and what emis-
sions instruments to buy and sell? What is consistent and what is variable in
these instituted economic processes?
4. In what ways are these institutions similar or different to the regulated systems
of exchange such as the CDM and EU ETS?
These questions will be addressed in turn, and general conclusions about these novel
economic institutions and the biophysical and social implications of such free market
environmentalism drawn out.
9.1. Distinguishing compliance and voluntary markets
Like the previous chapters I have adopted a Polanyi inspired institutional frame-
work to approach the voluntary market. A simple use of the framework is to con-
sider the differentiation of compliance and voluntary markets. As in table 6.1 on
page 122, the distinction is often drawn at the role of the state or international en-
vironmental regime in setting the terms of production, exchange and consumption.
For instance, the Kyoto Protocol places obligations on states to reduce emissions
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and institutes an internationally regulated market of standardised units with sanc-
tions for those who fail to meet its terms. In contrast, an individual person may
voluntarily log on to the website of a carbon credit retailer of their choosing, make
an arbitrary payment and receive nothing of any legal standing or utility in return.
However, they may still have participated and in doing so produced a carbon trad-
ing institution.
However, by paying more attention to the different processes of consumption, ex-
change and production, the distinction between voluntary and compliance breaks
down somewhat. For example, in the UK airline passengers are voluntarily buy-
ing and cancelling credits produced by private companies to the terms set by UN-
FCCC CDM. There is also often an assumption that voluntary transactions only en-
tail credit instruments, however, one of the largest voluntary systems, the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX), primarily exchanges allowances. It is clear that produc-
tion and exchange aspects of compliance and voluntary markets overlap, however,
a meaningful distinction can be made with regard to the motivation for and terms of
consumption. Compliance market instruments, by definition must be recognised by
national and international emissions legislation and in all present cases means that
they are accepted into cap and trade systems. Buyers and sellers exchange volun-
tarily in order to meet legislated emissions targets, therefore the terms are set and
enforced by the states which ultimately accept the instruments as meeting the tar-
gets1. In contrast, the governance of voluntary markets is much more diffuse as the
choice of credit institution, exchange partner, quantity and terms always rests with
the buyer. How this is vested with some stability is discussed in the next chapter.
9.2. The ’why’ and ’how’ of offsetting
It is briefly worth considering the motivations for businesses to purchase credits vol-
untarily. Predominantly it seems that corporate reputation and being seen to be an
environmentally benign organisation were substantial. It was not clear from inter-
views if consumers genuinely considered offset credits to be materially equivalent
to the reductions that they delivered in their own operations. The mainstream eco-
nomic rationale for offsetting argues that it is more efficient to reduce emissions
1 It should be noted that buyers are not mandated to purchase credits specifically; they may be
awarded a free allocation of allowances, be able to purchase allowances from other participants,
or may simply reduce their polluting activities to minimise their liabilities.
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through the activity with the lowest marginal abatement cost. From a consumer’s
perspective this would necessitate estimating the MACs of the various options avail-
able to them and weighing this up against the cost of purchasing credits for some
or all of their intended degree of emissions reductions. However, some retailers re-
ported the lack of basic environmental data available to their clients and the number
that to their surprise wished to contract them for consultancy services but did not go
on to purchase credits. More than one retailer made comments similar to the below:
Things changed quite a lot. Initially, when we went out just to sell car-
bon offsets, there were a few that bit and it was all very exciting, but
as time went on we realised that the majority of businesses wanted ad-
vice on carbon footprints and carbon reduction so the carbon offset bit
came later. Because many NE businesses hadn’t even done their foot-
print, it was like cart before the horse to try to sell them offset, so that’s
what we concentrated on offering. By the end of the five years we had
teamed up with [energy consultancy] so we formed a partnership with
them offering carbon footprint and energy audits and reduction advice
to businesses. We moved away from just selling offsets to charging for
carbon footprints and energy audits as well.R2
This aspect of market relations highlights a prior step in voluntary offsetting that has
been cited as a central benefit. Voluntary offset retailers argue that ’carbon literacy’
and individual consumer understandings of climate change are increased by volun-
tary credit purchases because in most cases there is an accompanying calculation of
the emissions output of the activity to be offset (Evidence given by Climate Care and
The Carbon Neutral Company to House of Commons (2007)). One retailer argued
that they play a direct educational role:
It is very much around reduce, replace, neutralise framework because
we’re not in the market of flogging offsets, we’re in the market educating
and demonstrating to consumers ways that they can reduce and replace
their emissions and ultimately offset the rest if you like. We don’t neces-
sarily consider our success based on the amount of offsets that we sell.
We think it’s equally important to get hits on the website and people
actually calculating their emissions created from driving and awareness
raising in that regard.R10
Another focused on the measurement services, audit and reductions targets that they
also provided alongside credit retirement:
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We carry out carbon audits. We’ll go into an organisation and we’ll pro-
duce a carbon footprint document for the organisation itself or for a prod-
uct up to PAS 2050 standard and use the GHG Protocol for organisational
foot-printing. We’ll do the foot-printing part first, then provide full car-
bon management strategies for organisations and then offsetting as well.
R8
The implication is that as well as funding mitigation projects elsewhere, those pur-
chasing credits better understand their own climate change impact and hence re-
duce it. Evidence for this is tenuous, both in terms of the depth of literacy fostered
and its secondary consequences. A recent postal and online survey followed up
with sophisticated statistical analysis found that individuals that purchased offsets
were more likely to undertake multiple flights in a year than those who did not
(Whitmarsh, 2008) and were also more likely to have a self identity that favoured
offsetting (Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). This might suggest that voluntary credit
purchases were secondary behaviour following on from other preferences or pre-
existing ”guilt” and that calculation had little dispositional impact.
It would appear that a similar trend is developing, of business consumers that have
no legal liability for their GHG emissions voluntarily measuring and monitoring
their output as a necessary precondition for offsetting. Interviews with business
consumers suggest a variety of justifications, not all of which would necessarily en-
courage direct reductions. One was quite bold in arguing that offsetting provided a
political risk management strategy that would enable things to carry on as before:
If you listen to the policy debate and you listen to the public debate and
you look at the scientific debate you have to of course take this issue re-
ally seriously. Taking care of this or really being proactive about this en-
sures the growth, the continuing activity of your business. You can think
of other industries in the past that had challenges and they didn’t look
at their challenges seriously enough and their business model collapsed.
Look at the tobacco or the fur industry. Other really bad industries that
didn’t take care of their issues... And thereby ensuring, there’s never a
guarantee but at least try to ensure that our customers can continue fly-
ing the way that they have in the past, thereby keeping them able to do
what they used to do. In that way it also makes sense for our customers.
If you were honest and you are serious about this and you can convince
the general public or environmental NGOs that you’re serious about this
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then you will avoid people sitting on your planes at Heathrow Airport
or so on.C3
Provided that it is credible to the expert and public audiences then cancelling credits
is a simple and immediate activity in comparison to running an aggressive internal
mitigation programme that may take years to realise. Some UK based businesses,
The Co-op Group, Marks & Spencers and BSkyB for instance, are clearly pursuing
both strategies voluntarily, with public statements of environmental performance
targets and audited progress reports. However, claims to carbon neutrality may be
regarded sceptically and the public relations effect is acknowledged as ambiguous,
as one interviewee described clearly:
We do communicate on carbon neutral but we’re aware that for some
people it works as a phrase but for some people it just gets their hackles
up. So, I think its good from a communications perspective because once
people get it its quite simple. They balance things out. But for an awful
lot of people it’s tarnished with some of the negative connotations that
its a cop out its a licence to pollute and we’re very careful in our commu-
nications that this isn’t the first action we’re taking, the main thing that
we do is reduce our overall emissions and once we’ve done what we can
there, recognise that we offset the rest. But, it’s also a way of allowing
us to do something right now that makes a difference, whereas some of
the initiatives to reduce emissions are going to take months if not years
to put in place. We do use the term carbon neutral but it’s not our head-
line and we try and avoid it being taken as a headline but there is a risk
that that overshadows all the rest of the stuff that we’re doing which is
actually more important.C6
9.3. The standardisation in the voluntary market
In contrast to the considerable and rigid bureaucracy of the CDM and EU ETS it is
remarkably easy to engage voluntarily in carbon transactions. From a retailer’s per-
spective, all that is needed is a shop or website to promote a carbon saving concept,
frequently a tree or a stove, some means of advertising to potential consumers and
a way of receiving payments. Indeed both of these features are provided by the e-
Bay online auction site and so it is no surprise that one enterprising organisation has
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Figure 9.1.: Screen-grab of The International Small Group and Tree Planting Pro-
gramme (TIST) eBay ”GHG Boutique” (18/12/2007)
done just that (Figure 9.1). A ’carbon calculator’ to assist your customers in quanti-
fying their emissions is helpful, although by no means essential. A glossy certificate
as a memento of their transaction may generate more repeat business but has little
legal standing. Your customer may then feel free to pollute without concern because,
in the words of Robert Aisi, the Papua New Guinea ambassador to the UN, ”A tonne
is a tonne is a tonne” whether it is stored in trees or released in burning fossil fuels
(Aisi, 2005).
Although a caricature, the above example highlights both the tenuous and immate-
rial nature of carbon credit transactions but also the contrasting effort to format the
exchange in terms of a quantified material entity. Although denominated in metric
tons it is not clear what is being bought and sold, nor what the contractual responsi-
bilities of the various parties are. In voluntary markets, the buyer does not receive a
delivery of goods or experience the use of a service directly, rather money is paid and
an action is performed elsewhere. This feature of transactions has been of particular
concern to government regulators and NGOs wishing to implement and maintain
trading systems. One interviewee was quite animated when discussing the volun-
tary market:
When you’re selling something that doesn’t actually exist physically how
much scope is there for you to not do what you said you’d do. Just com-
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pletely lacking in regulation and passionately believing that every action
that someone takes that they think makes a difference has to be geared to
be making a difference.R9
Without a regulatory requirement specifying the terms of exchange there is the po-
tential for greater diversity in voluntary transactions than in the CDM. Without for-
mal regulation, the claims that are made by retailers need only match the expectation
of consumers such that they continue to purchase the product. Early transactions in
the period 2000 to 2006 were primarily conducted between retailers and consumers
on terms set by individual retailers. The Carbon Neutral Protocol is one example that
set out how The Carbon Neutral Company would go about commissioning projects
and auditing emissions reductions. However, without customers having any way
of monitoring or confirming effective implementation of the project the potential for
unintentional failure or deliberate fraud was great. Some respondents found that
proprietary standards could gain credibility by association and the organisations
that buy from them. As one interviewee recounted:
I suppose it’s implicit because [proprietary] offsets have been bought by
the UN for one of its COP projects. They’ve been bought by international
businesses who have been through tender processes. It hadn’t been en-
dorsed directly by DEFRA but [proprietary standard developer] sat on
the committee to discuss the voluntary code. So it was as near as damn
it, as good as there was out there at the time. It was a recognised brand,
and that was important to the selling. That gave us a good kick start in
terms of selling the projects and the process.R2
Credibility can also be located within the retailer’s organisation if they are seen to
be legitimate or reliable. In response to my question about offsetting received broad
criticism in the press one interviewee argued that:
Inevitably they came up but the strength of having a [city] council behind
it, was that as much as people grumble about councils, there’s the believe
that it was bona fide with the council behind it. If it had been a little
charity or something without the council’s support it might have been
different.R2
There remains the question of why multiple proprietary standards did not persist in
the market? It appears that there has been little attempt to resist wider independent
standardisation. One interviewee describes the situation as follows and this seems
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to be borne out in later market surveys (Hamilton et al., 2008):
They [owners of those proprietary standards] were broadly supportive,
many of them said “we are only doing this because there isn’t something
in the market”. We would prefer to have an internationally recognised
base standard which we can then add our own specific attributes on. For
example, there was one company that had its own standards, now uses
the VCS as its base standards then adds on a couple of geographical and
sustainability requirements and that’s very much what we hoped for it
to do. I2
They went on to describe the additional credibility that comes with recognition by
multiple, external organisations and the scrutiny that comes with both comparison
and audit:
What it was was that they were all finding it a long winded process set-
ting their own standards. It was beneficial to them to have an indepen-
dent standard that was supported by a range of NGOs and businesses
and other organisations so that they had something external to test their
project against...There had been a lot of questions in the press about
whether offsetting was a bunch of snake oil and stuff like that. They
wanted to have something that brought them together to say that they
were clearly doing something that was demonstrably good and demon-
strably credible to separate themselves from those who weren’t, and to
have a public code of conduct that they would be audited against, and
they can say look we are doing what we say we’re doing. I2
As the CDM predates the 2005–2006 boom in voluntary retailers setting up (Gössling,
2007), it would also have been possible for organisations to retail credits generated
by the CDM without the development of any extra standards. However, sCERs trade
at a much higher price than primary ERPAs or similar contracts, there is a clear op-
portunity to increase profit margins by employing less exacting standards that meet
the need for assurance but at a lower cost:
Why would you pay a premium? Why would you bother with a com-
pliance market when the voluntary market exists? We want to make it
affordable and accessible to consumers. Its this whole idea of being as-
sured of the value chain around these credits. R10
There is also the possibility that transactions would be conducted on some basis
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other than market exchange, a simple donation or contribution to a fund for instance.
Surveying the market in 2006 it was found that of the organisations identified as
offering offset services online to individuals, almost all conducted transactions in
credits (Gössling, 2007). Further, all the major voluntary standards use institutional
analogues of the CER, the unit of exchange that is so central to the CDM, with similar
controversy surrounding the definition and veracity of credits.
Credits generated outside of the CDM but validated and verified to an external set
of criteria are typically referred to as Verified or Voluntary Emissions Reductions,
abbreviated as VERs in both cases. Without the organising role of the UNFCCC a
variety of market actors have developed autonomous quality assurance standards,
formalizing different parts of the credit creation process and with varying degrees of
rigour. Standards in the voluntary market typically comprise of i) rules for the valid-
ity and additionality of projects, ii) rules for the quantification of credits including
methodologies, iii) quality assurance procedures, including monitoring, audit and
the specifications for registries and iv) procedures for the governance of the stan-
dard itself. The most prominent complete offset standards, that include all these
elements, are:
Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) http://www.v-c-s.org/ The VCS was initially
developed as a collaboration between business NGOs The Climate Group, In-
ternational Emissions Trading Association (IETA), the World Economic Forum
Greenhouse Register, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment (WBCSD). The VCS has complete carbon accounting procedures similar
to CDM but relies more heavily on auditors and consultants to perform quality
assurance and adopts ISO standards (14064-1:2006, 14064-2:2006, 14064-3:2006)
as the basis of emissions calculation, validation, monitoring and verification.
The standard has no specific requirement for supplementary social or envi-
ronmental beneficial outcomes from projects and accepts large hydro, nuclear,
forestry and industrial gas destruction. There is the possibility of alignment of
interests between auditor and developer given that the same company can val-
idate and verify a single project without any further scrutiny or independent
approval (Kollmuss et al., 2008). Unlike the CDM, issuance is not managed by
a single body and multiple registries are accredited.
VER+ https://www.netinform.de/KE/Beratung/Service_Ver.aspx This standard and
registry are offered by a prominent audit company and DOE, TÜV SÜD. VER+
credits are generated using calculation methods and audit procedures from the
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CDM but with more relaxed crediting periods and wider geographic scope.
Like the VCS specifies no additional social or environmental benefits arising
from project implementation than the emissions reduction credits, although
industrial gas destruction, nuclear and hydroelectricity (>80MW) are not eligi-
ble.
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ The CCX
was a hybrid system in two senses: firstly, most companies involved partic-
ipated on a ‘cap and trade’ basis but it had rules for credit generating projects
and secondly, membership was voluntary but commitments were legally bind-
ing. There were over a hundred full members representing a wide variety of
organizations including electricity generators, primary and secondary indus-
try, municipalities, states and educational institutions. Other organizations
could qualify for offset credits for a variety of project types including forestry
and agricultural practices. Additionality was assessed on a group basis rather
than project by project and there were question marks raised over projects re-
jected by the CDM subsequently entering the CCX (Carbon Finance, 2008).
However CCX was bought out and its various components broken up in late
2010 and it is not clear what aspects will remain functional (Stumhofer, 2010).
Gold Standard (GS) http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/ The Gold Standard is a
’not for profit’ organization initiated by the WWF, initially intended to sup-
plement the CDM and promote local benefits from the emissions reduction
projects, increase the stringency of additionality requirements and stimulate
innovation in clean technology rather than simply provide least cost emissions
abatement. To achieve supplementary GS certification, CDM projects must be
based on renewable energy or energy efficiency methods, and undergo more
detailed Environmental Impact Assessment and local stakeholder consulta-
tion. Other accounting and registration procedures are as for the CDM. There
is also a GS VER standard with an independent registry, external audit proce-
dures similar to but less onerous than the CDM, simplified procedures for ‘mi-
cro scale’ projects generating less than 5000 tonnes of reductions per annum,
less stringent requirements for host country approval and a wider variety of
approved project implementation and monitoring methods.
An indicative voluntary market survey, conducted by market intermediary New
Carbon Finance, found that 96% of reported voluntary transactions in 2008 were
validated against one of the independent standards, with the VCS by far the most
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used, accounting for 48% of transactions surveyed, four times the next most frequent
standard, the GS (Hamilton et al., 2009)2.
The VCS, VER+ and GS draw upon various aspects of the CDM as a source of tech-
nical expertise through the use of existing methodologies, professional capacity by
specifying only accredited DOEs, credibility by association of these, and most signif-
icantly the supply chain of projects and project finance. With less stringent valida-
tion procedures, the VCS can register projects more quickly than the CDM. This has
led to credits being generated in the time between a project starting operation and
its documentation being completed by the CDM. Such pre-registration VERs have
dubious claims to financial additionality, the extra income for the short period prior
to earning CER credits arguably having little consequence to the initiation of already
operational projects. However a number of market participants articulated this as-
sociation positively, as conferring the approval of the CDM board to these voluntary
credits:
A lot of the VCUs being traded now are coming from pre-registration
portion of CDM projects. You’ve got a credit the same effectively, the day
before and the day after registration, and the price is probably a third.
VCUs prior to reg, CERs post reg, you’re buying CERs in all but name.R3
Of the 3 projects that we have they’re pre-registered VERs so as you prob-
ably know they’re all voluntary credits that are bound to become CERs
under the CDM. So we feel we get the quality of the CDM process be-
cause they’re in line to become CERs but we still get them at a premium
price because they’re not CERs yet. So we can tell our customers you get
all the auditing and all the vetting of the CDM process but we’re charg-
ing you a fee that is acceptable for you and thereby we feel that we can
make it mandatory.C3
2 Data quality is poor in the voluntary market and not comparable with the CDM Pipeline or World
Bank data sets for the compliance market. Without all transactions passing through a monitored
registry or regulated exchanges it is very difficult for market analysts to produce reliable data. The
New Carbon Finance survey (Hamilton et al., 2007, 2008, 2009) is the largest of its kind but inter-
views with market participants suggested that there was a very varied regard for the accuracy of its
outputs. Most retailers interviewed, however, reported that they made data submissions to it. The
NCF survey could not distinguish primary and secondary transactions so there is the risk of double
counting the movement within a supply chain of individual credits from one year to the next, and
also the same transaction reported by buyer and seller. Retirement data may be more reliable in the
first regard but not the second. Standardisation is a precondition of secondary market sales so one
would expect a heavy bias upwards.
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This phenomenon has a regional and technological pattern, with most such projects
being grid connected hydroelectricity and wind turbines in India and China (Hamil-
ton et al., 2009). This may be a result of consumer preference for projects that pro-
mote decarbonization of energy systems or developers claiming voluntary compli-
ant credits from projects prior to their acceptance by the CDM. Whether this is a
positive outcome, the voluntary markets assisting worthwhile projects to reach the
compliance market, or alternatively of questionable merit is not clear. If the revenue
stream from the CDM is the primary motivation for project development, are the
pre-compliance credits really additional? Without doubt, however, many voluntary
market participants’ claims to innovation and coverage of the ”gaps” that the CDM
leaves in climate mitigation finance are clearly questionable. The voluntary market
does not appear to be supporting LDCs or addressing geographic imbalances in the
CDM, indeed the latest surveys suggest trends in the opposite direction with reduc-
tions in the numbers of projects funded in Africa and Latin America and increases in
Asia and North America (Hamilton et al., 2009). The alignment of compliance and
voluntary market supply chains is discussed further in section 9.4, but is an area that
deserves much greater scrutiny in future.
9.3.1. Function of standards
I asked market participants what role these crediting standards fulfill. The most fre-
quent response was that they should provide the basic definitions shared between
buyers and sellers for the unit of exchange. As one respondent discussing the initia-
tion of a new standard put it:
...one of the things that we found was that while the Gold Standard had
been successful and rightly so in terms of increasing its projects, it still
wasn’t something available that covered the whole of the voluntary car-
bon market in terms of giving a basic standard that says a tonne is a tonne
is a tonne that says your emission reduction is real, verified, additional,
permanent etcetera without making any claims or requirements about
sustainability attributes which other standards do. I2
Other interviewees discussing the basic definition of credits, provided by a standard,
also used a tangible commodity conception of the units of exchange rather than de-
scribing them as financial instruments. A standard’s role was to ensure that the units
exchanged were or corresponded directly to quantities of emissions, and quantities
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of credits were invariably referred to as tonnes of CO2. Consistency in calculations
appeared to be an important source of credibility for retailers, the implication be-
ing that the audience for the calculations anticipate a single accurate figure, without
acknowledgment of the subjectivity involved in calculation3. For instance:
What ICROA’s4 partly to do is standardisation. We will retain our own
competitive edges in different areas but what we will do is make sure
that the calculations of carbon, particularly when they’re done online are
done along standard lines. One of the criticisms is that on 10 different
websites you’d get 10 different answers about how much carbon is re-
leased from flying from London to Sydney and what we’re all trying to
do is at least get that standardised or at least explain where the differ-
ences lie.R8
For retailers and those organisations that profit by acting between producers and
end consumers, standards also provide fungibility of units, to the extent that price
competition becomes possible. This retailer’s comments were typical of a number of
others in a similar position:
If you’re talking to a client that wants a specific thing we don’t have
then we go out to the market, you accept a certain quality standard and
see what the best price you can get it at is. There’s a whole range of
secondary market suppliers including banks, commodity traders who
see carbon as just another commodity to be traded, a whole range of
potential suppliers. You bump into them at trade fairs, you use personal
contacts, people who you’ve worked with in the past, just a web search.R8
With multiple proprietary standards, much of production and retail would be con-
ducted ”in house” with a single organisation supply chain and no requirement for a
functional aggregator class of agents. It is therefore in the interests of many interme-
diate organisations to support independent standards that increase the possibility of
high volume exchange on secondary markets. It also seems likely that widely recog-
nised standards with uniform units of exchange offer benefits to buyers and sellers
by reducing search and transaction costs. By adhering to a recognised standard both
3 Indeed this positivist assumption runs through the critique presented in Gössling et al. (2007) as it
reviews the calculation standards that voluntary retailers employ.
4 ICROA is the International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance, a trade association rather than an
exchange standard. It was founded in 2008 by retailers to the voluntary market with support from
the NGO The Climate Group.
218
9.3. The standardisation in the voluntary market
classes of agent minimise the time spent negotiating contracts. One retailer com-
mented that:
Carbon is increasingly standardised, it actually makes our life easier be-
cause you either meet a standard or you don’t and you can write into
the contract that you are buying a particular commodity, VCUs, CERs,
GS CERS, whatever they happen to be and if the seller cannot produce
that product for whatever reason, because the project doesn’t come up to
scratch then the consequences are written into the contract, which we’ll
follow and that’s very easy in lots of ways. R3
Similar sentiments were expressed about intermediary organisations by credit con-
sumers who wished to engage in a credible activity but without individual invest-
ment in expertise and knowledge:
In the early days of [NGO] we were asked by our members and partners
to help them with their efforts to be carbon neutral, one aspect of that was
helping decide what kind of voluntary carbon units or VERs to use and
we felt rather than go through the same process every time as there were
a number of organisations looking at this we thought that a standard
would be useful. I2
The authority of standards also serves to deflect criticism from specific retailers or
consumers onto the certifying body. There are a number of calculative practices
that are not valid within the CDM and are of questionable worth but which have
found favour with voluntary retailers and consumers, for instance forward, ex-ante,
crediting which is discussed in section 9.3.2. Similarly when discussing the sale of
pre-registration credits, one retailer referred to standards as defining acceptability:
Well, they’d have to be VCS, that’s in the code. There’s a year’s period of
grace as we run into it. All credits sold by ICROA members have to be
either VCS, GS, CER or EUA. If its pre-reg and doesn’t have any of those
other, we can’t sell it. R8
Likewise in discussions of funding projects that are ”economically no regret”, one
consumer deferred to the expertise that is implicit in the judgments and positions
taken to accept or reject projects and methodologies:
If a project is viable without co-financing then it should not receive co-
financing at all. But I’m not the policy maker so I don’t know the details
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of every single project going through the CDM mechanism. It seems to
be the best thing out there now that we piggy back on.C3
Note that in both cases above, the arguments for or against both general policy or
specific cases are reduced to the single matter of acceptance under the terms of a
standard. This might entail multiple steps, for instance approval of a methodology,
submission of registration documents and verification of a project’s implementation
by an auditor, but they are all encompassed and communicated via the institution of
a standard.
There is clearly a tension here when market participants hold a conception of credits
as material things but implicitly recognise that those things are socially defined by
the procedures set out in the credit standards. Standards are dominant arbiters of
a blurred boundary between ”quality” and ”reality”. In this grey area, the CDM is
usually seen as a procedural benchmark. The Advertising Standards Agency has
made judgments on a number of corporate carbon neutral and carbon offset claims
on the basis of comparison between voluntary standards and the CDM (ASA 2008,
ASA 2009). Its clearest statement is from a case involving Eurostar where the adjudi-
cation stated ”We acknowledged that Eurostar had followed best practice methodol-
ogy for carbon neutrality and that credits were to be either certified (CERs), or from
projects that complied with one of the Standards within the voluntary market that
were evaluated and validated to a sufficiently high level (ASA, 2008).”
In the absence of formal regulation between buyers and sellers bodies like the ASA5
are important in stabilising institutions like emissions trading. Its rulings on the
validity of claims made on the basis of carbon credit exchanges have reinforced the
importance of ’independent’ standards. In this case the ASA endorsed the VCS as
a valid standard for crediting that would be acceptable to substantiate carbon offset
and carbon neutral claims, although it has been criticised within the industry as
providing a weak basis for demonstrating reductions and, as described in section
9.3.5, is not regarded favourably by the UK government.
However, the content of standards is heavily influenced by retailers and consumers
who have much to gain from a ”light touch”, from overtly industry lead bodies like
ICROA to the VCS board which is comprised almost entirely of representatives of
organisations directly involved in emissions trading. The voluntary market is often
5 The ASA is an independent body overseeing advertisers’ output and responding to complaints from
the public. ASA rulings are recognised both by advertisers and the related UK government depart-
ments such as the Office of Fair Trading and the Office of Communications.
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discussed positively for its acceptance of ”innovative” modes of crediting. This in-
variably means sources of credits, audit or calculation methodologies that, for better
or worse, are not eligible under the CDM:
People wanted to have something that was seen to be as rigorous as the
CDM so that the voluntary market didn’t seem like a poor relation and
in fact tonnes through the voluntary market were not a poor relation and
were not seen to be less rigorous. However, there were issues that peo-
ple had, is there a way that we can do this without the level of bureau-
cracy and delay that the CDM involves? Other ways that we can expand
on what the CDM allows so that we can try new approaches using the
CDM’s levels of rigour as a benchmark. So we want to be as rigorous
but do other things such as performance standards or other types of ad-
ditionality test, and so forth. A broader set of countries and project types
included. That’s the way we wanted to deviate from the CDM and have
wider set of methodologies but aiming to achieve the same level of rigour
and acceptance as the CDM. I2
Considering voluntary transactions in the UK, by volume occurring predominantly
between large corporates and secondary retailers, VER standards have becomes the
main source of credibility and coordination. Like the EB in the CDM, in determining
the acceptability of calculation methodologies, setting the terms of audit and requir-
ing registries and some degree of transparency in documentation, they have become
the central governance institutions.
9.3.2. Forward crediting and forward selling
A significant issue that is unique to voluntary markets is the possibility of forward
selling of credits that do not yet exist or ex-ante creation of credits for reductions
that have not yet happened. Both are accounting conventions, with a different val-
idation and verification regime to that used for ex-post compliance credits (see also
section 7.2.3). In ex-post accounting the credits are created as accounting units after
the project has been in operation and monitoring data is available. The initial capital
to construct the project may come in part from forward sales of the rights to credits,
as is typically the case with ERPAs. With ex-ante crediting, reductions are claimed
and sold as credits on the basis of the project’s plans. There may also be a monitor-
ing regime with reconciliation. In the UNFCCC and EU ETS compliance markets,
221
9. Regularising Without Regulating: Voluntary Carbon Market Exchange
the credits must be available for surrender at the time the consumer must produce
credits for their liability. However, in the voluntary market, some consumers are
happy for their payment to be used to initiate a project that will yield reductions in
future, or are unaware that this is the terms of the contract that the retailer is selling.
As one retailer critical of the practice argued:
A lot of donors are not in a position to even have that conversation. If
you go onto our website and donate to us, we will offset your emissions.
There’s no possible way that we can engage people in a conversation that
tells them “thanks for the money, you are aware there’s a risk we’re not
going to be able to offset your emissions”. You just can’t do that.R6
For this reason, the UK Government Offset Quality Assurance Scheme, discussed
further in section 9.3.5 also specifies how credits are to be managed by a retailer and
cancelled within a specific timescale, effectively excluding ex ante systems. Forward
crediting is different to a consumer who intentionally forward contracts for credits
but makes a carbon neutral claim only on the basis of those credits that have been
delivered at the time of the claim. Forward crediting transfers the consequences of
an unsuccessful project from the seller of the credit to the buyer and atmosphere.
As can be seen from the CDM, there are substantial possibilities for projects to yield
many fewer CERs at verification than anticipated. One survey found that all project
types with the exception of N2O destruction delivered fewer CERs than calculated
in the PDD and that methane based animal waste and landfill gas projects delivered
72% and 67% less than projected respectively (Castro and Michaelowa 2008). This
phenomenon has been attributed to inaccurate or over optimistic estimation models,
delays and failures in the practical execution of the project activity and procedural
losses due to divergences between monitoring plans and monitoring activity. A few
very large industrial projects have substantially over performed such that overall
CDM issuance was 96.8% of projections up to May 2010 (UNEP Risø Pipeline 2010).
However some of these values must be regarded with a degree of scepticism given
the matter of inflated baselines and market leakage (see section 7.2). The voluntary
market has not favoured industrial gas projects but does show substantial use of
methane abatement projects which have been some of the poorest performers in the
CDM.
Forward selling may encourage a greater proportion of capital investment from
credit sales and reduce costs by reducing debt interest payments and default risk
premia. It may also provide a greater likelihood of additionality although this is
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not a logical necessity. One retailer was keen to differentiate their credits developed
using this model:
Because a lot of our credits are based on a forward accounting process to
help build in that additionality argument, what happens is a client will
come to us and say “I like the low energy stoves. There’s £100,000 to buy
X tonnes of carbon in that project”. They give us that money then we
send it to our office in Nairobi and they go and build the stoves. It’s very
clear that without their money it wouldn’t have happened. Now there’s
an increased delivery risk there as compared with selling issued credits.
Most of our clients are prepared to take that small risk in exchange for
the much tougher financial additionality test that that provides. R8
The same projects could be delivered through an ex-post credit system. There is noth-
ing substantially different in carbon accounting terms or the physical implementa-
tion. However, the financial flows and risks are quite different This rearrangement of
delivery risk and capital requirement is not permitted by the VCS, although forward
sales are allowed on the basis of a successful validation.
9.3.3. Audit Requirements
Against the transaction enabling function of standards there is the burden of the au-
dit requirements for project developers. A VER standard only practically functions
if it is adopted by market participants and if its specifications are fulfilled. Indepen-
dent audit, as provided by DOEs, is the primary means of ensuring that credits that
are claimed against a standard meet with its requirements, offering some measure
of consistency and credibility of the credits and, by association, of the standard as a
whole.
The quality assurance mechanisms in the CDM, outlined in section 7.3, were de-
scribed by voluntary market consumers as bureaucratic and burdensome, denying
carbon finance to projects that were described in strong normatively positive terms,
for instance in providing health benefits or reducing local deforestation, holding
uCO2-eqp others, and driving developers to larger projects:
To be eligible for CDM we need to reach a certain volume and that might
not necessarily be in the best interest of the villagers. One of the prob-
lems with the CDM is that you have to have projects of a certain size so
223
9. Regularising Without Regulating: Voluntary Carbon Market Exchange
smaller, no less beneficial projects, are prohibited against... It just seems
that the smaller projects are being pushed to one side because everyone’s
searching for the big bucks.R2
We always struggle with that CO2e because of the community scale of
our projects. We’re never going to withstand the costs of CDM or cer-
tainly not in the near future and some of the costs with large scale GS are
quite prohibitive. The GS has a micro GS threshold so that the costs asso-
ciated with that are much lower than with normal GS. It’s mainly down
to verification which is sampling based rather than exhaustive.R8
Stricter standards with more substantial audit procedures raise transaction costs for
project developers and these are passed on into a price competitive market. In set-
ting minimum requirements for monitoring and verification, standards are crucial
in maintaining stability and credibility of exchange against pressures to reduce costs
on both sides of secondary transactions.
Like calculation, there is no absolutely ”correct” method for verifying and validating
that will produce an entirely accurate credit supply chain. Ultimately, it seems that
the credibility of the standard endorsing the credits is the most important aspect
and that this is a matter of prevailing consensus in media and policy arenas. Credits
generated in ambiguous ways illustrate this point, firstly those using proprietary
standards and secondly those claimed for avoided deforestation.
Increased audit increases direct costs on the production of credits and may be a bur-
den for small scale projects. In these cases retailers may be prepared to generate and
sell credits to end consumers that are asserted as meeting a proprietary standard,
with less rigorous sampling methods or no third party involvement. One intervie-
wee described a long standing project they wished to continue to sell credits from:
There are some projects, like that energy efficient lightbulb project that
we’ve been working with since 2002. We’ve always contracted the credits
as plain VERs not VCUs, partly because when we first started working
with it there wasn’t a VCS but that project because its so small it would
find it quite hard to bear the transaction costs of the VCS, to get a DOE
in to do the validation, certification and so on.R3
In such cases the retailer’s reputation and brand may be cited as the source of cred-
ibility rather than an independent set of audit criteria or audit performance. How-
ever, recent market surveys suggest that the use of proprietary standards is declin-
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ing with time (Hamilton et al., 2008). This has been corroborated in interviews with
consumers and provides the second example. In Europe there is limited expert and
formal recognition of afforestation credits and standards that endorse credits from
avoided deforestation primarily because of concerns about permanence. One con-
sumer interviewed was wary of using their trusted retailer for these transactions in
advance of widespread recognition of a standard, instead describing tentative ap-
proaches and efforts to directly partner with NGOs:
My strategy for us is that if we do anything with forestry we would only
do it first with our internal emissions, not with our customer emissions
so we would put our toe into the water, look at the temperature, test it.
And then if we feel confident going forward after a year or maybe two
years the we say “OK, now we feel confident, this is a good project, this
mechanism works” and now we roll that out to our customers...
[Our usual supplier] has offered me different projects. But I feel that
is an area where we haven’t made a decision yet. Maybe at the end
of the day we’ll say it’s safe and the mechanism works to buy from an
offset provider like [Project Developer X] or [Project Developer Y] even
forestry, and that’s fine, but at the moment I feel that a lot of those NGOs
on the ground are struggling with the offset providers to get the projects
off the ground and so we can jump over those hurdles directly and go
into the field and help them off the ground. And by the way if we do
that, the benefit is that we know that our money will go further. C3
There is a tension between even the limited audit requirements of the major volun-
tary standards and consumers’ price sensitivity. With increasing transaction costs
involved in registering, validating, operating and verifying a project it is not sur-
prising that 49 per cent of credits traded in the voluntary markets in 2007 originated
from projects over 100,000 tCO2e per annum (Hamilton et al., 2008).
9.3.4. Consumer Reliance Upon Standards
UK corporations have since 2005 increasingly consumed credits and engaging credit
retailers in order to made carbon neutral claims and retail their own products pack-
aged with an offset claim. Amongst others, HSBC has used credits to offset busi-
ness travel and direct energy consumption, Eurostar has offered a carbon neutral
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rail service and Avis carbon neutral car hire. As outlined in section 9.3.1, standard-
isation has facilitated these transactions by reducing the requirement for research
into counterparties and the various contracts for carbon reductions that they could
provide. One retailer stated that they had noticed suppressed market demand in
the early stages of their operations due to persistent uncertainty in the credibility of
standards:
What we’ve quickly found is that with the Code of Best Practice and all
the issues around CERs and VERs, until you provide a bulletproof state-
ment of standards there’s no way, companies were very reluctant to just
climb on board something. They wanted to retain a lot more control over
their own sourcing and that kind of stuff. They were very reluctant to go
out to their customers. You don’t want to go out to your customers and
then the standards change. I think there’s a lot of nervousness around
that.R6
Whilst over time consumers may have become more accepting a common basic def-
inition of emissions reductions, market participants distinguish between standards
on the extra criteria that they screen for, GS providing a greater insistence on local
benefits of the projects earning credits for instance:
Smaller customers are less savvy, bigger ones more exacting. Sometimes
people request GS but often just to see what’s out there. They sometimes
see price premium and say if that’s the case I’m happy to just have VCS.
Very few, maybe an NGO, will say we’re just going to take GS, most now
if they’re going to specify a voluntary standard they’d put VCS in.R3
Whilst VER standards tend to promote this basic commodity conception of credit
contracts, that they ensure ”a tonne is a tonne”, interviews with representatives of
consuming organisations revealed that they appraised carbon markets in two other
ways. Firstly, almost all organisations look beyond standards to the projects that
generated them, placing extra criteria on them over and above emissions reduction.
This interplay between the notional emissions reductions worth of credits and the
projects that they are associated with is picked up in section 9.4. Secondly, a num-
ber of consumers described due diligence and scrutiny procedures in addition to
those mandated by the standard the credits were validated against. One consumer
described the following:
Our original intention had been to choose two different providers and
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use both of them but at the end of the day we thought [retailer] was
the only one who could live with our pickiness. Whilst we have some
standards that we insist a project has, we don’t accept those standards
as sufficient verification that we are happy with it so we go through the
PDD documents and probe for more detail, particularly on additionality,
but potentially on other things. C6
One retailer, described on their website and in interview how they sought to differ-
entiate their credits as being more robust than the standards they were certified to,
and certainly more than competitors’ credits, even on the most fundamental criteria:
Clearly the GS has considerable traction but even GS, there’s one project
that I’ve seen that, its first project I think, that’s hopeless. I think it fails
on just about every test that I’d put a carbon offset project through. So
again I think these things are minimum standards.... we’d encourage our
clients to look into various issues in more detail, and additionality is the
key. R8
The Co-operative Group has similarly made efforts to inspect and assess projects
that it has purchased credits from and been vociferous in its support for the volun-
tary offset market (House of Commons, 2007). It has gone to great lengths, in some
cases directly visiting projects to inspect their progress and outcomes (Shearlock,
2008). However, this raises the issue of consumers’ expertise in key issues of carbon
accounting and social survey that would be relevant to effective appraisal of project
consequences. A number of interviewees, with less hubris, explicitly recognised dif-
ficulties in assessing for instance the additionality claims of projects that they had
purchased credits from:
In some cases, such as jute mill, we went back and really pushed them
on whether this wouldn’t have happened anyway... We tend to err on
the side of caution but also recognise you can never be 100% sure of
this without thoroughly thoroughly going through the books which no
project is going to allow you to do. C6
I’ve thought about flying out there but that would mean I would have to
fly to Philippines, China, Chile and I was looking at one in India in quite
rural areas. We had one person in the company fly out to China and look
at two projects in the Philippines yes so somebody from our company
went out there and looked at the project and made the choice. It wasn’t
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a technical expert though. He had no way of assessing in detail how
the money streams were flowing there and how the carbon was being
calculated and so on, other than trusting what the offset provider and
the project developer were telling him, the reports they were showing
him and so on.C3
The major implication is that the whole supply chain is highly reliant upon the stan-
dards set and the audit procedures required. One retailer commented:
We’ve had plenty of dealings with the GS people and I’ve got the convic-
tion that if they’ve signed off on something there’s no need for further...
they’re very thorough in their approach. I don’t think there’s any addi-
tional value in anyone else having another look at it. Certainly for CDM
GS, anyone who tries to institute any other proceedings above that, I
mean what is the point? When does the checking stop, as Wittgenstein
would have said?R6
Another interviewee neatly summarised their primary motivation to follow up a
project as being quite separate to the emissions reductions:
All the due diligence occurs prior to and then we have a monitoring ba-
sis, keeping an eye on the projects to make sure that nothing untoward
happens that gains huge media attention. It really is just a reputation
monitoring part of it.R10
Despite some consumers claims to engage in detailed assessment of the supply chain
of credits it appears that this aspect of governance presents no greater prospect of
robust environmental integrity than that which standards enshrine. There are lim-
itations in expertise, market incentives to reduce costs and organisational priorities
oriented around reputation rather than ecological outcomes which militate against
high stringency consumer lead institutions.
9.3.5. Government Intervention in the Voluntary Market
In the UK, Government responded to the growth of voluntary offsetting by issuing a
Code of Best Practice which after consultation was implemented as a Quality Assur-
ance Scheme which retailers could apply to particular products. Its most controver-
sial aspect was the exclusive endorsement of the compliance regimes (Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism, Joint Implementation and EU Emissions Trading Scheme) for
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the supply of emissions reductions units. It appears that the bureaucrats’ intentions
were to remove ”rogues” from the market, companies with lax emissions reduction
contracting, to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the system and consumer
confidence.
Offset Code of Best Practice and QAS consultation trundled on at its own
pace... looked like it was going to be just CDM and EUAs which was the
position we were all pushing for internally and there was kick back... We
needed to clear out the cowboys. People who sell the same credit twice,
who don’t do what they said they were going to do. R9
[senior regulator] wanted the VER industry to coalesce itself around a
single standard that it could put forward, but that clearly wasn’t going
to happen, the market isn’t at this point in time moving towards a single
standard, so we thought we would go ahead and launch the scheme I6
However, the scheme was not to go so far as to formally regulated the market and
enforce the use of compliance units. In test cases of corporate claims the government
was happy to allow the ASA to make judgments and didn’t move to regulate against
VERs and implicitly the standards that generate them. This was articulated to me
in terms of variable quality of emissions reduction units and the scale of potential
harms:
...the Quality Assurance Scheme is saying that there are these things
available and you don’t have to be protected against them but there are
different standards of quality, if they were dangerous or really problem-
atic we would have to step in and regulate and remove them...Traditionally
policy making is done by looking at the cost and benefits in terms of
to the government department and also to society in general of putting
through legislation and some system to regulate that, in terms of C’s and
B’s, and that depends on the size of the market and how many people are
buying offsets and how much harm is potentially being done by those
purchases. I6
The implication is that the UK government had little confidence in the governance
procedures of VER standards but acknowledged that the scale of transactions was
too small to be of major consequence. The reputational risk to emissions trading
as a whole, by association with fraudulent activity, could be mitigated by acting to
distinguish the quality of credits. The system can be made sound by having cred-
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ible institutions that exclude isolated transgressors. Where there were failings, the
governance structure of the CDM allows problems to be revealed and resolved:
We knew there were problems with the CDM but at least there was a
framework for correction and there was more transparency. There were
things that were wrong with it but at least they were visible.R9
If you’re worried about all these things that are wrong with CDM get
involved in changing the CDM don’t just set up your own crap thing
that no-one can regulate, it’s bound to let cowboys in. Try to make the
regulated system better.R9
The proposals appear also to have been taken seriously by a number of UK airlines,
with EasyJet, British Airways, Flybe and Virgin Atlantic programmes complying.
One retailer speculated that this was associated with formal regulatory pressure:
Airlines seem to be the only sector that’s gone for CERs for voluntary
programmes and I think they are the ones that felt most under pressure
around inclusion or not of aviation within EU ETS therefore the best way
to avoid regulation is to use a regulated instrument to show that they
were almost quasi regulated.R3
Some retailers have drawn on the invitation to discriminate on quality and have
used the QAS as part of their sales package despite higher cost and competitive
tendering processes:
[The CoBP was] recognised as the highest quality and if you want to be
able to sleep at night as well as say that you’re carbon neutral. If you
want to go to bed at night and say you’re carbon neutral and not worry
about whether you’re going to get caught out because you bought pre-
CDM VERs then you may be prepared to pay that price.R6
However, discriminating along the lines of an ambiguous notion of ”quality” has
drawn substantial criticism from buyers and sellers in the voluntary market. The
problematic aspects of the CDM outlined in chapter 7 are widely recognised if rarely
articulated in public. One buyer discriminated against both the projects that were
incentivised by the CDM6 and the process for earning credits:
My feeling is if they’ve [DEFRA] got absolute confidence in the CDM
then they probably haven’t looked at it thoroughly enough. The very fact
6 Section 9.4 addresses this matter in greater detail.
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is that the mechanism for getting CDM verification, from an outsiders
perspective, looks like its pretty slow. If you have more and more projects
going through it its only going to be slower and slower, unless they beef
it up. It seems a shame to hold up good projects on that basis. C6
I’m encouraged by the fact that they are looking for some sort of a vol-
untary standard that could be more standardised but am just waiting to
see what happens with that... Whilst there might not be a single standard
across the voluntary market, its often allowing projects to take place that
might be too small to be worth going through the CDM process but are
actually as or more valuable. I think the risk with what they’ve done is
cut out things that are actually very positive. C6
We’ve bought CERs. Its not that we’ve got something against the CDM.
What we’ve got is an issue with saying that that’s the only valid projects
there are...We have a number of areas where we have a different view
from DEFRA. Our stance tends to be that if we believe we are doing the
right thing then we do it, we communicate about it absolutely transpar-
ently and if we don’t agree with their advice we ignore it. C6
The CDM is not exclusively seen as benchmark by voluntary retailers nor is gov-
ernment ”approval” or guidance seen as necessary when it places a greater price
premium because of its transaction costs, delays and connection to the EU ETS sec-
ondary market. A typical response by one retailer was:
A few people in early days around consultation of CoBP I met people
who said “we think we understand this market well ourselves we don’t
need to be told what to do by DEFRA. If DEFRA chooses to go down
the CDM route then we’ll ignore it”... There was one client who said “we
really want to comply with the QAS” and I said you realise you’d have to
use CERs then and the price of your programme will double or more and
I didn’t get any response to that so price is an important determinant. R3
Finally, the spatial scale of governance can interfere or align with efforts towards
standardisation and this can be seen in the case of the QAS. International businesses
that I spoke to highlighted how national guidance can be problematic and that they
preferred to operate to international standards:
Our position on the DEFRA code is its not realistic, it’s not suited to pur-
pose, and we have an international business, [our offset programme] is
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in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France,
so having a UK kitemark for an international business, we are not that
interested if they’re not going to respond to the repeated requests that
have been made by the industry around this, through various consulta-
tion processes.R10
I think on some of the other, not offsetting, reporting guidelines DEFRA
has one set of advice, ADEM who is the French equivalent has a totally
different set of advice... [some of our clients] are based world wide and
the minute you go down the route of doing different reporting, particu-
larly as you’ve got passengers who travel and are exposed to information
about us in both markets, they hear one figure here and one figure there
and then they’re thinking ”What on Earth’s going on? They don’t know
what they’re doing.”C6
These comments suggest that recognition and consistency are the most valuable
functions of standards to market participants. However the first also suggests a
certain opportunism, the respondent may have been more amenable to citing UK
government recognition overseas if it had been supportive of their programme’s
own agenda.
9.4. Conspicuous production
In discussions with market participants it is very clear that the projects that are cited
as the origin of credits are as significant to exchange relationships as the accounting
units themselves. Whereas CERs have near universal fungibility and acceptability
to the regulatory bodies that recognise them as equivalent to AAUs and EUAs, con-
sumers in the voluntary market are much more particular about the provenance of
the VERs they purchase. Section 9.3.4 suggested that consumers discriminate be-
tween standards but it is also the case that they discriminate amongst credits val-
idated to a given standard. This section will discuss how non-uniformity in com-
modity consumption manifests itself and why it may exist at all.
9.4.1. Projects, commodities and stories
In abstract terms, emissions reduction credits are awarded quantitatively to incen-
tivise activities that ought to contribute to climate change mitigation. They do not
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have any inherent materiality but the projects that they are awarded to do. This is
naturally the most obvious and conspicuous aspect of emission trading for individ-
uals and organisations that are not expert or regular market participants. Where
there is a normative motivation to contribute to social and economic development
this must be represented in the projects themselves as standardisation, save for the
Gold Standard, has tended to focus on GHG quantification. For instance, one retailer
who performs no project development described the following criteria for selection:
We only accept VCS and GS. For example, the fact that we don’t adver-
tise, but for the purposes of your anonymous research we don’t take any
projects that are too industrial, we don’t take forestry, we have a prefer-
ence for renewables. Projects need to be able to demonstrate some addi-
tional social, environmental, economic benefits locally at project sites so
we’re interested in local sustainability aspects of the projects. R10
The GHG element is assumed to be assured by the presence of VCS or GS certifi-
cation, then the retailer selects projects according to other criteria. The majority of
UK corporate offsetting is publicised and conveys to a broad audience, that may
include direct customers, regulators and employees, the organisation’s engagement
and commitment to climate mitigation and corporate social responsibility. In dis-
cussions with both retailers and consumers the ”story” conveyed by the projects
that supply credits came up again and again. Although similar, it is worth citing the
variety and multiplicity of ways I was told of the importance of ”story”:
Generally renewable projects are priced at a premium to industrial en-
ergy efficiency projects of the same standard... The way the voluntary
market differs from the regulatory market is that clients want some of
the story around what it is they’re supporting rather than just the com-
modity credit. I think the market is shifting towards a greater acceptance
of commodity stuff, people just want to say that they’ve offset so many
tonnes but generally people want some story to help communicate what
it is that they’re doing. Quite often there is a disconnect between those
projects that have a story associated with them and those stories that
have the most carbon associated with them. R3
What is it easiest to sell? Is it easiest to sell, in the notion to the consumer,
in terms of the sustainability piece some kind of charismatic carbon like
wind in India where you can talk about you know, job creation, renew-
able energy, all this kind of thing, or just some random fungible CER
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that’s come from some HFC project in China or some industrial gases
project. What’s sexier? The sexier ones are the ones that you can talk
about and get into the details of.R10
If you look at the kinds of credits that we sell, the vast majority is stuff
that we’ve generated ourselves through our Nairobi office and there’s
a very good story that goes along with that. Its more than just about
saving carbon its about health benefits, its about social benefits, its saving
people money, its putting people’s living standards up. We can tick a lot
of boxes for clients with those sorts of boxes in a way you’re never going
to do with a typical CER project, industrial gas destruction, power station
energy efficiency. Who cares, I can’t sell that.R8
As a buyer I want to get the best deal and I want to get a guarantee
and I want to get a photogenic project that I can easily explain to my
customers. Which is also why for example we’re also looking at forestry.
Its something I can explain easily to my customers. Buying credits from
methane pig farms in the Philippines is something you really have to
explain to somebody, and then even if you do, they can say why should
I support pig manure in the Philippines?C3
That’s what it’s all about. Its about wanting to tell a story, to say, we un-
derstand climate change is a real issue. We’ve done all the reductions,
and reductions are kind of hard to communicate, but if we finish it off
by going carbon neutral we can talk about some projects we’ve done and
some projects we buy in from elsewhere. There’s something more com-
municable about it, I don’t know why that is. There’s something very
tangible about it.R6
Market participants variously described favoured projects as ”charismatic”, ”sexy”,
”photogenic”, ”tangible” and those that can be ”explained easily”. Conversely, one
retailer had tried to operate as a commodity exchange, providing uniform, reliable
credits at the lowest cost to voluntary consumers. However this model did not suc-
ceed:
We built it as a high volume, low margin model like an exchange. But
voluntary offsetting, the way that it’s different to compliance, that’s not
an appropriate business model for offsetting because the buyers are not
looking for compliance so they are interested in where the project comes
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from so you have to spend a lot more time sourcing the projects. And
the companies that you work with they want a lot of hand holding. The
exchange model that we started with is not the right model. R6
The emphasis placed on communicating storylines may also be one reason why very
few EUAs have been cancelled voluntarily. Arguably, removing allowances from a
strict emissions cap is one of the most reliable means of making a quantified emis-
sions reductions claim, however, very few offset retailers offer this option and up-
take has been low. Only one consumer interviewed had considered EUA retirement
and they immediately mentioned the lack of ”emotional” attachment possible:
We looked at it [retiring EUAs] at the time we were going through all the
possibilities what we were looking for were projects that were relevant
to us and that we could have some sort of emotional attachment to and
EU ETS we were just never going to become that emotionally involved
in(!) I think we’re looking for more out of it than the simple offset. C6
In a fascinating effort to provide this connection, one retailer described buying EUAs
from hospitals and universities and legally contracting assurances from them that
the revenues raised would be invested in emissions reductions. This model is func-
tionally equivalent to Kyoto Joint Implementation and has an additional twist in that
projects may be non-additional and yet still generate tangible savings. Even though
the purchase and cancellation of EUAs have the same ’accounting level’ effects re-
gardless of whose EUAs they are, the retailer I spoke to had tried to create projects
and write additionality into their retirement of EUAs. In this case the retirement
corresponds to an energy saving action, not simply the sale of over allocated hot
air that might otherwise have been used by an over-polluting installation. This case
emphasises the way that the story is attached to a physical project not an immaterial
commodity or instrument. If one assumes a deterministic outcome for the EU ETS,
i.e. that all allowances will be consumed by an installation releasing an equivalent
amount of pollution, then the above developer’s actions are a waste of time and
money. However, it is notable that consumers talk about their offsetting strategy in
terms of the projects that they supported rather than the credits that they bought, for
instance:
We have some wind farms, both in India, a couple of small scale hydro
power, possibly in China. We’ve got one which is a jute mill where they
converted one of their plants to use the left over jute for energy produc-
tion. C6
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As well as the low cost, forestry projects’ appeal rests in the obvious form of ma-
teriality; the tonnes of carbon dioxide sequestered in the standing biomass of the
trees:
We will be able to have a more photogenic project because we can then
communicate to our customers in a more direct way. To put it simply
we could say, “look, this forest, these 100,000 hectares, this is the [our
company] forest” and you can look at it on Google Earth and you can
go and visit it if you like. These are concrete things that I discuss with
these NGOs as a possibility going forward. So it’s something they can
really touch, see, grasp and it’s our project, we’ve adopted this forest this
community around or inside the forest and so on.C3
The converse of the importance of publicity in offset programmes is that there are
potentially negative consequences of being attached to a ”bad news” story. Criti-
cal press reports of failing projects have directly linked consumers to projects, one
story in The Telegraph even going so far as to name a project consumer in the head-
line ”How Coldplay’s Green Hopes Died in the Arid Soil of India” (Dhillon 2006).
Elements over and above the reliability of quantification procedures therefore enter
consumers considerations of offset counterparties. One interviewee even considered
the secondary relationships of the project host:
We have looked at things, with the jute mills, trying to check as far as we
could what the jute was used for, what the energy was used for, to make
sure that the energy wasn’t going to some clothing factory that used child
labour. That was our slight nagging doubt and we check all that to the
extent we can.C6
Acknowledging the reputational risk both in purchasing CERs and VERs, one might
wonder why publicise a ”story” or why offset at all? Indeed, a public offset strategy
is not the norm for UK businesses even if it is by no means unusual. Some of these
issues have already been discussed in section 9.2.
9.4.2. Credit portfolios that spread a story
Exchanges of credits can be classified according to the classes of agent participat-
ing, with a general distinction made between primary, secondary and retail markets
(section 8). The purchasing requirements of end consumers vary in each market
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from the hundreds of thousands of units that large coal powerstation and indus-
trial facilities are using for EU ETS compliance, to fractions of tonnes by individuals
looking to offset flights or events. Similarly projects earning credits vary in produc-
tivity from HFC destruction of the order of millions of units per annum to energy
efficient lightbulb schemes that may only earn hundreds. One consequence of di-
visible, transferable and ’non-perishable’ accounting forms of emissions reduction
units is that these diverse and mismatched scales can be accommodated; there is no
requirement for a ’double coincidence of wants’.
This aspect has significant implications in the voluntary market where the scales
of consumers and producers are often substantially mismatched and occur via an
intermediary. An individual consumer or small business will typically purchase
less than 10 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent units from a retailer, who in turn
will purchase from multiple projects selling to both primary and secondary markets,
spreading costs and risks. They may be offered the option to buy a unit from a
specific project but this is not always the case. Some of the largest retailers, including
in the UK Climate Care, sell only from their ’portfolio’ or projects. This implicitly
treats the units as a uniform commodity. The trend towards ’selling stories’ is by
no means universal. There was and is still demand for ’any old carbon’ from some
consumers, a point made dismissively by one retailer:
What they [the clients] wanted first and foremost was the carbon neutral
brand. This was at the point where discussions were going on about local
projects but they didn’t care whether they were overseas or local. R2
Another retailer recounted an experience from around 2004, early in the develop-
ment of the UK voluntary market:
If you told me 5 years ago that we’d be able to sell carbon from an indus-
trial energy efficiency project to a small business or coal mine methane
flaring to a small business I’d have said the voluntary market will never
take that. I remember in our old office so 4-5 years ago, someone offering
me a million tonnes of landfill gas flaring or energy generation in Egypt
and I just laughed at him and said clearly you’ve got no understanding of
how the voluntary market works. We could have picked up that project
at a dollar a tonne, or less, he’d have taken whatever we would have
given him and now we could sell that, it would go. R3
The ability to sell credits against a standard might be considered the sign of a mature
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market that has developed over time. The same retailer also recognised the useful-
ness of portfolios as a temporary way of selling credits from unpopular but low
cost projects by packaging them with more expensive and more positively received
projects.
This provides us a way of selling stuff which is difficult to sell on its
own. I think that [selling charismatic carbon] it is a temporary thing. As
the market gets more sophisticated and more commoditised, the need
for story element decreases... We’ll put together mix 20% renewables,
20% methane capture, 60% industrial efficiency and charge a combined
price. Then the price will come down. When they want to communicate
about the offset projects that they’re using they can shine the light on the
renewables project and still get the advantage of having a relatively cost
effective portfolio because they’ve got a big chunk of industrial, more
commodity carbon, in there. It’s a way of trying to optimise price and
perceived quality. The carbon quality is the same for all of them because
it’s on the same standard but it’s a communications value around the
project as well.R3
Similarly, a business consumer described how their aspirations to purchase credits
from projects with community benefits could be managed alongside the cost impli-
cations by using a portfolio.
The fourth project I’m looking into now is a pre-reg VER but also a GS
project because we want to up the game gradually and get better and
better. GS has co-benefits but of course they’re more expensive as well.
Now, currently the GS costs me pretty exactly twice as much as the pre-
reg VERs but we build it into an average price, we have a package that
we charge our customer and we feel that makes a lot of sense.C3
Further, a retailer of credits described how they were able to accommodate the
wishes of their customer base, even if that was through questionable biological se-
questration, by providing a mix of projects to fulfill different aspects:
The reason that we still offer UK forestation is because it is a popular
form of offsets. People like it because they can go see it, it’s tangible, a
tree is iconic for people it’s something that still is quite popular. What we
tend to do is if clients are keen on forestation we recommend that it’s a
small part of a balanced portfolio so that the overall vintage period isn’t
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dangerously long. The danger with forestation is that it’s 50 or 100 years
away when we’re being advised to stabilise over the next 4 or 5 years
so we tend to recommend it’s part of a portfolio including much shorter
vintage projects or perhaps 6 years. R8
Buyers and sellers may also have more prosaic reasons for using portfolios. Higher
volume business consumers reported holding an inventory portfolio that helps to
manage volume requirements, cash flow and liability on the buyers’ side. In such
situations credits are purchased periodically and deducted from stock as they are
cancelled to meet emissions output.
Portfolios therefore perform a diverse array of functions, offering the ability to com-
municate multiple storylines to increase perception of quality, reduce the costs of
production, balance temporality, hedge price and reputation risks, and excuse ques-
tionable projects. The common feature, however, is the ability to dislocate perception
and from quantitative commitments. A business may ’shine the light’ on projects
with high social and health benefits to increase positive public perceptions but sub-
stantiate the emissions reductions claim with credits from industrial projects. What
is it about the institutional arrangements that allows this situation to persist? One
consumer remarked how little scrutiny their programme had been put under:
We’ve been asked very little about them. So for the effort we’ve put in,
it’s a little disappointing. It’s one of the areas, where... the message of
carbon neutrality isn’t one we’ve got out there enough. From a purely
commercial perspective you could argue that we could have been a lot
more laissez faire about it and just hoped for the best and we’d probably
have been fine. Saved us a hell of a lot of time and effort, but it wouldn’t
have felt like the right thing to do and I think now that we’ve got this
process to step back from it would feel very wrong. Also, we’re getting
better at it... I think they just don’t know about it. Last survey something
like less than 10% knew we were offsetting. More people understand the
broader picture that we’re “good at this”. C6
This was reiterated by a retailer whose perception of their clients customer base
was that there was a very limited understanding of what constituted carbon neutral
claims:
I think that many of the companies will look at it as a compliance model,
there’s no doubt about that, but my experience with consumer facing
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organisations, when they go to their consumers the consumers don’t un-
derstand the compliance market at all.R6
However, some were at pains to distinguish between the supplementary qualities of
standardised VERs and the core emissions reductions claims that being made:
One of our existing clients that we’re talking to has gone for a portfolio
that only comes 10% from us and 90% from really cheap rubbish shit in
the US and we’ve said at some point you guys are going to get really
shafted. They’re not claiming that it’s carbon neutral, our brand is not
visible there at all. People are going to realise that most of the carbon
you’re selling them is crap and so we are looking to source robust carbon
that is as cheap as we can get it, so VCUs.R3
Given the opacity of many publicly made carbon neutral claims and the sophis-
tication and expertise required to discriminate between them, even where details
are available, there is clearly the opportunity for a certain degree of misdirection.
Nevertheless, the voluntary market receives some degree of expert scrutiny from
journalists, NGOs and trade associations. The ASA, for instance, scrutinised adverts
from an insurance company, ibuyeco, that had purchased a portfolio of credits, a
large proportion of which were deemed to be unsatisfactory and unable to support
the claims of ’carbon neutral driving’ (ASA, 2009). Claims relating to the supple-
mentary benefits of particular projects and the presentation of portfolios have not
been similarly tested and are likely to be even more subjective in their rulings. Busi-
ness consumers are conscious of this but also that many of their key audiences are
not naive. Where other corporates are important clients, their internal expertise and
price sensitivity may put divergent pressures on the type of offset portfolio that they
present, for instance:
It also depends how you look at our customers because when you sur-
vey its individuals but a reasonable proportion of our customer base is
large corporate customers, and whilst the individuals travelling within
that corporate might not know it, if the travel manager that’s making
that purchase decision knows and you’ve actually captured quite a lot of
people. And they tend to be a more educated group on this and an easier
group to work at that level of detail with. Some of them were the ones
that actually prompted us to look at this in the first place.C6
Then if I talk to the majority, them being large corporations I don’t talk to
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the CEO and say this offsetting is a good thing to do, I talk to the travel
department and these guys compare us and look at the market, and these
guys will challenge me and I really have to build a strong business case
of why I’m charging them for this. At the end of the day it’s all volun-
tary because the client could decide to [travel] with someone else who’s
cheaper. C3
These dynamics towards and away from uniform commodity carbon, expressed in
the contradictory growth of offset portfolios and creation of ’charismatic carbon’, are
suggestive of a Polanyian double movement. This will be discussed at length in the
following chapter.
9.5. Summary
Individuals and organisations could coordinate their climate mitigation activities
in many conceivable ways. Even just considering market exchanges there could be
substantial diversity in contractual terms and the parties involved. Bilateral commit-
ments are the simplest relationships but there are many physical and institutional
obstacles to their flourishing. This chapter has described how in a novel arena, uni-
form contracts for accounting units representing material quantified emissions have
come to predominate and stabilised by a number of non-market, co-ordinating insti-
tutions.
As in Chapter 6, carbon crediting is best seen as an empirically variable institution
with a range of possible configurations. There is potential variability in the types
of commitments made between agents, the agents themselves and the timing of the
commitments. The CDM is but one set of procedures that does not absolutely and
unequivocally define emissions reductions. Whilst it is possible for retailers to vol-
untary consumers to offer different arrangements it seems that the majority favour
standardisation close to the CDM model of ’real, additional, verifiable’ credits that
are rhetorically positioned as material commodities.
One distinct feature of this commodity model is the act of fixing emissions fluxes to
specific agents at specific locations over specific time periods to define both liabilities
and credits, as outlined in chapters 6 and 7. As a result, the act of calculating emis-
sions liabilities is a necessity for those engaging in voluntary transactions. Indeed
this has become a substantial economic activity in its own right, a point repeatedly
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made by interviewees on both buy and sell sides and outlined in section 9.2. How-
ever, whilst heralded as contributing to ’carbon literacy’ there is little evidence that
these calculations either promote direct emissions reductions or conversely legit-
imise high emissions lifestyles and business models by encouraging all sources of
emissions to be seen as equivalent.
There is no single instrument of exchange with a common property registry as in the
CDM, so from an IEP perspective one must ask what is the basis of the economic
exchange or if not, are these institutions of a different economic kind. It is observed
that some standards require credits to be logged in a registry which provides ac-
counting units over which to hold property rights but without regulated cancella-
tion or surrender, consumption claims remain direct relations between buyer and
retailer, retailer and project host. These registries do not offer complete coverage
and are not always coherent with state emissions accounting regimes, leading to the
possibility of double counting. As the performance of voluntary market retailers
and their contracts remain untested in the courts, consumers may be vulnerable to
a fraud whose consequences they do not feel. This asks an interesting question of
Polanyi’s economic anthropology; can the voluntary market be regarded as an ex-
change institution if property is not defined or enforced? The economic resources
supplied by voluntary credit consumers are not made in exchange for a material en-
tity and may not confer them any formal rights. In this respect, the offsetting might
be better understood as a redistributive process (p77) with the combined complex of
the retailer, offset standard and project developer acting a redistributive centre. The
offset consumer is not seen to be an agent in the allocation of the economic resource
as they have little ability to control the final destination. However, the provision of
resources to the centre is not mandatory, nor integrative, nor governed by a pow-
erful social norm. It is therefore more appropriate to consider the particularities of
an institution that is broadly exchange based through the IEP framework, noting the
particular aspects and their economic implications.
Increasingly voluntary standards that provide a degree of regularity and equiva-
lence. They allow individual projects and credits to be tested against wider stan-
dards, and are themselves open to scrutiny. In the UK, the government has cho-
sen to exclude the most widely used standard, the VCS, from its Quality Assurance
Scheme although it is accepted as the basis of marketing claims and appears to be
becoming the de facto basic standard in the UK and USA (Hamilton, 2009).
Much of the motivation for consumption is associated with normative agenda of ’do-
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ing your bit’ to fight climate change or contribute to international development. Cor-
porate purchases of offset credits are also often accompanied by public claims. With-
out a regulatory body to receive credits or specify eligible projects, there is greater
potential variation in projects in the voluntary market. It might also be expected
that preferences for projects with non GHG co-benefits to their host communities
would be incentivised as they would make for more positive and appealing public-
ity. However, it appears that many consumers purchase from a portfolio including
much less appealing industrial and agricultural projects. Despite the promise of
delivering a raft of high quality schemes and the aspirations and claims of many
consumers to support such projects, fewer as a proportion of total credits, are be-
ing delivered over time. Many worthwhile projects, with more robust additionality
claims and more stringent screens for community benefit could be delivered were
consumers prepared to pay for them. Although the Gold Standard which provides
the best indicator of this commitment is used more in the voluntary market than
in the CDM7, it appears that the success of standards in producing credible credits
with consistent, if not stringent, quantification protocols is that price competition is
driving voluntary credit production to look very much like the CDM, minus HFC
and N2O projects (Corbera et al., 2009).
The IEP theorisation suggests that beyond the day to day matters of climate policy
there are dynamics common to other instances of market genesis. As in the case
of second generation mobile telephony described by Mina (2003), the mainstream
economic concepts of competition, atomised participants and utility maximisation
are clearly not responsible for the development and operation of voluntary carbon
market exchange institutions. However, unlike in the telephony case the state is not
proving strongly influential in the creation of the market and the setting of stan-
dards. In summary, this chapter has described the contradictory processes of stan-
dardisation and product differentiation, audit and economic efficiency.
7 High quality volume data for the voluntary market are not available but the 2009 NCF survey
recorded 12% of transactions in the voluntary market in 2008 to be GS validated. The Feb 2009
CDM Pipeline reports just 3,028,000 GS CERs are anticipated by 2012 out of a total of 2,910,925,000
(0.10%). Although the two figures are different measures of market activity, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the GS has less prominence in the compliance market by volume.
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10. Discussion
This chapter attempts to synthesise the information and arguments presented in the
preceding chapters that outlined and evaluated the institutions enabling a trade in
emissions reductions credits. There is considerable detail presented in these chap-
ters, which is important not only to provide the reader with guidance through a
complicated topic but has also been necessary for the author to elucidate the tenden-
cies within the institutions.
Chapter 3 outlined a neo-Polanyian analytical framework that assists in compre-
hending carbon credit exchange and introduced concepts that are absent from both
mainstream economic theory and the ANT economic sociology that have been promi-
nent in this field. These concepts and areas of analytical emphasis include i) substan-
tive economics and the specificity of economic processes, ii) institutional context of
exchange relations, iii) the organisation of exchange and dynamic processes that cre-
ate the conditions for economic exchange, iv) non-market economic flows and v) the
Polanyian concepts of fictitious commodities and the double movement. The ana-
lytical value of these concepts in relation to carbon credit institutions is discussed in
turn and the utility of the IEP framework as a whole is appraised.
10.1. Substantive economics and the identification of
specifically economic processes
The substantive approach to economics focuses on the empirical economy, a soci-
ety’s processes of material provisioning, rather than reducing economic analysis to
a logical calculation. The series of conclusions drawn in this chapter each in their
way arise from taking a substantive approach. For instance, scarcity is a founda-
tional concept in neoclassical economics but I discuss in sections 10.2 and 10.3 how
this is contingent and institutionally determined. However, I will focus firstly on the
flawed assumption of the efficiency of carbon credit exchanges.
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The primary rationale for market based instruments in environmental policy is that
they promote this calculative process, however, the evidence presented in chapter 7
shows that there are significant problems with this approach. Were one to consider
the CDM purely through the lens of mainstream economics then marginal abatement
cost (MAC) harmonisation would be the primary rationale to support the exchange
of credits, with the ultimate objective of correcting a market failure at least cost. It is
not trivial to empirically demonstrate that a given project supported by a crediting
transaction is either contributing to allocative efficiency or is one of the most cost ef-
fective projects that could be undertaken. In order to demonstrate optimal allocation
one would need to show that in turn, each project supported is the next most cost
effective possibility in both the host and donor economy. This also requires a metric
against which to make that assessment, for example incremental cost which is the
cost of making an investment in an activity with lower emissions than the baseline
case (Jackson et al., 2001, p39).
The argument that the market type mechanism automatically performs the ideal
calculus, at a lower cost than alternative interventions, is substantially related to the
type of economic theory one adopts. Even within the neoclassical framework there
is recognition of the presence of manifold visible and hidden subsidies, distortions,
market structure imperfections and information problems that agents in the actual
economy are faced with and thus make the determination of efficiency a fraught and
subjective task. Sections 7.1 and 8.1 clearly demonstrated that each CDM project
may involve a myriad of financial backers and economic influences. The research in
chapter 8 also shows that there is not just one market for credits but that they move
through a series of different types of exchanges between different kinds of economic
agent.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the substantivist approach recognises the speci-
ficity of economic activity. That is to say, while the empirical economy is variously
associated with social and political activity, the core processes of production, con-
sumption, exchange and distribution can be discerned. For example, carbon credit
institutions might be interpreted as social practices of ethical consumerism or the po-
litical actions of government to regulate industry, however, the substantivist frame-
work identifies their specifically economic aspects. This has formed the basis of the
organisation of the empirical material. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 discuss the three of the
core economic processes Polanyi identifies; distribution was set aside because it oc-
curs simultaneously with exchange for immaterial entities like carbon credits.
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10.2. Institutional context of economic relations
Having recognised carbon credit exchange as economic, methodologically this thesis
has set aside idealised formal analysis. The empirical work has shown that the insti-
tutedness of credit relations in international governance regimes, consisting of both
state and non-state classes of agent, shapes the economic activity of credit exchange.
Conversely, credit exchange is one aspect of these novel institutions that shape other
economic activities.
Firstly, constructing and operating the projects that earn credits requires financial
resources substantially beyond those generated through CER sales. In raising these
funds project developers turn to IRR calculations and therefore pit mitigation projects
against other investment options and weigh up the risks and potential returns or in
China’s exceptional case, consider the benchmark for rate of return set by the state
(Schroeder, 2009b). Research that focuses solely on technical, engineering or socio-
political aspects of mitigation potential and costs misses a very substantial part of
the incentives and actual governance of mitigation by the CDM. ’Cheap carbon’ is
not only a feature of the technology involved, although industrial gas projects il-
lustrate how that can be relevant, but also of national economic circumstance. Sim-
ilarly, those countries and regions with rapid industrial expansion, stable govern-
ments and high rates of economic growth will find it easy to attract CDM invest-
ment whether warranted or not. China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea have
delivered 92.1% of CERs and host 76% of projects (CDM Pipeline May 2010). They
each have stable, growing economies with feed in tariffs, preferential taxation, pub-
lic investment and renewable energy subsidies applicable to many project types. It
is clear that LDCs and countries without well developed capital markets and public
investment in the economy will struggle to compete for CER funds. Much of the
geographically uneven outcome of the CDM is due to prevailing national economic
conditions, a point clearly identified by taking the IEP approach to exchange ( 3.2 on
page 87).
Secondly, despite being predominantly determined by market exchange, the pCER
price floor set by Chinese DNA prevents a competitive equilibrium price developing
and increases scarcity rent. Without this intervention it is possible that lower prices
may, counter to mainstream theory, have reduced total volume due to uncertainty
associated with volatility at the outset of a market. Aside from this intervention, it
appears that many other project host parties and companies are unwilling to trade
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at less than €6 per CER as the investment in a DNA for the host government, and
search, legal and other transaction costs for the selling company are not viable at
lower prices (Degouve, 2007).
Thirdly, additionality requirements create an important interaction between the CDM
and national environmental regulation. There were early concerns that the CDM
would provide a disincentive for Non-Annex I governments to pass environmen-
tally progressive regulation. Were low emissions technologies to be mandated or
financially supported then additionality demonstration becomes more difficult. In
2005 the EB issued guidance intended to reduce these concerns stating that only reg-
ulations that favour low emissions development passed before the adoption of the
Marrakesh Accords should be considered in the business as usual baseline. Any
subsequent legislative requirements ought to be disregarded by DOEs validating
projects (EB22 Annex 3). Although intended to remove a perverse incentive, this
judgement creates the peculiar situation of projects entering the CDM not being
judged against their host country’s operational environmental standards.
10.3. The organisation of exchange and dynamic
processes of commodification
Randles & Harvey (2002) provide the framework used in this thesis to approach the
organisation of exchange and processes of commodification. Chapter 7 shows how
the entities that are exchanged, property rights over GHG emissions or reductions,
have no a priori form, and only exist as an instituted set of calculative procedures
and relationships between classes of agents within the compliance and voluntary
markets. It is revealing of the commodity form of credits, the variety of organisations
that participate in the production and audit of credits, and the importance of state
agents in setting the terms of trade and the type of activities that are eligible to earn
credits.
The market exchange between economic agents acts in subtle, immaterial ways, but
nonetheless with material consequences. Talk of commodification, may to some
extent over emphasise the materiality by associating the instruments of exchange
with physical quantities of GHGs. The grey literature and policy literature are re-
plete with references to ’carbon commodities’ and ’tonnes of carbon’. As Castree
(2003) clearly summarises, all commodification processes are multifaceted and all
248
10.3. The organisation of exchange and processes of commodification
commodities exist as a bundle of social relations, but the in the case of carbon trad-
ing institutions there are no physical entities directly changing place or changing
hands at all. The new institutions created are closer to monetary systems that enable
economic exchange. They also contribute to new motivations and social dynamics,
as Marx articulated in his presentation of the M-C-M’ circuit of accumulation.
As credits are produced by fiat rather than manufacture, the authority to issue cred-
its is central to the institution. In this sense it is worth noting that credit-based
systems align more closely to traditional ‘command and control’ policies than al-
lowance systems (Ellerman, 2005a). Credibility is the major determinate of value
within credit exchange institutions and its origin differs substantially between com-
pliance and voluntary regimes. The IEP framework captures these dynamics and
relates them directly to the economic process in a way that other frameworks do
not.
Further, project level abatement decisions, i.e. what to build, when and where, are
primarily governed by broader economic circumstances and by the terms and con-
ditions of the regime authority rather than the price of the credits within the market
(section 7.1). In fact, no measurement of emissions need occur in a credit regime,
the regulator may choose to grant credits on the basis of standalone policy or the
presence of investment so long as confidence is maintained in the regime (Ellerman,
2005). This feature is at the heart of debates about the effectiveness and environmen-
tal integrity of project-based credits. What is at stake is the correspondence between
the social institutions of the trading regime, the quotas and property rights, and the
material flows of pollutants over time. The same criticisms also hold in respect of
cap and trade schemes and is often overlooked. The level of the cap determines the
physical implications of each traded instrument and there is not necessarily a one to
one correlation with material units of greenhouse gas emissions.
Credit generating projects are always situated within wider economic systems, see
figure 8.2 on page 200, and this means that commodity form will remain problematic.
Problems of spatial and temporal leakage, as raised in the case of N2O and HFC
projects or rebound from energy savings, section 7.2.2, cannot be entirely eliminated
as complex social systems are indeterminate in the long term. Credits are just one
economic institution that influences project host economic activity and greenhouse
gas output. As such claims that credits are exactly equivalent to material tonnes of
emissions are logically insupportable.
Grubb’s paradox, raised in section 7.1 on page 153, goes to the heart of the dif-
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ficulties of using this kind of market mechanism to deliver quantified emissions
reductions and why assumptions of unequivocal commodities are inappropriate.
By all accounts there are a great many low emissions actions and policies that are
’economically-no-regret’ (ENR) but which are not being done for one reason or an-
other. They therefore offer the possibility of very cheap ’reductions’ in any institu-
tion that attempts to stimulate low carbon development through crediting. If per-
fect market assumptions held then none of the many possible projects at negative
marginal abatement costs, i.e. projects whose implementation generates net eco-
nomic benefits for their operators, would exist. However, given that they do, price
competition would suggest that they will be identified, credited and consumed first,
but with a very substantial risk of some being business as usual activities. There
is no way to determine unequivocally associate the initiation of a particular project
with the sale of particular credits. Alternatively if they are screened out of crediting
through the use of stringent financial additionality criteria so that only ’economic
regret’ projects remain then the costs of credits will be raised and the rationale for
instituting a market substantially weakened. Confident determination of the ENR–
ER boundary will likely only get harder as time goes by as national and international
policies and norms change and the price of fossil fuels increases (Carbon Trust and
Climate Strategies, 2009, p58).
Energy efficiency interventions in buildings and transport are thought to present
substantial low or negative cost mitigation possibilities that are persistently over-
looked in economies around the world (Enkvist et al., 2007). However, there are very
few credit financed projects that address these areas (see 7.1 on page 151) because
of the institutional structure of CDM and for many of the same reasons that these
changes are not being conducted under ’business as usual’. The site specific notion
of ’the project’ does not adequately correlate with the pattern and types of change
that are required in these sectors, upfront capital requirements may be very high,
infrastructure and planning considerations substantial, and the widely distributed
nature of inefficient homes and vehicles make calculation difficult and monitoring
very expensive. The ENR aspects of these interventions also means that market leak-
age may be expected to be substantial, increasing emissions in diverse, distributed
and difficult to measure ways.
However, this additionality paradox is clearly less significant in the case of indus-
trial and fugitive gas projects which present their hosts with no financial return aside
from that earned through credits. Yet, here there are other political institutions at
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work or national political norms of pollution regulation. For instance, HFCs could
be regulated by the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987), a political regime that has contributed substantially more to climate change
mitigation than the Kyoto Protocol (Molina et al., 2009). The IEP framework takes
the social and political embeddedness of economic institutions as a starting point
rather than working from an assumption of atomised individual action that would
be blind to such considerations. Additionality can therefore be seen as a weak con-
cept overall, and not just a problem of determination.
It is also clear that crediting systems do not meet with the new institutional eco-
nomics ideals of simplistic property rights and institutions that realise low transac-
tion costs. The most striking feature of emissions reduction crediting is the complex-
ity and ambiguity in the definition and allocation of the commodities. However,
their operation is eminently possible and sufficiently stable to allow considerable
resource flows. Section 7.3 illustrated the substantial transaction and audit costs re-
lated to the production of credible, fungible instrument that are borne by the compli-
ance market but these are not sufficient to impede high volumes and are in any case
dwarfed by the rents and speculative gains that are realised by project developers
(see page 152) and in secondary transactions (section 8.2).
Finally, by looking to the organisation of exchange a notable geographic element of
the CDM’s transaction costs can be demonstrated. Financial intermediaries, consul-
tants and DOEs are almost exclusively based in Annex 1 countries and so economic
revenues from their activity remain in richer nations. This is an empirical rather
than theoretical criticism but a rather substantial one. Whilst there is a case for sup-
port by way of grants for CDM host countries to develop unilateral projects and
capacity in auditing and project development to reduce and retain transaction costs
(Michaelowa, 2006a) it is arguable that ODA would be better spent directly imple-
menting development projects rather than supporting lower mitigation costs for rich
nations.
10.4. Market and non-market economic flows
Despite the issues outlined above, the CDM’s rules for production of CERs have
been sufficiently stable to enable economic flows governed by market exchange and
motivated by private gain. The primary CDM market, section 8.1, fits Aristotle’s
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conception of chrematistic activity with credits only ever produced for exchange be-
tween parties; those who produce them have no direct use for them, by definition
under the UNFCCC. This exchange indicates a flow of financial resources from a
class of organisations or states who wish to increase their output of emissions to
class of existing polluters who can demonstrate reductions. As there are a host of
institutional risks and variables, gain motivated developers seek out the most pro-
ductive projects with a high rate of return on investment. These are the projects
hosted by the most intense polluters, the HFC and N2O manufacturing facilities and
landfill sites. More broadly it should be no surprise that some CDM projects have
encountered local resistance. This has been initiated by fenceline communities and
environmental justice groups that object to the continuation of economic activity that
is detrimental to local environmental conditions and injurious to health (Lohmann,
2006). Because credits are awarded for changes to existing patterns of pollution,
revenues should be anticipated to flow to a highly polluting class of agents and it
cannot be assumed that climate mitigation will also reduce the other ’externalities’
that such agents impose in their locality.
Primary CDM market flows also generate a secondary, material effect. CER produc-
tion is to a large extent associated with industrial gases, however, they are consumed
in the EU ETS, which principally influences emissions of CO21. There is therefore an
exchange in the qualitative type of gases entering the atmosphere, not only the loca-
tion and timing of their source. CO2 emissions will increase in Europe as the CDM
reduces methane, N2O and HFCs in Asia and South America.
IEP also helps to identify some surprising yet influential non market economic
flows. Section 8.4 details the carbon credit specific flows, namely CDM fees, the
SOP-Adaptation levy, registry fees and DNA fees and the general national taxation
regimes that apply to credits generating projects as a matter of course. In financial
terms, the Chinese taxes on industrial gas CERs have generated the greatest funds.
Flows such as these may to some extent explain the lack of will for DNAs to set strict
sustainability criteria when screening projects.
However, the most significant influence of non-market economic flows is exerted
by state taxation and energy pricing. Projects are necessarily set in wider economic
circumstances and the state may be a key influence on the incentives that result. For
1 Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) allows nations to voluntarily opt in N2O from point
source industrial installations to Phase 2. As of October 2010 Austria, The Netherlands and Norway
had done so (DECC 2010).
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instance the tax laws and renewable electricity price guarantees of a state are seen
to have more influence on a CDM project’s additionality than the presence of ab-
sence of carbon finance (p152). In this way, non-market economics relates to each
of the previous conceptual points outlined in this chapter; the importance of insti-
tutional context of economic activity, the contingency of commodification and the
significance of overlapping economic relations.
10.5. The Polanyian concepts of fictitious commodities
and the double movement
The concepts of fictitious commodities and the double movement are two of Polanyi’s
most referenced contributions to political economic scholarship. As discussed in
chapter 3 they offer both analytical and normative perspectives on the relationship
between integrative market exchange, society and nature. Voluntary and compli-
ance carbon markets illustrate and ambiguities of both concepts in their original
form and provide empirical detail to support an IEP interpretation.
Briefly to recap, Polanyi describes land, labour and money as fictitious commodi-
ties as, in market societies, they enter economic processes through market exchange,
even though they are not originally ’produced for sale’. Nonetheless, Polanyi docu-
ments a tendency within market societies to expand the scope and depth of market
relations. He argues that the consequences of this are social and ecological instabil-
ities that invoke a societal response to reform or remove the market institution. It is
this that is referred to as the double movement.
It is possible to see early indications that Polanyi’s concerns around the creation of
fictitious commodities may come to pass in carbon trading institutions. GHG emis-
sions can be quantified and recorded as units of account in national emissions in-
ventories, organisational environmental management strategies or personal carbon
footprints without becoming units of exchange. It is quite a different institutional
matter to enable exchange of such units, or create new units not founded on emis-
sions output but on supposed reductions. Whilst credits are ’produced for sale’ they
are property rights over units of account, and not the underlying entity, a stable and
favourable climate. Like money, the units exchanged in emissions trading regimes
are politico-economic institutions, not material objects. As such they are vulnerable
to the decisions made by bureaucracies, a point that is acutely felt by compliance
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market participants. Millions of dollars hinge on the acceptability to the European
Commission of industrial gas CERs for use in the EU ETS, and similarly on the ad-
ditionality arguments accepted or rejected by the CDM EB (section 7.1). There is
no evidence so far of social instability but it is not beyond the realms of reason to
suggest that sustained high electricity prices, sparked by a tight EU ETS cap over a
predominantly fossil fuel grid linked to a rapidly growing aviation industry, could
precipitate unrest. In such circumstances it seems most likely that the cap would be
relaxed rather than allow people to go cold or substantially redistribute economic re-
sources through taxation. The political economic impact of emissions trading under
a series of caps sufficiently stringent to decarbonise OECD energy use by 2030 (Bows
et al., 2009) needs to be considered fully before the majority of mitigation policy is
surrendered to market exchange.
Polanyi’s description of the double movement does not go so far as to detail lo-
cal or immediate causative mechanisms. Harvey et al. (2007) interpret the double
movement as a dialectic of regulation and deregulation of economic activity in their
IEP framework. It is the institutionalisation of economic activity that is in ques-
tion, so the tendency to market deregulation is not a matter of separation or ’dis-
embedding’ of the economy from society. In the opposite direction, IEP extends the
double movement by presenting three possibilities for the causation of regulation;
social protection by the state, strategic construction of the conditions for market ac-
tivity by market participants and state led market construction towards a particular
goal.
This framework suggests a number of ways that different aspects of carbon credit
institutions can be interpreted. Firstly, climate change could be seen as an economic
externality and that compliance credit institutions are an attempt by a coalition of
nation states to reform the market economic system to address this danger. How-
ever, the active role of nation states and non-state actors in the design and operation
of the exchange institutions (section 6.2) suggests that it is an expansion of market
relations in the interests of multiple classes of economic agents that are driving this
agenda. Where there have been criticisms of the efficacy of CDM, reform has been
to minor procedural details, such as incentives for the participation of LDCs, rather
than to the structure of the institution.
Secondly, a double movement of social protection may be seen within the supple-
mentary certification schemes, such as the Gold Standard, that recognise failings in
the CDM and voluntary market. Despite clear and thorough institutional arrange-
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ment there has been limited material penetration of such schemes. It is proposed
that their failure to be adopted by compliance regimes, has left them as little more
than an ethical smokescreen for other less benign projects. Indeed, the empirical
evidence from the voluntary market, presented in section 9.4.2, suggests that com-
bined portfolios of supplemented and basic credits are used to increase credibility
and prestige at minimum cost.
Thirdly, section 9.3.1 describes efforts to increase the credibility of both the produc-
tion and consumption of carbon credits by various classes of agent in the volun-
tary market. The VCS for instance, promotes itself as being a basic standard that
identifies carbon reductions that can be exchanged and consumed as equivalent to
emissions. It does not claim to provide any local, community or ecological bene-
fits like other standards, but has become the most widely used voluntary standard
and has good recognition with the corporate consumers that represent the bulk of
the demand for voluntary credits. However, whilst promoters of standards appeal
to the possibility of certification providing unambiguous carbon commodities, it is
clear that there are differences in stringency of crediting criteria and quality assur-
ance procedures between the standards available. Interviews with producers and
consumers show how both parties make efforts to identify specific projects, and the
’stories’ that they can communicate, looking beyond the simple quantity of cred-
its. This ’conspicuous production’, detailed in section 9.4, is a pronounced feature
of the voluntary market in contrast to the consumption of uniform commodities in
compliance regimes. There is simultaneously a tendency to standardise the units of
exchange to increase volumes, reduce costs and maximise economic gain for par-
ticipants but also a corresponding response from market participants to know the
origin and some aspects of the conditions of production of the credits they purchase.
Again, it may appear that a double movement of some sort is occurring, however,
the details are not captured in a simple explanation of expansion and consequent
retreat of market institutions. It is here that the IEP approach, recognising the par-
ticularities of the exchange institutions offers a more subtle explanation. This exam-
ple appears to reveal a tension in the process of instituting immaterial commodities
where the qualities of the commodity are not familiar or readily verifiable to the
consumer. In order to promote exchange activity, the retail class of agents enriches
commodities by over-writing their uniformity and enlisting the credibility of third
parties such as environmental NGOs.
Considering both fictitious commodities and the double movement, it is clear that
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the original Polanyian concepts are useful starting points for analysis but leave per-
sistent ambiguities in this case. Although, the IEP approach retreats from macro
scale grand historical causation it provides additional insights and analytical guid-
ance.
10.6. Appraisal of IEP framework
The above sections have shown how the IEP framework has revealed insights into
the process of instituting markets for carbon credits. It has drawn attention to a num-
ber of difficulties in the definition of emissions reduction credits and then related
these to the economic systems within which the classes of agents that participate in
the institution are situated. However, whilst the IEP framework is methodologically
useful in identifying the structure and operation of economic systems, it offers few
specific causative mechanisms or hypotheses to test against empirical findings. Fur-
ther, unlike Marxian analyses of commodification it provides little sense of repeated
and historic regularities in formatting for exchange.
At the macro social scale, Marx and Polanyi presented explanations for large scale
trends in Capital and The Great Transformation, although recent scholarship is reluc-
tant to follow them (Castree, 2008a and 2008b). Nonetheless, Castree (2003) outlines
six features of capitalist commodification identified as regularities within the ’com-
modification of nature’ literature; privatization, alienability, individuation, abstrac-
tion, valuation and displacement each of which might be identified in the foregoing
carbon credits case. Applying this approach might provide further insights into car-
bon markets and also contribute to discerning the general tendencies of capitalist
processes by comparison with cases from, for example, forestry (Prudham, 2004),
fisheries (Mansfield, 2004) and mining (Bridge, 2002). However, Marxian commod-
ification fails to capture broader and diverse institutional features such as multiple
markets, non market economic flows, and peculiar dynamics and incentives such as
found in HFC baseline manipulation and N2O market effects. These features may
have been overlooked without the IEP framework.
Finally, Polanyi’s original concepts of the double movement and fictitious commodi-
ties, have proved ambiguous in this case. Neither directs the analysts attention to
the supporting non-economic relationships between economic agents that are either
necessary for exchange to take place or arise as a response to the instabilities of ’pure’
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market exchange. It is here that the IEP framework provides a useful extension, for
instance in comprehending the additional standards and ’stories’ that overlay CDM
and voluntary market credits.
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11. Conclusion
The Clean Development Mechanism has exceeded the expectations of many busi-
ness and policy elites who at the signing of the Kyoto Protocol had little idea of the
scale it would reach in the decade following. Billions of dollars have been invested
in the credits that are exchanged and the projects which generate them. Despite
substantial criticism from civil society groups, academics and some quarters of the
business community, it has persisted and grown in scope and size even if at a lower
rate since the 2008 financial crisis and the uncertain outcome of the COP15 at Copen-
hagen in 2009. The CDM bureaucracy itself continues to grow and with negotiations
for new crediting mechanisms post 2012 appears to be an established and impor-
tant part of the international climate regime. It is difficult to quantitatively estimate
voluntary sales of emissions reductions credits, for the reasons outlined in chapter
9, but surveys suggest it has slowed dramatically in 2009 from exponential rises in
volume in preceding years. The main third party standards bodies have continued
to register new projects and new methodologies and lobbied for accreditation with
regulated bodies in new trading regimes in the USA, Australia and New Zealand.
Carbon markets appear to be a persistent policy innovation.
The theoretical analysis presented in Part II provided substantial principled reasons
to be sceptical of the prospects for mainstream economic theory to provide policy
proposals that were both analytically consistent and contributed to concrete human
well being. Critics of the approach contend that it is not the absence or failure of mar-
kets that causes environmental problems but rather the inappropriate extension of
market norms (O’Neill, 2007). Price mechanisms may be unjust and regressive, lim-
iting access to goods or influence for poorer members of society in what ought to be
political matters (Lohmann 2006). The Coasean body of theory removes the proper
moral stigma attached to acts of pollution, and individuated, economic transactions
lack a sense of collective endeavour or sacrifice necessary for social transformation
(Sandel, 1997). The socio-technical systems that drive greenhouse gas emissions are
typically associated with long lived infrastructures and habits and there are accusa-
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tions that the marginal logic of carbon trading may not incentivise innovation, long
term planning or radical change and, indeed, it may enable further lock-in to highly
polluting infrastructure (Unruh, 2000; Driesen, 2008).
The mainstream economics framework has limited analytical purchase on the matter
of emissions credit instruments because so many of the formal assumptions on the
structure of markets and action of agents are violated. For example, nation states are
key agents in the process of defining, enforcing and participating in the institutions,
theoretically and empirically. For a host of reasons, their actions cannot be described
in instrumentalist atomized terms. Alternative economic frameworks that have con-
tributed to the development of credit institutions highlight this. Public choice the-
ory pays attention to possible welfare losses from government failure. In consid-
ering firms’ interactions between themselves and with households and the state,
new institutional economics suggests that the efficacy of actual alternative institu-
tional arrangements may differ because of transaction costs absent from neoclassical
theory. The Austrian perspective rejects market optimality and symmetrically mar-
ket failure, so justifications cannot be made by reference to an ideal allocation but
invokes benefits of autonomy and the putative calculative and information aggre-
gating properties of market coordination. Because of the scale and inseparability of
normative issues from climate change policy and analysis, positivist economics is
analytically problematic and ideologically naive.
For all the libertarian rhetoric of neoliberal reforms, the role of the state and gov-
ernment is still central to governance and whilst Robbins accents scarcity and choice
in markets, the implicit goal is the maximisation of the circulation of goods and
services as commodities (Bromley, 1990, p91). The extent to which the underlying
dynamics of capitalist economies are substantially altered by new modes of gover-
nance is questionable. Within the realm of environmental governance, the majority
of efforts at ’sustainable development’ adhere to the reformist notion of economic
growth with ecological modernisation. Patterson (2009) argues that this is not to say
it is, just, a smokescreen; indeed it may be closer to a raw growth tendency where
improvements in human welfare can only be conceived of in terms of expanding
the economy. Ecological degradation is genuinely considered, but as a problem to
be managed so that maximised growth might address poverty alleviation, problems
of malnutrition, lack of access to clean water and all manner of insults to human
dignity, within a broadly capitalist social order. This is especially conspicuous in
the development of market based instruments (MBIs) to achieve particular social or
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Nevertheless, the empirical material in Part III has shown that the exchange of emis-
sions reductions has been effectively instituted and shows a number of objective
stable features. Quantification and assurance procedures are in place and widely
accepted by market participants. Model contracts are available and market partici-
pants have become arranged into a constellation of economic agents that produce,
exchange and consume emissions reductions credits. The 407 million CERs that had
been issued by the CDM by May 2010 are anticipated to be joined by another 600
million before the close of the Kyoto compliance period in 2012, generated by over
2100 registered projects. Each CER can be redeemed for an increase in allowable
emissions by the nation states, public and private sector organisations that purchase
them, predominantly large industrial plants and power stations in the European
Union. The demonstrable economic consequences of the mechanism are to transfer
finances from EU electricity purchasers and industrial manufacturers to consulting
organisations that provide CDM project development services and the financiers
that back them. A proportion remains with the owners of polluting infrastructure
in NAI states and host governments, almost entirely China, India, Brazil, Mexico
and South Korea. Emissions undoubtedly increase in the consuming nation, but as
illustrated in chapter 7, the quantification and quality assurance mechanisms that
are meant to ensure correspondence between the units of exchange and material
quantities of greenhouse gases are fundamentally flawed. Because of the ambigu-
ities in the crediting process and the definition against a counterfactual model, it
is simply not credible to claim that credits could have a 100% guarantee of being
”real, additional, verified” reductions. That is not to say that the all transactions are
fraudulent or false, but rather that it is a logical impossibility to accurately measure
the absence of pollution from a business as usual baseline. Those projects that were
genuinely incentivised by finance from CER sales may indeed contribute to climate
stabilisation but it is not possible to quantify this with any certainty when they are
embedded in other economic flows (see 7.2.2 on page 159). Further, determining
additionality is a matter of subjective judgement not a statement of fact. It is too
much to give the the economic agents nominated on the PDDs complete agency so
looking at the institutional incentives surrounding investment in CDM projects it
is clear that the most ”cost effective” i.e. most attractive projects are those that we
are least able to distinguish. Greater robustness could be provided by seeking out
projects that are economically isolated or providing a larger proportion of funding
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to the project from CER sales, however, both of these remedies work against the gain
motives of individual agents and the cost minimising logic of market type institu-
tions. Furthermore, credit exchanges require substantial expert investment and in
voluntary markets where oversight is not mandated to the same degree then it is
likely that there will be questionable approvals. However, in voluntary markets, the
consequences on the consumption side of the exchange are not so clearly defined. It
is not so clear that emissions will necessarily go up as credits are consumed, in the
same way one would see in compliance markets.
I can only speculate as to why the institution persists and continues but would
suggest that it serves the short term political economic ends of the majority of
regime participants. Host states and organisations receive modest revenues, con-
sumer states and organisations reduce their regime compliance costs and producers,
financiers and intermediaries are afforded the opportunity to accrue rents and in-
crease economic activity. The detrimental consequences of the GHG pollution are
translocated spatially and temporally by the climate system so that provided con-
tracts are sufficiently robust and quantification sufficiently credible then exchanges
between parties can continue.
The complexity and opacity of the procedures and methods surely contributes to
this process. I have found research for this project both bewildering, enthralling and
time consuming. As a result the final contribution to knowledge may appear trivial
in relation to the detail provided, or tedious for those steeped in the markets. How-
ever, to get to this stage has taken some considerable investment. I feel this has been
necessary in order to provide a robust critique of some aspects. The depth of so-
phistication of the institutional procedures that contribute to the production of some
CERs is staggering and I have only been able to present a very limited set of illus-
trations in the empirical chapters. Developments in the voluntary market are even
more difficult to appraise for the reason that there are multiple different standards
organisations with their own myriad structures and procedures. This complexity
surely prevents both consumers and regulators from apprehending the full impli-
cations of particular practices and lends a skein of expert respectability through a
vocabulary and conceptual framework that excludes casual scrutiny. Further, this
variety reinforces the notion that exchanges are contingently and variably instituted
and need not conform to a rigid model or pre-existing commodities.
At present extant emissions trading institutions do not appear to offer a high degree
of likelihood of delivering net emissions reductions when the whole supply chain
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from the production of credits to their consumption by a polluter is taken into ac-
count. They would certainly not meet many of the key ecological economic tenets of
strong sustainability, acknowledgement of thermodynamic and material flow lim-
its, recognition of discontinuous and non linear ecological damage functions or the
rejection of a hedonistic account of welfare (Pearce, 2002).
With this thesis I hope I have accomplished a number of tasks. I have provided
an overview of the theoretical rationale for carbon trading and a synthesis of the
critiques of much of its basis. By introducing the neo-Polanyian IEP framework I
hoped to bring some analytical clarity to the complex relations and processes present
in the carbon markets I examined. Further, in operationalising the IEP framework
in a novel setting I hope to contribute to the advancement of this body of theory.
However, it was lacking in some respects, notably the ability to move away from
ideographic descriptions of particular exchange processes. Related to this point it
also lacked other comparator studies. In retrospect, a Marxian commodity analysis
may have better suited some aspects of the study and further time spent integrating
the two may prove fruitful.
Considering climate policy and empirical matters, the study suggests a number of
subsequent avenues that could prove fruitful or be significant with regards to im-
proving the environmental integrity of the institutions. With the advent of registries
for voluntary credits it may be possible to perform comparative analysis of data dis-
closed in PDDs. For example, the proportion of funds contributed to a project by
credit revenue, could be grouped by methodology, standard, and year of origina-
tion, and hence may be revealing of additionality claims. Using similar information
sources, rejected projects could be tracked through sequential submissions to CDM,
GS, VCS and VER+, revealing the boundaries between acceptability and exposing
questionable claims of environmental integrity. Finally, the class of DOEs plays such
a crucial and contested role in the production of credits and credibility that their
activities and performance deserve much greater scrutiny, and studies could theo-
retically contribute to the critical accounting literature.
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